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	<title>Comments on: Surge</title>
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	<link>http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/</link>
	<description>The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy!</description>
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		<title>By: Phil Andrilla</title>
		<link>http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/comment-page-1/#comment-38914</link>
		<dc:creator>Phil Andrilla</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jan 2007 21:14:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/#comment-38914</guid>
		<description>Maybe I have too simple a vision, here it is.  With a Gi on every corner and one in the middle of the block, where are the bad guys going to hide?

Sen McCain: we need significantly more troops.
Colin Powell: use overwhelming force.
USMC grunt: you can really reach out and touch someone with a 50cal.
Phil Andrilla: do it, do it now Mr. President.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Maybe I have too simple a vision, here it is.  With a Gi on every corner and one in the middle of the block, where are the bad guys going to hide?</p>
<p>Sen McCain: we need significantly more troops.<br />
Colin Powell: use overwhelming force.<br />
USMC grunt: you can really reach out and touch someone with a 50cal.<br />
Phil Andrilla: do it, do it now Mr. President.</p>
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		<title>By: Bomber Guy</title>
		<link>http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/comment-page-1/#comment-38899</link>
		<dc:creator>Bomber Guy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jan 2007 19:15:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/#comment-38899</guid>
		<description>Let&#039;s reduce this issue to a local comparison. If you have a neighborhood rife with violent crime, you can send in more police as a short-term solution. Of course that reduces your ability to properly police the remainder of your jurisdiction. This will soon overtask your personnel, resources and budget absent a significant increase in the overall size of your force throughout your jurisdiction. The criminal element will soon learn to shift their activities to areas in which the police are not deployed in sufficient numbers to pose a deterrent.     

Bottom line: The local residents must want law, order and a peaceful existence rather than life in an area infected with a huge crime rate. No reports, at least in the media, suggest that the majority of Iraqis have chosen the former over the latter.

For the second time in my lifetime, we have a case in which politicians are attempting to use the military as the hammer with which to force a round peg through a square hole. Western ideology and mores translate no easier to the Muslim nations than they did in Southeast Asia.

Any &quot;new&quot; plan must include a realistic assessment of the will of the Iraqi people.

In the future, let us remember that the mission of the United States&#039; Armed Forces is to export violence; to fight and win our wars. They are neither trained nor equipped to serve a police officers in a region in which every home is permitted to own an AK-47, and RPG&#039;s are as plentiful there as TV&#039;s are here.

If the decision is to remain in Iraq, we should consider ourselves to be in a street fight; you don&#039;t knock your enemy on his butt, then patch him up, build him a new house, and give him a job. Leave that to the U.N.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Let&#8217;s reduce this issue to a local comparison. If you have a neighborhood rife with violent crime, you can send in more police as a short-term solution. Of course that reduces your ability to properly police the remainder of your jurisdiction. This will soon overtask your personnel, resources and budget absent a significant increase in the overall size of your force throughout your jurisdiction. The criminal element will soon learn to shift their activities to areas in which the police are not deployed in sufficient numbers to pose a deterrent.     </p>
<p>Bottom line: The local residents must want law, order and a peaceful existence rather than life in an area infected with a huge crime rate. No reports, at least in the media, suggest that the majority of Iraqis have chosen the former over the latter.</p>
<p>For the second time in my lifetime, we have a case in which politicians are attempting to use the military as the hammer with which to force a round peg through a square hole. Western ideology and mores translate no easier to the Muslim nations than they did in Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>Any &#8220;new&#8221; plan must include a realistic assessment of the will of the Iraqi people.</p>
<p>In the future, let us remember that the mission of the United States&#8217; Armed Forces is to export violence; to fight and win our wars. They are neither trained nor equipped to serve a police officers in a region in which every home is permitted to own an AK-47, and RPG&#8217;s are as plentiful there as TV&#8217;s are here.</p>
<p>If the decision is to remain in Iraq, we should consider ourselves to be in a street fight; you don&#8217;t knock your enemy on his butt, then patch him up, build him a new house, and give him a job. Leave that to the U.N.</p>
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		<title>By: The Thunder Run</title>
		<link>http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/comment-page-1/#comment-38842</link>
		<dc:creator>The Thunder Run</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jan 2007 15:01:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/#comment-38842</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;Web Reconnaissance for 01/09/2006...&lt;/strong&gt;

