The Junior Officer of the Deck walked to the port side chair, and with the OOD looking over her shoulder started her report, “Captain, JOOD, I have a contact report.”
“Go ahead.”
“Captain, we’re on course 345 at 12 knots. I have a contact twenty degrees right of the bow at 24,000 yards. Contact has a target angle of five degrees left with a slight right to left drift. Closest point of approach is in 20 minutes at 1500 yards off the left beam. Recommend coming right to course 000 to open the CPA.”
The Captain considered this for a long moment with his eyes still closed before asking, “How long until the next launch?”
“Fifteen minutes, sir.”
“And where are the winds?”
“Um. 340, sir,” she replied, reddening slightly, grateful for the darkness. Altering course to starboard would only bring the contact back to the bow when the carrier turned into the wind for the launch.
A long pause: Reflection? Rebuke?
“Call him.”
“Aye-aye, Captain.”
The JOOD walked to the bridge-to-bridge transceiver and gathered her thoughts briefly while grimacing in the darkness: The civilian mariners who ply the waters of the Arabian Gulf are not known for their disciplined use of BTB comms, she reflected, and many of them were inclined to make juvenile and even disgustingly suggestive replies to the sound of an American English-accented, female voice wafting through the ether. It was a feature of life here in the Gulf that the JOOD had accustomed herself to without ever truly forming an appreciation for – sexist pigs, she thought. She waved impatiently aside the momentary desire to pass the mic to the OOD and let him make the call – this was her task.
In his port side chair, the Captain reached his across his chest in the darkness with his right arm, away from prying eyes and pinched the skin above his own ribs hard between thumb and forefinger, trying to become more fully awake. It had been such a long day. Such a long, long series of days. He had become suddenly so very tired with the setting of the sun, a kind of fatigue that had been an almost physical blow – “Boats,” he croaked to the Boatswain’s Mate of the Watch,
“Sir!”
“Get me a cup of coffee, will you?”
“Aye-aye, sir,” replied the bosun, marching off to the starboard side bridge wing.
He must be fully awake – these kinds of interactions occured every night, sometimes as many as a dozen times in a night, and any one of them could go wrong in the blinking of an eye. The ship herself would not be damaged in the least by a collision with one of these wisps of bark of course, but a dhow would be snapped to kindling by the merest brush of the carrier’s hull, taking her crew to the swirling bottom along with the Captain’s own career and the ship’s reputation, inextricably intertwined as the two were. Not for the first time the CO marveled at the apparent carelessness with which the local fishermen sailed these seas in utter darkness in much the same manner as they had for a thousand years or more; no radios, no radars, little in the way of lighting and nothing but the frailest of craft to protect them from the greedy, inrushing Sea. You’d think they’d want to get out of the way of a hundred thousand ton aircraft carrier bearing down on them out of the darkness, lights blazing, warning horn blaring its five short blasts of the hazard alarm, but every night the smaller contacts they would encounter maintained a kind of disinterested passivity, the local habit of fatalism summed up in a word, “inshallah.”
If it be God’s will…
He heard the JOOD speak into the bridge-to-bridge VHF, thought to himself, “She’s a fine officer, will do well,” and wondered briefly how his own daughter was doing back at home, back with her mother in Norfolk. In her middle adolescence, the relationship between the two of them had become strained and striving. He wondered how all of that would turn out, and what part he had to play in it: “Not much, from here.” Back to work.
“Unknown vessel 35 miles southwest of Bushehr, course 190, speed five, this is a United States Navy warship off your port bow for 11 miles. I am currently conducting flight operations and restricted in my ability to maneuver. Request you alter your course to the southeast to maintain a safe distance, over.”
The JOOD unkeyed the mike, awaiting the contact’s improbable reply – none of these little dhows seem to have radios and few that did spoke English – while steeling herself for the inevitable jeering from the bridges of those merchants large enough to have both VHF radios and English-speaking crewmen, or at least, those who spoke a kind of English. These latter were not long in coming, and even while they were the sort of routinely revolting displays of inanity to which she had become accustomed, they were yet the more frustrating given her pressing need to hear some sort of reply from the contact vessel as the range continues to close, to engage in a mutually advantageous contract to avoid a collision. An aircraft carrier is not a frigate, she thought to herself. We cannot turn this thing on a dime, nor stop it at will, and the launch is not so very far away. This ship must be into the wind at launch time. She leaned over the squawk box, selected the watch center of the CO’s Tactical Operations Plot, a darkened radar room just aft of the bridge and spoke into the box, saying, “COTOP, get me a lat/long for Skunk Bravo Echo.”
“COTOP aye.”
