When a pilot arrives at his destination air field, the approach controller will know what airfield he intends to land at, but not which approach procedure – visual or instrument, precision or non-precision – he will use. To clear this up, if the pilot doesn’t share his plan with the controller on check in, the controller will often ask, “State your intentions.”
But when I was a flight school instructor back in the day, another of the IP’s shared an amusing anecdote about one of our students – flight instructors are eternally amused by their students when they aren’t being terrified by them, and the sharing such stories occupies a very great deal of an instructor’s free time. This particular student had requested a practice instrument approach to a touch-and-go at a local civilian field. Unfortunately for the student, he hadn’t done all of his homework and by the time he arrived at his destination, the airfield was closed:
“Memphis Center, Shad 951 requesting a practice TACAN approach to a touch and go at Key Field,” requested our hero.
“Shad 951, Memphis, Key Field is not in service,” drawled the controller in reply.
“Roger, center,” answered the student, aware that he needed an approach to successfully complete his flight, but not having planned such an unlikely contingency as an airfield closure – he peremptorily added, “State my intentions!”
Which, despite the fact that we call them “controllers” is not how it works. Except in a limited, “turn left to avoid traffic” kind of a way, controllers don’t tell us what to do, we tell them what we’d like to do and then they clear us for it or modify the request such that it aligns with local procedures, traffic flows and FAA regulations.
Unless, you know: The airfield is closed.
Somehow this news from the Atlanta Journal Constitution reminded me of that long-ago day:
The Navy is looking for a few good ideas, many of which it hopes will come from the general public, as its leadership tries to determine the course it should chart over the next several decades…
Known as “A Conversation With the Country,” the conferences are bringing together Navy leaders from the U.S. and its allies, professors and futurists who are charged with compiling ideas and suggestions and developing potential future strategies by late summer.
Now, your correspondent will freely admit to his deficiencies as a strategic thinker, but he thought that we would be telling them that.
Could they also term it as a “Listening Tour?”
Does this mean they’ve run out of ideas? I’m not sure I like the sound of that. And what do you need to study in school to be a “futurist?”
The fun really starts when you want to touch and go or land at an airport that is uncontrolled.State your intention and WATCH out for the goon that cuts in front of you, who didn’t fly the down-wind or base leg of a standard approach.Even after announcing my intentions, I’ve had to go around a few times to avoid landing on top of hot shot Bonanzas.C-172 gets very little respect.
And therein lies the problem with strategic thinking in today’s Navy. I’ll keep the gnashing of teeth to a minimum, but when I was N51B we consistently pushed for development of a new strategy that would inform and provide the basis for operations and force structure in a post-Cold War navy and joint maritime environment. Instead, we were held at arms length, like a skunk carcass, and told in no uncertain terms that “there was no more need for a strategy and oh, by the way, here are all these marvelous new business practices we want to install…” Oh yeah, there was that SP-21 thing (which we did not develop – but that’s another story…)
Now, we find ourselves scrambling to catch up and in the process there is a profusion of stove-piped efforts going on. OPNAV, NWC, NWDC, CFFC, and a host of others are each pursuing what they think is a strategy, most without thought or contemplation as to larger geo-political trends (and not just Iraq/GWOT). If I sound a bit frustrated, well, yeah, I am. I hate seeing wasted energy and it is being tossed away in bundles. Going on the road without at least a central vision (and “we need more ships/planes/subs ain’t it) leaves an impression of a rudderless naval service.
/rant
There, hmm, now I curiously feel no better for the rant
- SJS
SJS, have a few beers…maybe a dollop of Dr. Bombays Best…it will begin to fade away
Personally, I plan on doing a lot of listening here. I’ll offer an opinion or two, but if one of the professionals here tell me otherwise, I’ll be very inclined to take his/her word for it. I’m a lot of things, but stupid isn’t one of them.
The US Navy wants someone ELSE to state the Navy’s intentions? SJS, I don’t even know what I’m talking about, but I’m right with you on the rant… *shaking head and rolling eyes*
Speaking of SP21….you mention that it “never went anywhere,” which is an interesting take on the matter considering it is DRILLED into us at the Naval Academy during some of our tactics/leadership courses. I’m curious to hear the opinions of anyone who has been in the real Navy for the last 3-4 years; what is the perception of these documents (SP21, SP2010, etc)? It was the messsage of those teaching us that these “business plans” were the legitimate driving force behind the modern Naval organization in this country, yet now it seems not so much…why?
~Ens Tim
Re Ens. Tims question: The reply should be very interesting. I’ve got my guesses, but I’ll wait till SJS shows up.
A long time ago in Proceedings (1983) there was an article called “Great Operators, Good Adminstrators, Lousy Planners.” Written in a humorous tone it basically took the Naval Officer Corps to task for not giving more thought to Strategic Planning.
Personally, I think that the creation of FFC has usurped a lot of things that more properly should be residing in the OPNAV staff. Now never having worked in the building, I could be wrong about that.
Also, I have the sense that the Navy has been so busy trying to figure out how it was going to save money to buy all the things it needs to buy, that it has failed to come up with a good set of reasons why it needs them. Ala the Maritme Strategy of the 1980′s.
Was than an earthquake?
No, that was William Sowden Sims spooling in his grave.
Just read the article…not to demean the “conversation with the country” but don’t we pay all those folks with stars on their shoulder boards to figure out WHAT. LAYS. AHEAD? I don’t know what professors the Navy expects to learn about Naval Strategy from but if they’re like most American faculty, we’ll end up with a Brit-like flotilla of 26. Jeepers. I think, at a minimum, they should call it a “conversation with really smart people who care about the survival of the United States.” But that’s just me.
Cop to guy he just pulled over: “Sir, do you know why I stopped you?”
Pullee to Cop: “Why are you asking *me*? Don’t *you* know?”
My .02 on a couple comments above.
ENS Timmy… I just finished 5 years in the fleet with two deployments and none of that stuff was on my scope. I focused on taking care of the mission, ship and the sailors…. and that took most of my time.
The business management thing that swept the navy a few years ago was well intentioned, but when we (ship’s officers) were told to read and train on it, we read what we could and reported completion as ordered, cause there just wasn’t enough time in the day to do all of what they wanted done with it.
As for strategy, I (humbly) think we need some policy direction from above first and then we need to work a strategy that will effect that policy. The other factors that complicate that are our system of new policy makers every 4 to 8 years…
I’m glad I’m not responsible to deliver anything strategic, but I hope someone, somewhere is asking people that are knowledgeable enough to give some good answers. I say this because our country, at one point thought Jerry Springer was the best thing to watch on TV. Popular opinions are not always good things.
It was one of the longer cross country flights I had made in my Tampico. Crossville, TN back home to Columbus, OH, and the entire state of Kentucky socked in. I’m in the clear on top of a solid undercast that reached as far as I could see. I had planned a fuel stop in Clermont County, just outside of Cincy. As I descended towards MDA, I couldn’t help noticing that I had yet to reach the top of the undercast. For the two or three miles I was at MDA, I was completely socked in. My timer eventually told me that I was over the airport, but I never saw it.
I declared the missed with Cincy approach, and was met with the “What are your intentions?” query.
To which I replied, “I don’t know, but I don’t intend to try that again!”
A favourite with the students at Bankstown;
Saturday morning, the honey pot is buzzing with C152′s. Hardly room for a breath on the frequency.
YSBK Tower: “ABC, clear to land, no need to reply.”
ABC: “Clear to land, no need to reply, ABC.”