Having largely ingnored the outbreak of cooperation between coalition forces and tribal sheiks in the Anbar hinterlands, the WaPo noted today the fact that, well – things are looking up in the capital:
Sunni Insurgents Battle in Baghdad
Residents of Western Neighborhood Join Groups’ Fight Against Al-Qaeda in Iraq
BAGHDAD, May 31 — Sunni residents of a west Baghdad neighborhood used assault rifles and a roadside bomb to battle the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq this week, leaving at least 28 people dead and six injured, residents said Thursday.
The mayor of the Amiriyah neighborhood, Mohammed Abdul Khaliq, said in a telephone interview that residents were rising up to try to expel al-Qaeda in Iraq, which has alienated other Sunnis with its indiscriminate violence and attacks on members of its own sect.
“I think this is going to be the end of the al-Qaeda presence here,” Abdul Khaliq said of the fighting Wednesday and Thursday, which began over accusations that al-Qaeda in Iraq had executed Sunnis without reason.
This doesn’t mean that the Sunni “nationalists” are ready to shake coalition hands or throw their weight behind the Maliki government, far from it. But most of the more barbarous attacks on the Shi’a neighborhoods – attacks that have engendered tit-for-tat violence from Shi’a death squads, and empowered the likes of Moktada Sadr and his Mahdi Army – were committed by violent religious extremists in the Qaedist mold.
Breaking the link between the Islamist butchers and the Iraqi Sunni is a necessary precondition to reduced sectarian tensions and political compromise. Meanwhile, the Sunni are doing our work for us.
Good news.
Lex,
Meanwhile, the Sunni are doing our work for us.
Should read, meanwhile the Sunni are taking over doing their own work from us.
Nice to see that the Bagdhad Neighborhood Watch program is in full effect. Al Quaeda should realize that, as Twisted Sister put so eloquently 18 years ago, “We’re not gonna take it”…
GASP! A NEWSpaper actually noticed?
Oooo, can you feel that? It feels like, yes, we’re entering the log phase of domestic security maturation in Iraq. We may end up drawing down in the Fall at that.
Never said it was over pard. Only said it was good news.
We’ve had little enough of that.
“Meanwhile, the Sunni are doing our work for us.”
No, I think that they our finally starting to do their own work. It is, after all, their country.
Jetman – not to rain on your parade, but Twisted Sister put that song out 23 years ago. I remember it distinctly because it was my senior year in high school…it rocked then and it rocks now. And it is very appropriate…
I said the beginning of the log phase, and drawing down is not pulling out.
Abu, the newcomers are kicking our ass. They kill without hesitation, make better bombs, and have more money.
True, there is only one path to restore our power. We must go to the Americans, smile at them, tell them what they want to hear–that we want to get rid of Al Qaeda. It is true, is it not? We just don’t tell them that their actions will push us to the top of the pack. Anyone who threatens us afterwards, we just label them Al Qaeda or foreign fighters, and the Americans will kill them, too. They will give us the weapons, the ammunition, and the training, and maybe some good intelligence, and then we will get rid of them.
Truly, Abu, you are wise, and it is just by Allah that you are the leader of our tribe. Hop in, I’ll drive.
It must be tough to live life as the smartest guy in the room Zane. Right now, I feel pretty good about the fact that Marine casualties in the past six months have dropped off to almost nothing, when the shit was flying only a year ago in Anbar. I’ll take the other end of the argument, and guess that hard work and consistency has produced results.
Well said Casca. I have been searching the blogs for months for my news about Iraq because the MSM has ignored much of what has happened other than a running toll of U.S. losses.
Casca, I’ll pass on the ad hominem and go straight to it. AQI was kicking the tribes around in Al Anbar, screwing them over economically by drawing so much attention to the cross-border smuggling, and there was no way the tribes could handle AQI without us. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, they said, so we became their friends. They began working with us to defeat a challenger, not because of any recognition that our goals in Iraq are just and right. I don’t blame them. Were I an Al Anbar tribesman, I’d do the same. If it’s effective in a) reducing the number of AQI alive, and b) reducing the number of US casualties, amen to it. I’ll give you another hint about our success out there, though–AQI had decided long before our Al Anbar offensive kicked off that the battle for Iraq was going to be won or lost in Baghdad, and reallocated their efforts accordingly. There are no Shi’a in Al Anbar, and there is no press in Al Anbar.