She selected a different pushbutton on the squawk box, “Lookouts, Bridge, what have you got on the bow, 005 relative? Should be just hull up.”
“Bridge, lookouts, single white light 005 relative,” and after a pause, “No bearing drift.”
Great: A dhow for sure, constant bearing, decreasing range – collision course. No radio, no radar, no clue and no care. Still there was a form to follow, and COTOP had called back with coordinates of the contact:
“Unknown vessel in vicinity of twenty-eight degrees, forty-two minutes north, fifty degrees, forty-five minutes east, course 190, speed 5 knots, this is a United States Navy warship ten miles off your port bow. I am engaged in flight operations and restricted in my ability to maneuver. Request you contact me on this frequency and alter your course to the southeast to maintain a safe distance, over.”
Unkeyed the mic: Catcalls, hoots, howls, jeers and obscene suggestions. She frowned, thinking, cast a furtive glance at the Captain in his chair. Ten minutes to launch.
Half an hour previously, the FA-18 squadron CO had wrapped up his brief, looking at his wingman, a troubled young aviator in the form of a lieutenant junior grade, one of many such as he had seen either sink or swim in the course of his long career. For the first time now, he was seeing one of these from the uniquely powerful, responsible – and yes, he thought: Accountable – vantage point of command. The squadron CO was in the position now, as his predecessors had been before him, of being quality control, the one man who could and would ultimately decide this young man’s fate. That is, the CO reflected, if he didn’t kill himself first behind the ship. With an encouraging smile on his face but cool evaluation in his eyes he’d said to the young man, “Just about walk time. Ready to get this done?”
The JG had lifted his chin a touch, almost defiantly, while smiling in return – a smile that somehow did not quite make it all the way to his own eyes – and replied, “Yes sir. Let’s do it!”
Now both sat in their turning fighters on the flight deck thinking their private thoughts. Their start, post-start and pre-taxi checklists were complete, and they’d each of them given the thumbs-up to their aircraft directors. The yellow shirts in turn stood patiently in front of the fighters on the cat track, lighted wands crossed in front of them, signaling, “Hold brakes,” and looking aft for the visual signal from the midships Fly-2 petty officer to send their charges aft, back to the waist catapults.
Of the drama playing itself out in slow motion on the bridge, they had no knowledge.
Yay, another installment. Thanks Lex, I know you have more important things to do instead of entertaining me.
Interesting perspective from the female officer, I never would have thought that catcalls, etc. would happen over the radio. Makes sense though from what I have read.
Good stuff!
So I guess the bike (or bicycle) ride worked. It was worth the wait, sir. Left us (me, anyway) with a bit of a nail-biter, you did. I’m thinking that the CO & his young JG are gonna have time for about one quick look-see before somebody has to make a decision. Course I could be completely wrong, too. Either way’s good for me, it’s the waaaaiiiitttt that gets me! Keep it up, Skipper. And have a great week.
Like fine wine, aged cheese and good company, a well written story is worth the wait.
Now we’re going into a night launch sequence with yet another wrinkle. Skipper, you should be giving lessons!
This seems like it would be the perfect thing to have a helo available to go snooping around… and guiding off, if necessary.
Littorals are no place for a carrier. Battles such as The Eastern Solomons to wargames such as Millenium Challenge 2002 has shown this time and again.
If the modern CVW actually had the ability to project power at a decent combat radius maybe “the boat” wouldn’t be forced to operate north of the Hormuz.
Used to be a time the navy was adamantly opposed to doing so.
The very misguided “From The Sea” doctrine which eschewed the need for the “extraordinary” 750nm range that the abortive A-X would have provided was a mistake…a Big mistake.
…But so much for cuddah-shuddah-wuddahs. Ya gotta go with what ya got.
Can’t wait to see how this one pans out. Hope the jg gets past his troubles!
Great stories Captain and thanks for bringing modern NavAir to life.
Sid,
You’re right in that a carrier doesn’t belong in littoral water. In my mind, our Navy needs to seriously reconsider small, fast and well-armed coastal patrol hulls a’la the PT Boats. A combination of LCAC derived fast patrol boats and V-22 aircraft based on floating off-shore bases would answer the immediate need. I’m not sure DDX is the right answer.
What to do with the need to continue inland force projection? As a surface sailor, I suggest bringing back the Iowas and then ‘double dog dare’ the fighters to try and damage them. 16-inch guns firing off a very stable platform make very respectable holes in the ground and 15 inches of class A armor wouldn’t even notice a Cole-style attack.
Cap’n Lex, this does raise another question, what war is NAVAIR planning to fight?
For deep strike, sid, the Navy has two words: Tomahawk.
Wait, that’s one.