A short recon of what?ǂ</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Web Reconnaissance for 01/09/2006&#8230;</strong></p>
<p>A short recon of what?ǂ</p>
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		<title>By: The Thunder Run</title>
		<link>http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/comment-page-1/#comment-409734</link>
		<dc:creator>The Thunder Run</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jan 2007 15:01:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/#comment-409734</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;Web Reconnaissance for 01/09/2006...&lt;/strong&gt;

A short recon of whats out there that might draw your attention....</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Web Reconnaissance for 01/09/2006&#8230;</strong></p>
<p>A short recon of whats out there that might draw your attention&#8230;.</p>
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		<title>By: Kris, in New England</title>
		<link>http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/comment-page-1/#comment-38833</link>
		<dc:creator>Kris, in New England</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jan 2007 13:45:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/#comment-38833</guid>
		<description>I&#039;d like to see a &quot;surge&quot; in the right kind of troops - not just infantry, but troops capable of training and oversight; setting up an infrastructure for the country is all well and fine, but if you don&#039;t have a separate and stronger infrastructure for the government and their own military and law enforcement, then what is the point? 

AND for the guys on the ground already and the incoming, change the ROE so they CAN clear out Sadr City, deal with Fallujah and Tikrit and just take the heat to them.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;d like to see a &#8220;surge&#8221; in the right kind of troops &#8211; not just infantry, but troops capable of training and oversight; setting up an infrastructure for the country is all well and fine, but if you don&#8217;t have a separate and stronger infrastructure for the government and their own military and law enforcement, then what is the point? </p>
<p>AND for the guys on the ground already and the incoming, change the ROE so they CAN clear out Sadr City, deal with Fallujah and Tikrit and just take the heat to them.</p>
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		<title>By: kat-missouri</title>
		<link>http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/comment-page-1/#comment-38746</link>
		<dc:creator>kat-missouri</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jan 2007 02:46:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.neptunuslex.com/2007/01/08/surge/#comment-38746</guid>
		<description>&quot;If, on the other hand, this is just another campaign of sectarian point-settling, there will probably never be a political solution and perhaps the time will have come to pull back into cantonment - or else fortify both the eastern and western borders - and let them have their little civil war.&quot;

Frankly, I think that is what we have come to.  At some point, it might have been prudent to &quot;surge forces&quot; to clear specific areas.  I am not sure that the window for that opportunity has not already passed.

I&#039;ve been thinking, no military strategist my self, that it may be time to use the situation to our advantage.  Part of the issue here is that the Iranians are trying to gain significant influence in Iraq as well as hoping to keep us so busy there we don&#039;t have time or the inclination to deal with their nuclear ambitions as well as keep a significant amount of money and resources from crossing their borders to the &quot;reformists&quot;.

I have thought that the forces we need should be additional training forces for the Iraqi military as well as engineers.  But, I&#039;m not sure I agree a &quot;surge&quot; is necessary so much as looking at our mix and what kind of forces we are developing state side (ie, training our own guys, billets available, etc).

I am thinking we should reduce our commitment there in order to create a vaccuum that might pull in even more Iranian money and sunni Islamists who think the Shia are great apostates or traitors, etc.  for all of Iran&#039;s petro dollars, it&#039;s the only thing fueling their economy and supporting the government.  So, if they start spending more in Iraq, they may quickly find themselves in a deficit that could shake their government to the core while at the same time letting them kill each other.

I&#039;m not suggesting abandoning Iraq.  Simply, that we put our money and resources in a different direction and allow the Iranians an opportunity to bankrupt themselves.

At the same time, with the additional &quot;lawlessness&quot; that may arise, we use the cover to infiltrate..ahem..I mean, provide some sustanence to the anti-regime crowd back the other way through the obviously open Iranian borders.

Put more money into the Iraqi government forces.  Allow the Saudi&#039;s to continue supporting the Sunni.  Let them drain their money and man power.  

Then, do the Stalingrad Stomp (more recently used in Fallujah).  In short, pull back, suck in the money and the people, then provide a very robust &quot;support&quot; for the Iraqi government forces.

The fact of the matter is, the Iraqi government is not seen as having a monopoly on large scale violence nor the ability to protect.  It is difficult to protect against a bomb here and a shooting there.  It can&#039;t be stopped anymore than pre-empting a bank robbery.  What you need to have happen is for the bad guys to actually coalesce into a more solid group with a fixed position (ie, the Ruskies pulled back from Stalingrad, allowed the German&#039;s to come in and declare victory.  Then the Ruskies encircled them, stomping them to pieces before they surrendered thousands upon thousands).  

