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A hard read

Soldiers of the second platoon, Charlie Company 1/26 had been decimated – literally – by insurgent attacks in the Baghdad suburb of Adhamiya. They lost their Bn CO to a humanitarian transfer when his own son died in Germany. They would be shocked by the suicide death of a respected senior NCO from another company. Mere chance prevented them to losing another handful of soldiers on an uncleared route in a hostile part of town.

A day later, they were ordered to go out on patrol. They mutinied instead.

And the strangest thing is that although I myself represent the law of hard discipline and military necessity, I’m not so sure they didn’t do the right thing.

It’s a hard read.

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35 comments to A hard read

  • Sounds like bad communication – “They aren’t going” doesn’t equal “They’re on meds and have been to mental health.”

  • Tom G.

    Tough story all around for guys asked to give it all and then some.

  • AW1 Tim

    Shipmates,

    I wasn’t there so I cannot judge these men as a unit or as individuals. I refuse to make a judgement based upon an Army Times article, because I cannot be certain that what was published is entirely correct.

    But yeah… a hard read.

  • FbL

    Uncle Jimbo has an interesting take, and I agree with him (to the extent I could be expected to have any concept of the situation):

    If Top couldn’t take it, how can the troops? This was not a mutiny. It was men who got hit with too much and stepped back and said, “Whoa, we are not well right now.” I find it admirable that they recognized they were losing their restraint and that they felt the possibility of stepping over the line.

    It IS heartbreaking, but I have great admiration for their willingness to recognize the issue and stand up to leadership until it was addressed.

  • Grumpy

    Lex, you are right, this was a “hard read”. After I read it, I was tempted to just move on with no comment. But no matter how I tried to factor it, the only thing to do was to face this blank box.

    First, we need to look at a few things, as I remember it, “The Road of Respect is a Two Way Street, NOT a One way Street”. The troops are supposed to respect and obey the chain of command in most cases, not all. This is confirmed by the Nuremberg Decisions. Now, there is an equal, if not more responsibility, from the command down to the troops. Command, TAKE CARE OF YOUR TROOPS! Command is defined by everybody who has a say in the deployment of our troops. YES, this would include POTUS, He is either 100% in or 100% out. Which is it? Would somebody please tell me,the article from the “Army Times”, was this an editorial or the findings of a court-martial? Under what authority was this article written?

    SGT Jeff (USAR): Sgt, you make a very precise point, I believe very appropriate to this situation.

    Tom G.: Sir, as I read this, no matter what I thought or wrote, I could not argue with the TRUTH of your comment.

    Gentlemen, THANK YOU!

    With respect,
    Grumpy

  • EJ Smith

    I disagree with Uncle Jimbo. I don’t find it admirable at all.

    I agree that the 1SG is a big hit to take, and I feel remorse for their lost commerades, but it is no excuse to not do your duty.
    Combining it with other issues does not make it any easier to swallow, nor condone.

    Passing judgement is not what I am doing. I just disagree. The NCOs in this platoon let their men down in my opinion. That platoon was their responsibility, and they failed that.

    I wasn’t there, I know. It still doesn’t sit right with me though.
    Sorry, it’s been beaten into my head for years.

  • EJ Smith

    Comrades. It’s Monday.

  • FbL

    The NCOs in this platoon let their men down in my opinion. That platoon was their responsibility, and they failed that.

    I wondered whether those with applicable experience might come to that conclusion. If (and that’s an if–I’m not qualified to judge) the NCOs failed in their leadership/responsibility, then wouldn’t it be reasonable for the people they failed to say, “we are not in a position to successfully complete our mission under these circumstances?” The mission is everything, but what if nobody thinks they can meet the mission, or that not only would they not successfully complete the mission but they would make things even worse due to a self-acknowledged concern about losing control?

    I mean, ideally they would have the training and strength to overcome anything, but what if (for various reasons) they didn’t…? Does that change the calculations?

    (I’m asking honest questions here, as I don’t know the answers)

  • Allen

    There is a lot missing here. How could the Company Commander not know what’s going on with one of his platoons? Where was the Platoon Leader? There should have been at least an acting PL that meets constantly with the CO.

    The NCO’s weren’t connected very well either. This a leadership failure up and down the line. The battallion commander wasn’t on top of his companies, the company commander was clueless about his platoons. That’s where the real problem lies IMO.

  • EJ Smith

    I can’t say. Your argument is sound, but I can not see myself in a position not to carry out my duty, and also ensure that my platoon was up to that task.

    How many times have other platoons felt that “we are not in a position to successfully complete our mission under these circumstances?” yet carried it out anyway?

    Hamburger Hill comes to mind. There are numerous other instances where that thought/feeling surely was pervasive in other platoons, yet they continued on.
    I am sure history is littered with such examples.

    But, as with you, I wasn’t there. I can only speculate and base my opinion on my experiences and beliefs.

  • EJ Smith

    I agree with Allen as well. Where were the other leaders of this unit?
    I thought of that as well, but still feel it was the platoon NCOs at the root.

  • That is a tough read. No matter how you look at it. What I want to know is why they weren’t allowed to go in and clean that area out. Hell, why not give them a little payback? Putting our combat soldiers out doing humanitarian projects, letting them get picked apart by jihadis, and then not letting them solve the problem… not letting them have a little payback is not only wrong, it’s dangerous.

    Jim C

  • Allen

    FbL- EJ Smith is right, if I had ever let my men get to even the talking point about this kind of thing I would have failed in my duty as a squad leader. The squad leader is the most effective man for this, because we really continue the fight for our buddies at the smallest unit, the squad. So the NCO’s dropped the ball big time IMO.

    But the CO was not very aware of the men’s morale. Which also reminds me the XO seems to have been missing in action as well. All in all it doesn’t sound like there was enough “follow me” but too much obey me.