The A-12 was a victim of bad timing – it was push technology, not ready yet for maritime play, and came at a time when Congress was getting ulcers over military spending. Didn’t help much that the program managers had permitted continuous change to spec within the contract.
SeniorD – google up the LCS or littoral combat ship. It’ll be on the waterfront next year (2007) and is meant to be the kind of mission flexible, shallow draft sherriff you’re talking about. At low cost, of course, and with minimal manning. I guess we’ll see.
And as for what war we’re planning to fight, well: What do you have on offer?
Because we’re planning on that one too.
Lex- you are one observant dude. I’d hate to have you write my fitrep!
Sid,
We operate in the box because we have since ’90. EMCON? Blue-water? Dino-stuff. All that is secondary to generating sorties for the JFACC.
Yes. Our strikers ARE limited by the range of the primary attack aircraft, the Hornet A,B,C,D, but the effects of those legacies (yes Lex) are hopefully mitigated by the advent of the SuperHornet. Case in point was Strike operations over Afghanistan through 2002. It seems to me we operated invic of old “Gonzo” station(1979-1990). US Naval Air forces made quite an impact generating most of the sorties for those first months after 9-11, mainly because of the range of the Bombcat AND the Navy (S-3) and USAF “bucket brigade” stretched out over Pakistan. Plus,we were fortunate the Taliban did not have a more robust IADS.
Lex is right-on about Tomahawk though, and that is problematic for a dino like me.
Neither “Naval Air”, the Marine Corps, or even the submarine fleet is “expeditionary” in the sense described in that article posted Lex posted last week about “The Bridges at Toko-Ri”. No, now we chop sorties (air defense, attack, etc.) to the Joint Air Commander. Much as it pains me to report, the BattleGroup Commander is little more than a resource coordinator to provide same. The only sorties he controls are self-defense and logistics. Chester Nimitz operating as CINC in the Pacific taking and holding territory is a thing of the past. CENTCOM has total OPCON as warfighter.
SeniorD- I can assure you “NAVAIR” is fighting the “war” of LeanSixSigma and AirSpeed for the NAE. It’ll be a long campaign. On a more serious note, you may get your wish on small craft. Check out new CNO’s Mullen’s latest declarations of last week. Only thing alerts me about that is memories of that movie “The Sand Pebbles”………
re A-12. This book has all the “gouge”. If y’all want to go there:
“The $5 Billion Misunderstanding: The Collapse of the Navy?ɬ
Lex- you are one observant dude. I’d hate to have you write my fitrep!
Sid,
We operate in the box because we have since ’90. EMCON? Blue-water? Dino-stuff. All that is secondary to generating sorties for the JFACC.
Yes. Our strikers ARE limited by the range of the primary attack aircraft, the Hornet A,B,C,D, but the effects of those legacies (yes Lex) are hopefully mitigated by the advent of the SuperHornet. Case in point was Strike operations over Afghanistan through 2002. It seems to me we operated invic of old “Gonzo” station(1979-1990). US Naval Air forces made quite an impact generating most of the sorties for those first months after 9-11, mainly because of the range of the Bombcat AND the Navy (S-3) and USAF “bucket brigade” stretched out over Pakistan. Plus,we were fortunate the Taliban did not have a more robust IADS.
Lex is right-on about Tomahawk though, and that is problematic for a dino like me.
Neither “Naval Air”, the Marine Corps, or even the submarine fleet is “expeditionary” in the sense described in that article posted Lex posted last week about “The Bridges at Toko-Ri”. No, now we chop sorties (air defense, attack, etc.) to the Joint Air Commander. Much as it pains me to report, the BattleGroup Commander is little more than a resource coordinator to provide same. The only sorties he controls are self-defense and logistics. Chester Nimitz operating as CINC in the Pacific taking and holding territory is a thing of the past. CENTCOM has total OPCON as warfighter.
SeniorD- I can assure you “NAVAIR” is fighting the “war” of LeanSixSigma and AirSpeed for the NAE. It’ll be a long campaign. On a more serious note, you may get your wish on small craft. Check out new CNO’s Mullen’s latest declarations of last week. Only thing alerts me about that is memories of that movie “The Sand Pebbles”………
re A-12. This book has all the “gouge”. If y’all want to go there:
“The $5 Billion Misunderstanding: The Collapse of the Navy’s A-12 Stealth Bomber Program”
James P. Stevenson. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001.
B2
While the Tomahawk is great for first strike, its not so good at persistence…Which brings up a question Captain: Will the carrier navy ever “really” buy into J-UCAS?
