The sea can be a hard mistress, and as if that weren’t enough in itself, the service can be hard as well. In one of his splendid sea tales, Patrick O’Brian’s fictional character, royal navy Captain Jack Aubrey noted that “an officer’s buttons” can be like the curse of God – with all the privileges and honor come awesome responsibilities and accountability. When an officer finally achieves the joyful burden of command at sea, these privileges and responsibilities both tend towards their absolutes.
So it is with some ambivalence I read the story of CDR Kirk Lippold, former CO of the USS Cole. The attack on the ship he had the honor to command – although no one recognized it at the time – was the opening salvo in the ongoing war against Islamist terror.
Cole was sent to Aden by Higher Authority alone and unafraid as a part of a policy of regional engagement. Although no specific and credible threat indicators were hot at the time of her visit on 12 OCT 2000, the CO was found negligent in enforcing several force protection procedures by a board of inquiry, convened after a terrorist attack left 17 Sailors dead, and 39 wounded. Lippold’s leadership in the immediate aftermath, as his crew fought to save their fellow shipmates lives while also fighting to save the ship was widely recognized as being creditable, in the best naval sense of the word.
Ultimately, Navy leadership – as well as that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – found that the CO had performed as well as could have been expected given the circumstances, both before the attack, and certainly afterwards.
But now, CDR Lippold’s promotion has been held up in a political process:
Though a Navy review found that intelligence failures contributed to the Cole attack and that other officers, including the Navy’s most senior admiral, also could have done more to anticipate it, only Lippold’s career has suffered. Everyone in his chain of command at the time of the attack has been promoted or given assignments with more responsibility, Lippold said; in many cases those advancements came with Senate confirmation.
Friends think Lippold’s nemesis is Sen. John W. Warner, R-Va., the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In 2001, when Navy leaders decided Lippold had acted reasonably to protect the Cole, Warner convened a hearing and lectured the service’s top admiral on the importance of holding commanders accountable for incidents at sea.
In an era when a Google search of “Navy commanding officer dismissed” returns over 1.4 million hits, it practically beggars belief that our civilian leadership, no matter how invested in the service’s traditions, concern themselves overly about our standards for command.
And yet such are the joys and risks of military premiership, subject as they are not only to the tides of fate, but also to the whims of our political masters. It’s little enough comfort to a good officer that his peers may say, “There but for the grace of God go I.”
In the interests of jointness, you should look at the case of Brig Gen Schwalier as well..very similar circumstances. Brig Gen Schwalier was the “fall guy” for Khobar Towers at the behest of SecDef Cohen…now he’s still being denied his promotion because of the Pentagon bureaucracy.
Here’s a good link…
http://www.afa.org/magazine/April2006/0406tschwalier.asp
Sen. Warner (the former Mr. Elizabeth Taylor) has a tradition of being pompous and lacking common sense. His power comes from Senate seniority, not competence nor demonstrated leadership. He exemplifies the lawyerly oversight mentality that tends to cripple our military forces and their commanders and reward those who do nothing wrong, but little good either.
Haven’t finished the series yet, but I am at book 13 in the Aubrey-Maturin series; during “Jack’s” day, wasn’t it an automatic courts martial for the CO in those days? Often as not after you lost a ship in combat you were reinstated.
In my mind the Cole was in combat, undeclared at the time of course (our “Phony war” period)and in retrospect.
Politics affecting “our” processes in this case? Yes, although Mr. Warner does have a certain level of professional authority in this matter. This is not the Stan Arthur type move (abominable).
B2
Reading the force protection procedures described in the link, it’s hard to see how a “rigged fire hose” could have stopped the blast of a car bomb in a suicide boat. At first glance, it appears to be 20/20 hindsight and nit-picking.
Thinking further, one or all of these procedures could have kept the threat at a greater [perhaps less lethal] range, or at least bought some time for other countermeasures. That they weren’t used at the time means this threat was not fully on the minds of the COLE’s leadership.
