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When lieutenant colonels collideAnalytic readers will remember that the Deputy CO of the 3rd ACR, one LTC Paul Yingling made something of a splash late in April, when he took the current crop of Army general officers to task for a failure of moral courage. Another LTC begs to differ:
It’s very tempting for men in the arena to step out of the line and assume the mantle of historian – tempting, but usually a mistake. Our nearness to the events unfolding overseas prevents the kind of detached analysis of principle sources which have in any case not yet been archived, even if they have been written. Better informed opinion is still opinion. The decision to send our troops to war was taken at the political level – as it must have been under our system – as will be the decision on how and when to redeploy to garrison. It’s always best to stay in our lanes, punch at our weight and pass the ammunition. There will be time enough for both garlands and blame casting when the reckoning is complete. Right now there is a war to fight. (H/T to EJ for the Washington Times link.) 22 comments to When lieutenant colonels collide |
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Copyright © 2009 Neptunus Lex - All Rights Reserved |
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Seems to me what the guy is saying ( and he is no more senior to Yingling so his opinion is no more or less valid) is that since the generals are generals, the Army should just go quietly into that great good night that their political masters have sent them into. Yingling is saying that the Army should be stronger than that. One supports the party line, one does not. Bottom line is that both are stuck in the same Army, fighting a war that is never going to end.
As participants in the process, its just wrong to presume that they do not get a vote. They do and I hope that more Yinglings rise up. Just because on LTC ( or some) agree with party line does not make Yingling’s arguement any less valid.
Skippy, here is the answer you seek. Learn it, live it, and you may someday become a warrior. Till then you will just be a civilian in uniform:
War is not violence and killing, pure and simple; war is controlled violence, for a purpose. The purpose of war is to support your government’s decisions by force. The purpose is never to kill the enemy just to be killing him…but to make him do what you want to do.
Not killing…but controlled and purposeful violence.
But it’s not your business or mine to decide the purpose of the control. It’s never a soldier’s business to decide when or where or how — or why — he fights; that belongs to the statesmen and the generals.
The statesmen decide why and how much; the generals take it from there and tell us where and when and how. We supply the violence; other people — ‘older and wiser heads,’ as they say — supply the control. Which is as it should be.” [Heinlein 1959:63, emphasis and ellipses in original]
There are may folks making “valid” points out there and they usually cause a little excitement before fading. In my experience they affect the guys in the arena very little. Two I’m somewhat familiar with are Tony Herbert and David Hackworth: highly decorated officers with tremendous experience and a perceived moral high ground, each with a cadre of fans. And they desire(d) you to know it. Other than interesting reading and stirring rightous indignation in junior folks, they affected this ragnar’s missions not at all.
Web Reconnaissance for 06/05/2007…
A short recon of what?ǂ
Skippy,
I think this war will end… but… it will only be won if it is fought with the same determination and resolve that we have fought past wars… like WWII. The biggest problem I see with the current conflict is that the Public’s resolve, and the Pol’s resolve doesn’t match… or for that matter come anywhere close to the resolve of the troops. IMO, this spells disaster for the eventual outcome.
V/R,
Jim C
lex…“There will be time enough for both garlands and blame casting when the reckoning is complete.
Right now there is a war to fight.”
———–
Perhaps more accurately stated, there is an insurgency to fight, not a “war”. And therein lies the crux of the problem.
The weapons, tactics, and methods to fight an insurgency are extremely different than those used to fight a “war”. The generals have been attempting to fight a conventional war when counterinsurgency ?
Since when do colonel’s critique general’s? That is a new one on me.
Skippy,
re “and I hope that more Yinglings rise up.”
Belies the true nature of your position. I found the 2nd 0-5’s debate more compelling from my own experience. You ought to know better, too.
b2
RC – When there is widespread dissension within the senior ranks on war strategy – as mentioned in this prescient, 3-year old, WaPo article, and positive change was not forthcoming. What is surprising is that more have not spoken out publically.
Nosmo,
Thanks for the lesson. You’ll forgive me if I don’t agree with your conclusion of who is and who is not a warrior. There is room for this discussion within the military and it should have been going on for a long time. Obiedence does not have to equal agreement. The serving person obeys, but he also has a responsibilty to ensure the tool of statecraft is used for the right purposes and is resourced properly by the so called statesmen.
That Yingling’s article was picked up by other media and used to advance a particular point of view is not Yingling’s fault-and he has made clear that was not his intention.
Your premise is that he should simply suffer in silence while the institution he has devoted a large portion of his adult life to goes down the wrong path? That makes no sense to me and never did.
Tweedle it down some, Skip – you’re the CO of a squadron and the DH’s are writing articles in Proceedings arguing over exactly how wrong-headed you are.
Good idea? Best thing for the squadron? Or maybe he should have walked a mile or two in your shoes before jumping paybands on his conclusions?
