I have come increasingly to believe that the biggest mistake made by coalition forces in Iraq was not the disbanding of the old Iraqi Army, nor even the de-Ba’athification campaign, but letting Moqtada al Sadr escape the siege of Najaf in 2004. And while it doesn’t seem fair at several levels – the Shia residents of the Sadr City slums were oppressed for decades, suffering the cruelist tyrannies of an inherently barbaric regime, and many of them have been finally goaded beyond endurance by the repeated depredation of Sunni-allied terrorists – I have also come to believe that there is no path to peace in a unified Iraq that does not involve destroying Sadr’s Mahdi Army in detail. From the Silicon Valley Mercury News:
Followers of the militant Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr took over state-run television Saturday to denounce the Iraqi government, label Sunnis “terrorists” and issue what appeared to many viewers as a call to arms.
The two-hour broadcast from a community gathering in the heart of the Shiite militia stronghold of Sadr City included three members of al-Sadr’s parliamentary bloc, who took questions from outraged residents demanding revenge for a series of car bombings that killed some 200 people Thursday.
With Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki relegated to the sidelines, brazen Sunni-Shiite attacks continue unchecked despite a 24-hour curfew over Baghdad. Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia now controls wide swaths of the capital, his politicians are the backbone of the Cabinet, and his followers deeply entrenched in the Iraqi security forces. Sectarian violence has spun so rapidly out of control since the Sadr City blasts, however, that it’s not clear whether even al-Sadr has the authority – or the will – to stop the cycle of bloodshed.
The north and south of the country are relatively stable, even if Basra is very far from the Athenian democratic ideal. But the west simmers and much of Bagdhad boils under the lid of coalition firepower, the only thing preventing a cycle of tit-for-tat revenge killings from escalating into a ghastly Roman holiday of butchery and barbarism.
Iraqi Army units have shown that they are willing and able to accompany coalition forces on raids inside Sadr City, but each time they have done so they draw a stern rebuke from Nouri al-Maliki, whose coalition government depends upon the good will of the Sadrist political wing. The internal security forces are too weak in arms and too thoroughly penetrated by al Sadr’s allies to be a reliable national force, trusted by all sides.
It is difficult to feel much sympathy for the Sunni rejectionists, they were repeatedly offered olive branches of peace and a role in the new Iraq. In reply they repeatedly sowed the winds of death and now they reap from its whirlwind. But there will be no military peace without a political accomodation, and it is the very size of the Mahdi army – and increasingly, its state of training – that now motivates the Sunni reaction. They see the Sadrists as the vanguard legions of the Iranian theocracy, the hated Persians, the ancient foe, so different in sect and ethnicity than their Arab neighbors. Almost reflexively, they cannot help but lash out, they cannot help but fight.
The Sunnis know now, they must, that they will never again be able to install a strongman of their choosing atop a cowed Shia majority, and many have now ranged themselves against the al Qaeda-allied foreign fighters with whom once they cast their lots, recognizing at last the smothering austerity of the jihadist vision. Still, feeling disempowered, disenfranchised and petulant they apply the only lever they feel they own and retreat to the kind of perverse political violence which threatens to swallow them up in its consequences.
The definition of a state is ownership of the levers of organized violence. As an organized force, the Mahdi Army represents the same challenge to Iraqi statehood that Hezbollah does in Lebanon, a state within a state and worse: A inner state with a jealous eye upon the larger crown. They must be destroyed, no matter how much al Maliki might squeal.
We have come too far, spent too much in blood and treasure to allow the political calculations of a man whose governmental writ still does not extend throughout the capital city to prevent us from doing what we must.
Go Big, Go Long, Go Home – to these three options I add a fourth: Go Hard.
From my limited vantage point, I must agree with all you say.
Left to resolve in my mind is the question of how do we, the coalition forces and the Iraqi government, declare this objective?