But what does this report actually say? One local band of Sunni engaged in gangland street fighting with a Sunni challenger. The challengers were accepted until they overstepped their bounds, that is, in addition to massacring Shi’a they murdered some Sunnis. Hey, killing the Shi’a is just fine with the Sunna, but killing Sunnis, that’s just too much. The “mayor” puts the spin on it that Americans want to hear–end of AQI around here–and everyone laps it up. Geez, at least Lex followed the story with small mountain of caveats to caution how little this might really mean.
I was with you until you got to this part:
I?
I was with you until you got to this part:
I’ll give you another hint about our success out there, though–AQI had decided long before our Al Anbar offensive kicked off that the battle for Iraq was going to be won or lost in Baghdad, and reallocated their efforts accordingly.
Since you clearly have sources, or deductive powers, superior to those of CINCCENT, may I suggest that you contact him or his staff immediately, and inform them that the forces deployed in Anbar are on a fool’s errand?
Thanks for the suggestion, but I don’t have to, that was JICCENT’s own analysis of AQI’s actions. Most of Al Anbar is utterly void of any coalition presence. The parts that are occupied were seen as key to stopping the flow of foreign fighters (especially the self-detonating kind) to Baghdad, mostly from Syria although occasionally KSA. AQI knew it had nothing to gain by fighting us or the tribes in Al Anbar. Moving splodeydopes is easy, the routes are quickly changed, and when it got too hot there was no reason for AQI to keep a high profile presence in Al Anbar. Was the objective achieved? Foreign fighters still going off like popcorn in Baghdad and environs? You tell me. Did the Al Anbar tribes get a monkey off their backs by leveraging a more powerful force against AQI, and get on the gravy train for US-funded training, weapons and supplies? Yep.
“Most of Al Anbar is utterly void of any coalition presence.”
I’ll have to pass that on to the I MEF CG.
“AQI knew it had nothing to gain by fighting us or the tribes in Al Anbar.”
Really? Then why did they fight us there? It was a very hairy place this time last year.
“Did the Al Anbar tribes get a monkey off their backs by leveraging a more powerful force against AQI, and get on the gravy train for US-funded training, weapons and supplies?”
Considering that getting them inside our tent pissing out had to be a major COIN objective, isn’t that a win-win? As a big league military strategist like yourself must know, it’s much cheaper to win with our checkbook, but that’s a little too dismissive of the real work that’s going on, on the ground. We’re in the business of building relationships/influence, one man-dress wearer at a time. Some we’ll buy, some we’ll win over, and some we’ll stomp. The good news is that in Al Anbar, most of the big time stomping is done.
That pacification of Baghdad is key to our success in Iraq is a no-brainer, but should you be discussing JIC product on a blog?
Casca, that “JIC product” was nothing CENTCOM didn’t hammer in the press conferences or the website.
Please do pass my comment on to the I MEF CG, he knows full well where his troops are, and they aren’t in the vast majority of Al Anbar for reasons too obvious to mention. Put your money where your mouth is, pass it on, please do. I’ll be waiting for the response.
“We’re in the business of building relationships/influence, one man-dress wearer at a time.” Sounds nice, but it’s not true. Our influence doesn’t matter if we’re not going to be there forever, one more tribe that must be taken into consideration in the ceaseless power maneuvering that goes on between the tribes and within the tribes. We are only buying time. In the short term we’ve been successful with it, but look at CAPT Lex’s caveats in the article. How much time is it going to take to work those out?
And you didn’t answer the question–was the objective of cutting of the supply of foreign fighters to Baghdad achieved? Sharply curtailed? Curtailed at all? If you can’t answer that question, you can’t measure the success of the campaign.
You want to take this on to the high side, send your email addy to the good CAPT Lex, he’ll get it to me.