I could maybe grant you and fliterman a point if Yingling had some affirmative point to make, but “Gosh those general officers were stupid, and maybe even immoral – if only they had an advanced degree in political science or French Poetry this’d never have happened” strikes me as a little less than compelling as a strategic argument. The pols tell us where and when to fight. We tell them how we’d like to. Somebody leads and somebody follows at every level – everything else is chaos, or else the Maginot Army mutinying in the field.
We don’t make policy at that level, we execute it. I know you think you’re smarter than the constitutionally appointed and elected memebers of the national security establishment, but merely averring that it is so doesn’t make for good policy and it doesn’t advance the cause no matter how warm and snuggly it makes you feel.
Lex, you have yours a very interesting discussion stewing in the old crock pot. My question is this, Where is this war? Are we just talking of the sands of Arabia and Persia? In some ways, the actual war is right here on the internet in the milblogs, Main Street in any American Town, but more importantly in the hearts and minds of the American people, not just the Iraqi people.
When I think of the situation you described, to me there is a good comparrison. I want you think about the process of polishing a diamond. They take a small pile of gems and put them into a drum and tumble them against each other. This process brings out the best in the gem. I am talking about all officers. I know the UCMJ says, no. The tumbling of the gems or hard heads with a little abrasive is done for a long time. When this is finished, the abrasive and gems are removed, then separated. The gems are then put back into the drum with saw dust. This last step polishes the gems. I think there is a balance point between the UCMJ and the tumbling process to bring out the best in today’s military.
Actually I had a JO that did exactly that. In the end he left the Navy, but he was well rewarded by me, because even though I did not agree with him, he was a good officer and a good NFO. He also knew how to do what he was told-even while he loudly made clear he did not like it. I can live with that kind of noise. Made for some entertaing discussions at the bar though and at his farewell I got a good roasting from him. Which was Ok-I actually learned a thing or two from that.
I had a responsibility to explain the why’s of a decison process to him and to the others. I’ve always believed in that and have tried to use it as one of my communication tools. Also, it was important to make them see that the system was something that was imperfect and one had to do the best for one’s people within that system. Especially with some of the hypocisy that was going on aboard and in CVW’s during the 1994 time frame.
re: “he was a good officer and a good NFO. He also knew how to do what he was told-even while he loudly made clear he did not like it”
Maybe it’s different in Hornets – those two statements are irreconcilable to me.
re: “I had a responsibility to explain the why?
Comparing LTC Yingling’s essay with some isolated dispute or issue within a Navy tactical command is perhaps a poor analogy.
To even the most casual observer, the schism between the US civilian defense leadership and the military – especially the Army – has long been evident. Less evident but no less serious has been the growing schism and discontent between field grade and general officers of the Army. This divide has long been festering and growing privately (as is usually appropriate).
But like tectonic plates under ever-growing pressure, fissures like this critical essay will naturally appear, (and should appear) indicating the massive and extensive stress, and needed change just beneath the surface.
This was not some disgruntled, renegade officer’s spiteful attack. Rather, it was a cogent critique by one with impeccable credentials who, without naming names, proffers a respectful call in a professional forum for exigent and major change within the Army. You can be sure it reflects the professional and combat experienced opinion of many peers, and to include those below and above his pay grade. It also had to be vetted. Indeed, because of LTC Yingling’s widespread respect within the Army, he was the likely appointed spokesman for many.
I seem to recall an instance involving the Naval Aviation in the early 90’s where there was much more public critique and bitter dissension. It exposed a great divide between senior flag officers, tactical commanders, and junior officers. Although a regrettable and excruciatingly painful experience, the eventual result ?
Its neither a Citadel thing or a multi seat thing. ( Although I think having a large wardroom has its own dynamics that Hornet guys just don’t understand) Mostly it was based on the people I worked for over the years. Who did explain things-even thought they were not required to. And taught me a lot. I was lucky that way. Worked for some real psychopaths too,(my DH tour was hell for the first year working for a real jerk) but the people I admired were teachers of how to use the system to take care of their people.
Maybe it the Hornet community is different-you guys always had the best of everything handed to you. Try holding Captain’s call in Hangar SP-1 where the roof leaked, you had two aircraft in ASPA and the wing was stealing engines from you for another squadron that needed them more-and its hard to look your youngin’s in the face and tell them that the Navy really cares for them. Especially when they could look across Chambers Field and see the nice spaces the Reserves had. Or taking the squadron to Puerto Rico on “smart per diem”.
We did OK. We won the awards we were supposed to win, and we almost always made our flight schedule and CAG was happy with us. Work hard play hard and all that. I had a good chief’s mess and a great CMC (after firing my first one) who kept me clued in on what people really thought. Two rules I learned early on were build a good network to know what people really thought-and keep an eye on your night check. I did all my roaming around the ship late at night. It was very instructive. Mustangs were great teachers too……..
If a guy gives you a good product on time ( which the JO I mentioned did)-that’s all that matters in the end. In the end, the only portfolio, if you could call it that-the only thing that really matters is taking care of your people. Getting them promoted-getting them the assignments they want- that’s about the only “stock” the “company” gives you. Mission accomplishment happens when the folks feel like they are being looked out for.