Once attacked, CDR Lippold fought his ship to the utmost, and has since made every effort to share the lessons so painfully learned. I think he has fully earned the right to promotion, and higher responsibility ashore. But not another commmand at sea.
Not as a punishment to him, but as a warning to other Captains: That there is no “safe harbor” anymore. Anywhere.
Don’t want to disharmonize the jointness, Mike, but while I agree that Schwalier may have been dis-served by the process, I detect the slightest difference in the two cases in that, once the word came out that he was not to pin on his second star he immediately retired. Only then did he pursue his promotion to 2-star for retirement purposes, seeking to gain after his service the pay and benefits he never actually received while on active duty.
Lippold is a year senior to me from the Academy, and would still be year my senior, had he been promoted on time. As it is, I’m now two years further up the captain list than he is, and he’s still plugging away at it on the commander’s list. So he’s lost not just three years of seniority, but also the rank – and a captain’s retirement is nearly double an O-5′s.
I had a neighbor who, as a CO of one of those sinking and resurfacing things, had the mis-fortune of being surfaced when one of the subs from the “other guys” surfaced underneath him.
At his change of command (at the end of a normal tour length), his boat had earned more awards, in every area of endeavor, than any other three good ships I had know of. The commodore gave a wonderful speech, then sat down. No MSM for my neighbor (whom I had known for about 5 years by then), who was a solid citizen. I learned a few years later, the COI said he wasn’t at fault, that the Soviet skipper broke the rules of the road. Rumor had it that “up the chain” one of the guys with stars was upset for the damage and made sure there were no promotions.
My neighbor went on to do some great things during Desert Shiled/Storm as a wandering gypsy expert, and even armed with a few 4 star recommendations, he never made O-6. This was confirmed by some our very own fellow silent service bloggers who worked with him back then.
Having never had command, I understand I can never fully appreciate this issue, but having had to conduct inspections, and knowing how shore staffs, thinking their time ashore is “make up” for sea time, I had exceptionally limited respect for those who would not take the effort to “uncomplicate” the lives of the sailors, and I regularly went to slay the dragons of this type. Some were finally declared dead, others thrived, and some became allies and some lived on unhindered by progress.
With that insight, and some other experience, it’s also not uncommon for the upper chain to wash their hands and breathe a sigh of relief, when they tell the MSM it was the CO’s fault.
Tough, tough call, and of course, we will never see all the details so a truly informed decision can be made.
CDR Lippold seems to be another in a long line of naval officers to be victimized by murky ROE’s and post mortem “force protection” interpretation. Does the USS Pueblo sound familiar?
Often wonder what would become of a C.O. of a combatant, who while bearthed at a public pier Sandy Eggo, with rail-mounted machine guns manned and armed watches topside, used deadly force on any one of drunken jet-ski riders or small craft kamikazees who make high speed runs on his ship.
Had the misfortune of being assigned to provide Sen. Warner with a brief on my airplane at an airshow years ago. There is no more arrogant nor pompous creature on the planet than a United States Senator, and Sen Warner wrote the lesson plan.
I refer to the process CDR Lippert is undergoing as “Kimmelization.”
For those who suffer from history deprivation, Admiral Kimmel was Pacific Fleet Commander on Dec 7, 1941, whne the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. He and General Short, the Army commander were relieved of command and reduced in rank after the attack. General Short died fairly soon after the war, but Admiral Kimmel sought to get a fair hearing to clear his name. More history here.
I note that Admiral Kimmel’s son, Edward, recently died after fighting for far too many years on behalf of his father’s good name.
BG,
I’ll bet a Naval combatant at a public pier would have a USCG patrol craft hovering nearby, politely but firmly heading off the jet skis and small craft from getting too close. Playing good cop, bad cop: “Don’t ignore the warning guys, ’cause the squids WILL shoot.” And if they’re drunk, the Coasties arrest them anyway.
Dead on about Senators though…
For another view, I would suggest reading Sam Pepy’s blog, http://www.pepysdiary.com/
Sam spent a long time establishing civilian control over the Navy. It seemed to work our quite well for his Navy.