And the A-X was being batted about after the A-12 was canned. Then SECNAV Mr. O’Keefe flat out stated in 1993 that,”the Navy does not require the A/F-X to be a long-range interdiction aircraft because deep interdiction missions are not the highest probability [for the service] in the years ahead.”
“We just don’t need this extraordinary 750-mile range because nobody’s going to be out there” for the plane to attack.”
Of course OIF proved his crystal ball was just a bit murky.
How much less a strain on tanker assets would a CVW with a true A-6 (or for that matter, a true A-3 replacement) replacement have been in OIF?
As far as carriers not being “expeditionary”; that’s how their existence is sold to this day…Needing no calling card and all that (see Massenberg, Zortman, Kilcline: “Naval Aviation: Forward, Persistent, and Dominant” Oct 2005 Proceedings). Which is really a bit of a myth more so now than it ever has been due to the need for offboard tanker and ISR…and the need to close the coast to project power ashore.
I guess my whole point is that in some future scrap, a “near peer”, or a particularly inventive foe-as in Millenium Challenge 2002-can make the littorals untenable for carriers. Yet even with the F-18E/F and F-35 that’s where they will be obligated to operate. It also doesn’t help that there will be fewer assets to lose as well.
Not trying to troll here, I just think these are some pretty weighty issues facing Naval Aviation these days.
“SECNAV Mr. O?ɬ
“SECNAV Mr. O’Keefe” was wrong about a lot of things, then and most recently, about NASA..but then again he’s a genial bean-counter not a warrior or spaceman. Probably a nice guy but I heard that guy who directed FEMA was nice too….
In the big scheme of things Sid wants a longer range airwing with the prestige for the big knockout ala Kamchatka/Cola contingencies the USN was ready to carry out in the mid-late ’80′s. Although I have had the same reservations as Sid, I’ve observed enough over the last decades to know that the die has not only been cast, but the mold is broken. Bottom-line- We got what we got, and it’s good enough for what we NEED to do. At least right now.
I think what Sid is essentially saying, is that we need a bigger Navy. I agree. Getting that done is a whole other $$$$$ issue.
b2
There have always been weighty issues facing naval aviation. It’s a tough business that we’re only just starting to run that way – like a business.
sid, you sound like an educated guy, so you know that every aircraft design is a tradeoff, or if you prefer, a series of compromises. On top of all the performance vs range issues in design, we’re also stuck on the ship with supportability, maintainability and size constraints. Trying to get a jet to do deep, persistent strike took us places that in a joint environment, we frankly didn’t need to be. That’s what BUFFs and Bones are for, and why we have an Air Force. Would it be nice to have a squadron of deep strike assets that didn’t need to be refueled and could linger in a target area without the need of other support (fighter, SEAD, AEW)? Sure. Is it affordable? Don’t think so, and the money pot maxed out (in constant dollars) quite a few years ago.
Some folks look at our reliance on strat tanking as a vulnerability, even a badge of shame. I look at it as making the best of the situation. High fuel capacity jets are fatter, which brings issues of weight, space, specific range, maneuverability and observability into play. Of all the many design compromises that go into an aircraft build, “fuel” is the only one that can be remedied once the jet leaves the production line. The others you are stuck with.
As for as the littorals are concerned, you raised that issue, not me. Sure it’s harder, but look at it this way: It’s harder in a good way. It means we no longer have to fight our way across the open ocean to get to where all the potential floppers are to be found. Brings its own set of defensive issues, but we don’t install CSG’s in close to other peoples shores just to defend themselves.
The Navy has was expeditionary before anybody else thought up a spin for the word. We’re just doing what we’ve always done, taking the flag to sea and defending the national interest.
It’s good to be us, I think sid. Tell me whose Navy you’d rather be floating in, if it came to a scrape?
While there is no doubt whose navy I’d rather be floating in (Wait! I did that!), I still see the paucity of range a Clausewitzian Center of Gravity ripe for exploit.
But you’re right about not being able to do much about it now or anytime soon (other than something along the lines of CV-UCAS). Indeed, in the matrix of compromises it may not be the best choice all said and done. And there is no doubt you and the others currently on watch preside over a Navy Next to None.
Now the real question is what will happen to our poor j.g.??
Oh, I think he’ll be all right. Tune in and see!
When? Saturday, prolly.
Lex
re- “…High fuel capacity jets are fatter, which brings issues of weight, space, specific range, maneuverability and observability into play. Of all the many design compromises that go into an aircraft build, “fuel” is the only one that can be remedied once the jet leaves the production line.”
Say what? Fatter?
B2
Thrust-to-weight challenged? Possessed of greater avoirdupoids? Girth enhanced? Less lithe?
Fatter.
??Hmmm-scratch-scratch??
Are you making fun-a-me?
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