Or do we not make any declaration, recognizing the dysfunction of the Iraqi government to secure the peace, and instead opt for a .50 cal solution?
Lex:
Given that there has been a significant increase in anti-al qaida activity in anbar province of late, is it possible that the government/coalition is looking to clean up one area before going after another? Alternatively, is it possible that al-Sadr is on the back burner for a while, and he will be taken care of when he least expects it?
Either way, hard choices abound. I’m just afraid that the choice will be made to do what is politically expedient rather than politically sound.
I wonder if there’s any realistic chance that we’ll “go hard.” I wonder if the will exists.
Like I said at CDR Salamanders, time to find a cold hard bastard like Black Jack Pershing, give him the tools, cover his back, and let him get the job done. It’s either that, or pull the plug on the whole thing.
Lex, when we first invaded Iraq, everyone pretty much thought that when we captured Bagdad, that the war was mostly over. Only problem, was that this wasn’t “capture the flag”, and Iraq is really a tribe of tribes. When we knocked off the top dog tribe, it left a power vaccum that WE DID NOT FILL UP.
I understand why we had to go to war. I fully support it. But damn it, do we have to do it stupid again?. I know everyone doesn’t want to hear the “Vietnam” comparison, but…In the sense that we never did what needed to be done, including destroying everything that supported the war in the North, regardless of Russian or Chinese advisors, we are doing the same thing here, by attempting to slapping bandaids on wounds that have festered for generations. Our soldiers are NOT COPS. They are soldiers, the worlds best. And I agree, Lex, there should have been enough intel on that SOB that a good sniper could have saved us all a lot of grief a long time ago.
Rant, off
I’d have to agree with Lex regarding al Sadr. He needs to go. And don’t stop with him – his entire army needs to be buried. And I mean that literally. They have been just as responsible for the situation in Baghdad as the Sunnis.
Besides which, it smacks Iran’s hands at the same time.
I have a friend who is stationed there now..a bubblehead officer who is an IA to a Special Forces team. I’d be worried, except he’s a better shot than most of the SpecOps guys, and can wrist curl 140 pds. Other than that, one of the nicest guys you’d ever want to meet.
Agreed, Lex. And said far better than I’ve heard it said recently. Truthful.
Agreed that al-Sadr has to go.
I read over the weekend that some are beginning to question how much direct control he actually has nowadays over his Madhi army, that “removing” him from the scene may not have the desired effects as they might have in 2004.
Been asking that question about Sadr since 2004 after viewing the graveyard battle (remember that?). Why is this dude walking around? Never had a good answer. Too many opportunities lost. I’m sure he would be superseded by another, just as bad, but he does have that tie to his father that is best forgotten by Iraq’a Shias- yesterday.
re options- What about big, hard and as long as it needs to be? (Call it the WWII model. That is exactly what it’ll take)
Ah- reality. No way. Not after 7 Nov when the American people chose the “Spanish Model”.
b2
B2 – would that we DID have the backbone and stomach for a WWII model. THAT would get their collective attention, wouldn’t it. Ah well…
And I wonder about why al Sadr is still here – could there be some misguided notion among the military top echelon that we aren’t in Iraq to commit murder and engage in mercernary activities? Just pondering aloud.
[...] That’s only a taste, and you really ought to read the whole thing before going on to today’s featured editorial (behind a subscription wall, alas) by Bing West and Eliot Cohen. The journals editors disagree with West and Cohen as to whether Nouri al-Maliki should be presented an ultimatum, but they are significantly silent on a point that I have raised before: Sadr City cannot remain of limits. When the death squads know they are hunted, many will flee the city. Others will fight back. Intense violence, however, cannot sustain itself. American forces fought Mr. Sadr’s milita in April and August of 2004. In both cases, all-out war by the Mahdi Army petered out due to lack of logistics. In both cases, the Shiite population stood to one side. We created a monster by letting Mr. Sadr go free twice. We cannot make that mistake a third time. [...]