Misuse of assets?

Interesting article written by former Marine infantryman W. Thomas Smith, Jr. over at NRO today, dealing with the alleged misuse of a tremendously valuable war asset: Navy SPECWAR

Petty Officer 2^nd Class Marc Alan Lee was one of the world’s most highly skilled unconventional warriors — a U.S. Navy SEAL. But on the morning of August 2, the 28-year-old Oregon native was detached to a conventional U.S. Army force tasked with hunting-down guerrillas in a Ramadi neighborhood where four U.S. Marines had been killed the previous week.

When a firefight erupted between the Americans (and an accompanying Iraqi force) and a band of guerrillas, one SEAL was wounded, shot in the cheek by an enemy sniper.

In the ensuing hour-long fight, stretching over several city blocks, another SEAL was struck in the shoulder.
Lee, who positioned himself between the two men, provided covering fire as they were evacuated. But he was later killed by a blast of machinegun fire.

Lee was the first SEAL to die in Iraq. His actions during the fight have been reported as “heroic,” and he has been posthumously awarded the Silver Star to go along with his Bronze Star medal (with Combat V), Purple Heart, and a Combat Action Ribbon.

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“In the context of Iraq, SEALs, who comprise a fraction of the Navy’s total force, are trained to handle those kinds of missions,” Divine tells National Review Online. “Every man is a critical asset in the war on terror. So to squander a life in support of a general cordon and search operation is just wrong.”

In our egalitarian society, this kind of thinking can come across to others as almost insufferably elitist – the life of a SEAL is worth no more or less than that of any other soldier or Marine. Why the special concern for the loss of this one man, among so many others?

The fact of the matter is that the SPECWAR operators of whatever branch are capable of executing a broad range of missions, from Cordon and Search or Close Quarter Battle all the way up to highly specialized direct action missions that other forces simply aren’t trained for, and for whom such specialized training simply isn’t cost effective.

The value that these operators represent is two-fold, both in the sunken costs spent in preparing them for unconventional warfare, and in the latent potential they have to generate strategic effects with an economy of mass. However uncomfortable it is to say aloud, elite forces really are elite.

There is a tension between exposing a young man to routine combat in the environment – blooding him – and preserving him for the special kinds of missions he’s been trained for. No one gets to “pull” SEALS out from within the JSOTF to support conventional operations, although they can ask – sometimes the SPECWAR guys will come along if they’re not busy, and they want a piece of the game. As Mr Smith’s article conveys, the risk lies in allowing motivated 24-year olds to make their own decisions about whether or not to participate.

SEALs are selected, among other things, for their exceptional motivation and a demonstrated ability to think for themselves. Leadership has a role in tempering the latter, without attenuating the former.