You just cost me the better part of a lost hour, there, with your Samuel Pepys’ diary
Sen. Warner. Hmmmm. I have shared a couple of dinners with the man in the Flag Mess. Hmmmm.
I don’t think I can say anything.
Isn’t Sam Pepys great?
Politics, reform of the British Navy, and complaints about dinner. Something for everybody …
It was especially interesting to see how the Restoration happened on a day-to-day basis, with confusion and rumors and plots. Not the nice tidy tale told by the history books.
I read CDR Lippold can remain on active duty until he is 65 while in his present status. As an 0-5 of course.
Of course that is not any any kind of plum.
re- “and a captain?
I read CDR Lippold can remain on active duty until he is 65 while in his present status. As an 0-5 of course.
Of course that is not any any kind of plum.
re- “and a captain’s retirement is nearly double an O-5’s.”
Not quite but nearly so under certain conditions. Of course one would have to serve the full 30 years as an 0-6. And we all know how many staff’s that means…
B2
Cpt J,
The USCG patrol boats rarely establish a defense zone, as that seems to have become the mission of Naval Security small craft. It is not uncommon to see ships of the ‘Gator Navy at a public pier with no waterborne protection. The only ships escorted into the harbor on a regular basis are the CVN’s; and the security craft are hard-pressed to identify a potential threat given the amount of maritime traffic. The normal buffer zone normally afforded a warship at sea does not seem to apply in the harbor, and some of those as previously described come danger close.
Lex,
This is no different then the fiasco post-Tailhook. Think about how many guys you knew then who were held up for Command at Sea or just held up in basic advancement during the political fighting because they either attended, knew someone who attended, or were members of said organization? For as much talk as there is about looking at some senior leadership who are at the front of the fight and willing to risk it all for thier beliefs. Now a days there aren’t too many out there willing to throw down thier stars or wings or whatever it is to say that “Lt. (or whatever rank) Joe Cool is being screwed by the system”.
I read Sam every day. He brought science into provisioning a navy. Sam would hang with Newton and Wren, then apply the scientific method to his job as a Clerk.
Just one example was Sam’s studies on rope. (Almost said hemp). Before him, rope contracts went to where they always went. Sam conducted studies by hanging weights on lines from different ropeyards and buying the strongest.
A case could be made that he was as important as Nelson.
BG,
I see your point about high speed jetskis and small craft easily breaking through a too-small defensive cordon. There isn’t enough time to physically interdict them if they are moving at speed to within that close a range.
Long range acoustic devices [LRAD], backed up by microwave active denial systems, are probably the non-lethal defenses that would change Joe Jetski’s mind in a real hurry. With a serious headache and sunburn in seconds. Both of these systems are already in use aboard Navy ships.
The Coast Guard does have Port Security Units [PSUs] that conduct layered defensive operations within a port or harbor. They also team up with Naval harbor defense commands, and other security elements to protect high value assets at piers and berthin areas. While often deployed overseas, PSUs are also permanently assigned to major U.S. ports.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dot/psu.htm
Concur with Bomber Guy (Post 15). Rode into Ft. Lauderdale through that narrow channel twice, once on IKE and once on GW. There were so many little boats out there that if one of them had decided to do us harm and pull the same thing that was pulled on Cole, I don’t think anyone could have stopped them.
John, in post 2, you say “His power comes from Senate seniority, not competence nor demonstrated leadership.” While I agree that most members of Congress aren’t worth the air that they breathe (see “Duke Cunningham”), Warner was a sailor, a Marine officer, and the Secretary of the Navy. Whether you agree with him or not, or like him or not, I’m not sure what else you want on his resume to demonstrate competetence.
In Post 16 Charles mentions post-Hook promotion debacle. I know at least five guys who didn’t promote, five good guys, and the only “blemish” they had was they were all in the same place in September 91. (They were not involved in anything, they were just….there).
I have been told that the Navy has stopped putting CDR Lippold’s name on the promotion list sent to congress. Anyone in the know care to comment?