Regrets-sure. But not so many. People I’ve helped to move on to do bigger and better things-a lot.
Whoa.
This thread’s gone from discussing two Army 0-5’s, well read who are giving personal anecdotes basically on General officers of the Army to well…I’m not sure…
On the other hand, I am sure that if we weren’t in the midst of the WOT, “Yingling” would still be just beer.
Skippy has personalized his opinion based on his “Command experience” and Lex has countered from his. IMO, both are off the point. The operational level and theater levels of war at the 3/4 star levels is outside their expertise unless they have spent years, not one tour, observing those leaders as COS-level 0-6’s. Fundamentally, that perspective is what is missing LtCol Yingling’s thesis bringing up credibility issues. All LTC Gentile sort of points that out and writes about is that 0-5’s don’t know a lot about General officers and what they do. I agree.
On the other hand Fliterman takes is on the academic type approach and “whole body”. All from books that seem to take on the establishment or seem to be expose’s. He does bring up a seemingly compelling point. IE- The great divide between Naval leadership and JOs during/post Tailhook. As he accurately points out, there was quite a gulf between the two which I can personally vouch for. What is incorrect about that analogy with the “Yingling-Gentile debate”, totally, is that the playing field is radically different. We are at War (WWIII?) today, possibly a generational war, and that makes “sniping” like Yingling did, seem counter productive and unprofessional, to most of us that have been around a bit.
b2
What B2 said.
Jake Grafton had some some simple, clear instructions for his JOs:
“You’ll fly when you’re scheduled. You’ll do as you’re told. You owe that to your country.”
[...] some food for thought from Lex about LTC Yingling’s [...]
B2,
I find it interesting you put my command experience in quotes-is mine somehow less valid than Lex’s? Command is command. I had 3 of them for whatever that is worth.
Regarding Yingling-he published in a military journal. There was a time we prided that kind of thing-I guess that’s no longer a virtue. He did not publish in the Washington Post.
By inference you are saying that we cannot accept ideas and opinions by junior personnel that are critical of the decisions made by their leadership. We are also told that we cannot accept criticism by retired Generals who have served at the operational leve of war and made the same types of decisions-because they are retired and no longer in the arena. Ergo no one can criticize serving military personnel at the flag level.
That’s probably one of the great achievement of the Clark tenure as CNO-all of the “boat rockers” who had genuine respect from the ranks were weeded out slowly and surely. “The company men” who toed the party line were rewarded. Don’t think the junior personnel did not pick up on that subtle message loud and clear.
In the meantime, the rush to the train wreck continues in all the services. When it occurs who will be blamed-no one?
And as for Jake Grafton he flew when he was scheduled-he also had low regard for many senior officers who were seen as advancing their own agendas………….
Skippy,
re- “I had 3 of them for whatever that is worth.”
It is worth a lot Skippy and I by no way demean. In fact, I agree with some of your premises regarding equivalence w/VFA. But that still doesn’t equate with what Yingling was critiquing, IMO, as outlined above. Naval command up to 0-6 ain’t comparable to operational level of war command.
re- “you are saying that we cannot accept ideas and opinions by junior personnel that are critical of the decisions made by their leadership”
I said NO such thing. Unlike some posters above I simply said it was “unseemly”. LTCOL Yingling has created his own “kitchen heat”. Gentile has rebutted quite effectively..it would have been unseemly for a General officer to do the same thing in any forum.
re “By inference you are saying…”
Because the above is wrong this is wrong, too- by inference sorta! EG- I jump all over retired flag/genos wannabees-hasbeens when they write/say something stupid/silly every opportunity I can get! You have a short memory. Plus, being retired myself I think some might say I have been outspoken too. You too. Lexxy too, but with “lightness”. LOL.
re- “Jake Grafton he flew when he was scheduled-he also had low regard for many senior officers who were seen as advancing their own agendas..”
Yep, and basically, that’s why I have several less command tours than you! On the other hand I did know when to shut up and fly wing! A “bad flight” is like “bad sex” and “no flight” is like “no sex! You understand.
Let’s be real here: Every CO has “his” own “agenda”. That’s why it’s called Command, but that agenda must conform to the orders, policies and framework of the service.
Everything else is “unseemly”.
b2
Skip,
In Flight of the Intruder, Jake Grafton as a JO gets wire-brushed by his CO for attacking an unfragged target. His boss tells him: “What you did was wrong –dead wrong…America will always need the Navy. And the Navy must obey.”
In Final Flight, Grafton is now the CAG. He has hot-shot JOs who want to leave before their committments are up, who are bored or disappointed with their assignments, who think they are smarter than their superiors. He has thought and felt before exactly what they are thinking and feeling.
But now he’s the grown-up and the buck stops with him. He’s seen and done everything that they see from their level. The reverse is not true. That’s when he bluntly tells them all what they still owe to their country. They don’t have to like it. But they will do it. He is not in a position to explain. He is in command.
Like B2 I also meant no disrespect for your command tours.