While it might not physically look the same as the Stalingrad Stomp (no one is going to be gung ho about bombing any city into the ground these days; those days are passed), we could have a similar effect allowing the Iraqi government forces a much larger role in maintaining and controlling their country.  We would surge money, supplies and training to the government at a critical point and then stand back while they commited some serious violence (we could occassionally protest, but insist as others do that the Iraq is a sovreign nation that makes it&#039;s own rules).

This may sound &quot;cold war&quot; in strategy, but i believe the truth is no one has ever beat an insurgency through number of forces.  So, I am willing to go &quot;outside the box&quot; to look at other potential strategies in finishing Iraq.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;If, on the other hand, this is just another campaign of sectarian point-settling, there will probably never be a political solution and perhaps the time will have come to pull back into cantonment &#8211; or else fortify both the eastern and western borders &#8211; and let them have their little civil war.&#8221;</p>
<p>Frankly, I think that is what we have come to.  At some point, it might have been prudent to &#8220;surge forces&#8221; to clear specific areas.  I am not sure that the window for that opportunity has not already passed.</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve been thinking, no military strategist my self, that it may be time to use the situation to our advantage.  Part of the issue here is that the Iranians are trying to gain significant influence in Iraq as well as hoping to keep us so busy there we don&#8217;t have time or the inclination to deal with their nuclear ambitions as well as keep a significant amount of money and resources from crossing their borders to the &#8220;reformists&#8221;.</p>
<p>I have thought that the forces we need should be additional training forces for the Iraqi military as well as engineers.  But, I&#8217;m not sure I agree a &#8220;surge&#8221; is necessary so much as looking at our mix and what kind of forces we are developing state side (ie, training our own guys, billets available, etc).</p>
<p>I am thinking we should reduce our commitment there in order to create a vaccuum that might pull in even more Iranian money and sunni Islamists who think the Shia are great apostates or traitors, etc.  for all of Iran&#8217;s petro dollars, it&#8217;s the only thing fueling their economy and supporting the government.  So, if they start spending more in Iraq, they may quickly find themselves in a deficit that could shake their government to the core while at the same time letting them kill each other.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m not suggesting abandoning Iraq.  Simply, that we put our money and resources in a different direction and allow the Iranians an opportunity to bankrupt themselves.</p>
<p>At the same time, with the additional &#8220;lawlessness&#8221; that may arise, we use the cover to infiltrate..ahem..I mean, provide some sustanence to the anti-regime crowd back the other way through the obviously open Iranian borders.</p>
<p>Put more money into the Iraqi government forces.  Allow the Saudi&#8217;s to continue supporting the Sunni.  Let them drain their money and man power.  </p>
<p>Then, do the Stalingrad Stomp (more recently used in Fallujah).  In short, pull back, suck in the money and the people, then provide a very robust &#8220;support&#8221; for the Iraqi government forces.</p>
<p>The fact of the matter is, the Iraqi government is not seen as having a monopoly on large scale violence nor the ability to protect.  It is difficult to protect against a bomb here and a shooting there.  It can&#8217;t be stopped anymore than pre-empting a bank robbery.  What you need to have happen is for the bad guys to actually coalesce into a more solid group with a fixed position (ie, the Ruskies pulled back from Stalingrad, allowed the German&#8217;s to come in and declare victory.  Then the Ruskies encircled them, stomping them to pieces before they surrendered thousands upon thousands).  </p>
<p>While it might not physically look the same as the Stalingrad Stomp (no one is going to be gung ho about bombing any city into the ground these days; those days are passed), we could have a similar effect allowing the Iraqi government forces a much larger role in maintaining and controlling their country.  We would surge money, supplies and training to the government at a critical point and then stand back while they commited some serious violence (we could occassionally protest, but insist as others do that the Iraq is a sovreign nation that makes it&#8217;s own rules).</p>
<p>This may sound &#8220;cold war&#8221; in strategy, but i believe the truth is no one has ever beat an insurgency through number of forces.  So, I am willing to go &#8220;outside the box&#8221; to look at other potential strategies in finishing Iraq.</p>
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