We are always taught that command at sea carries total authority, but the cost for that is complete responsibility. I think we are seeing that in this case. But still, I’d be happy to see him promoted. The way those sailors saved their ship, someone motivated them and taught them well.
Nose
I recalled, after my post earlier, I knew of a Commander (through my SWO Basic classmates and later neighbors who were on the FFG) who ran his FFG aground, wasn’t relieved, got promoted to O-6, got a major command, a forward deployed ship that also (but was not originally designed for) a Fleet flag ship. Ran that aground (while flag was embarked). Normal relief at the end of the 2 year tour. Later had command of a larger and more imposing vessel with plenty of firepower. Ran that aground, too. His “reward?”: Never made flag officer….details are intentionally leading, but not concise. He was…a nice guy, if that counts….
Oh, and toss this case on the table as a reference point: SAMMIE B.
BTW, I met the author at the MilBlog Conference. He stopped in to chat with me and see what were were up to. I have pre-ordered my copy of his book (oh, if you’re lost, click on the link) already. I suspect it will be a story in a foundation of excellence from Day One of Pre-Comm. I can hardly wait to read this, for as a “shoe” it was part of my time…
“The attack on the ship he had the honor to command – although no one recognized it at the time – was the opening salvo in the ongoing war against Islamist terror.”
Wasn’t the Cole really just the opening salvo in the lastest of a series of campaigns?
We have been in near constant conflict in the Middle East since 1979.
I would say the opening salvo was the takeover of the embassy in Tehran followed shortly thereafter by the one in Pakistan and the tragic denoument of Desert One.
The FON Ops in Libya in 1981 resulting in the first shootdown.
Then there was Lebanon, the MNF, the barracs bombing, the hostages, the hijackings, and the tragic scene of Col. Shoup hanged.
We certainly scored a big one with the capture of the Achille Lauro killers. Then, after El Dorado Canyon, things seemed to quiet down the “Mediterranian Theater”
Of course the Tanker War was still cooking along in the Gulf, and bubbled over into Operation Prayin Mantis and, sadly, the egregious shootdown of Iran Air 655.
Desert Storm never really ended with Operations Northern and Southern Watch, and Desert Fox.
So this “War” has been raging along in fits and starts now for better than a quarter century.
Now, one can argue that not all these years of conflict were against terrorists, but certainly states such as Libya, and Iraq wrapped themselves in that “flag”.
Well, if you take that point of view Sid, it’s really been going on for quite a bit longer, hasn’t it? In fact, if you throw out that brief inter-war period between the last siege of Vienna and Gallipoli, you could say we’ve been at this for quite some time indeed.
Charles wrote: “This is no different then the fiasco post-Tailhook. Think about how many guys you knew then who were held up for Command at Sea or just held up in basic advancement during the political fighting because they either attended, knew someone who attended, or were members of said organization?”
No worse example of the above than that of Bob Stumpf, who was on the verge of commanding his own air wing, and had the misfortune to be on the attendees’ list during Tailhook 91.
Bob was kyboshed by others as well as politicos, however the scenario is still familiar – power-crazy civilians who get a kick out of throwing their weight around and hearing four star admirals having to say ‘yessir’ to them.
“Well, if you take that point of view Sid, it?
“Well, if you take that point of view Sid, it’s really been going on for quite a bit longer, hasn’t it?”
I don’t know Captain. I would say this is a distinctly different conflict. 1979 marked the start of the “War Against The Great Satan”, but it really wasn’t until post-Cole that all too many Americans realized it.
Civilian control of the military is a good thing when confined to the civilian secretary of the service, the civilian secretary of defense, and the civilian President of the United States, but to subject military promotions to the whims of political expediancy is pathetic. Commander Lippold was nominated for promotion by a duly convened promotion board. That nomination was approved twice by the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense and once by the President of the United States and approved at every level in between the the promotion board and the President. The nomination was also supported by the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff in an unprecendented letter to Senator Warner. This is another case of the the politicians ignoring a professional military opinion on an inherently military process. Senator Warner is not a friend of the average miltiary officer – he is their worst nightmare.