    The moral of the story to me: A fine group of fighting men consigned to a trip through hell with leaders who didn’t lead.

  • EJ Smith

    “A fine group of fighting men consigned to a trip through hell with leaders who didn’t lead.”

    Well said.
    I agree.

  • FbL

    The reason I asked is because I suspected many would place blame at the feet of leadership, but I wasn’t sure…

    Thanks for the insight, guys.

  • FbL

    Btw, Blackfive himself says (in a comment on the post I linked) he’s been in contact with the unit and been doing some digging, and that he’ll have a post soon about the whole thing.

    Interesting…

  • Snake Eater

    A hard/misrable read indeed…Sweet Jesus… the Top blows his brains out in front 0f the troops… appaling. The CO…clueless to the end and yes… what about the Platoon leader or the XO…that said… I’ll hold further comment until more facts are revealed… Best

  • As an NCO in the US Army, it is MY RESPONSIBILITY to take care of my soldiers.

    Soldiers FIRST. THERE IS NO MISSION if my soldiers are not able to function.

    I believe, in my heart of hearts… and with everything I have ever learned about people and soldiers, that those NCO’s made the best damn decision that they possibly, conceivably could have made. And I would back them up come hell or high water.

    Not a single one of us was there, as we all know, and I hope to every god ever conceived of, that no soldier is ever there again… but the ONLY right answer to this is the answer those soldiers took. They were there.

    They aren’t soldiers who acted without consideration, without thought or without understanding of the repercussions. We all know what they are, and they were still willing to stand by their decision.

    It goes all the way up. It does not stop with the NCOs. That entire command failed those soldiers and leadership failed those NCOs. If command is not listening to the soldiers, then there is no true leadership. NCOs are not machines. We are not indestructible.

    Please, ask not what you think the soldiers should have done and don’t try to imagine what you would have done… just accept that there is no way any of us would know what we would do in that situation. And give those soldiers the respect they deserve for wearing the uniform, and performing their duties to the best of their abilities… we are all human. Including soldiers.

    By asserting what “we” would have done, we’re demonstrating our lack of empathy and respect, and showing a quality that every soldier who has ever been in combat despises, abhors and deeply resents. They will do enough condemning and live with enough guilt all on their own. They don’t need our help.

    It isn’t about whether or not they should have or should have not gone. The question is, why in the hell were they issued the order in the first place? There are some officers up there who obviously didn’t lose any sleep over the previous deaths of their troops. I guess to some, we are all still just little half inch colored pieces on a RISK board.

  • EJ Smith

    I’ll try to address Army Girl later. Too many issues to work on at the moment. Gotta work I guess. ;)

  • Curtis

    It may sound odd coming from a Navy guy but I once found myself with a mutinous department. It had nothing to do with me or my leadership but it had much to do with risking our lives every single day for months on end and with very bad leadership at the CO/XO level.

    I actually have great respect for these soldiers based on what I’ve read at the link. These guys found themselves, through no fault of their own at a natural human breaking point. No amount of training or discipline has ever kept troops in line once they have reached their limit. This has been recognized by real officers for thousands of years. Cities in the olden days were summoned to surrender and if they did they were spared the the following sack of the city in which the officers gave over to the men the complete rape, murder and humiliation of the city’s inhabitants.

    What happens when fighting an asymmetric war when the “good” guys decide one day that enough one sided bloodletting is enough? MY LAI?

    These days my responsibilities include employing 3500 sailors for ATFP duties all over the world. Believe me, if I had any indications that one of those dets was feeling not up to snuff we would immediately replace the team.

    I don’t know the facts in any case but the recent spate of Marine Courts-martial would seem to make a valid point about the near indefensibility of putting men known to the command to be borderline stable in the complex realm of making instant life or death decisions about just which of the rotten SOBs they are facing now needs to be shot.

    I went to the lion’s den for my guys and still take out and reread the letter my LPO wrote to me 3 hours after I talked them all out of the situation they had driven themselves to with the incredibly able assistance of the CO and XO of the ship. The happy resolution of that situation is one of the things I am most proud of in 24 years of service.

  • lex

    Taking just the facts as they’ve been presented in the Army Times, I tend to agree. The only concern that I have is that when leadership fails a team to this extent – again, if that is what has happened – that there aren’t any checks in place to keep good folks from cooking off. Because frankly, the unwillingness of 2PLT, Co “C”, 1/26 to go on patrol means that someone else whose turn it would not have been would have to go and take their place on the line.

    I guess I do have a problem with that.

    It’s also instructive that the platoon was broken up rather than disciplined under UCMJ. That at least implies a retrospective realization that something not of their own doing had contributed to this “mutiny.”

  • Allen

    I would offer one final comment on this matter. I know of no other profession that is so self-introspective by current and former members than our Armed Services. I would argue that this is a testament to the men and women who have served and do serve now.

    Regardless of the details, I find that the discussion of the potential merits and failures is in the finest tradition of service to the nation. If we but had this discussion in more aspects of our society

  • Doc

    Thanks for pointing it out, Lex. Saw In the Valley of Elah a while back. Worth a viewing if you haven’t seen it. This story made me think of it.

  • Grumpy

    Lex, as I read the continual saga of this event from the different points of view. I see many things. As when we were young, things were black and white. The line of separation was a very neat crisp line. but as we age in both time and/ or experience, the crisp line begins to blur. The battle space, things are easy to judge until you are there. It is NOT a schoolroom or a laboratory, it’s a life changing crucible. The word “mutiny” stould never have been in the discussion or the article.

    Thanks, Lex for posting this article.

    Grumpy

  • Please don’t misunderstand what I wrote. I’m not placing blame on the men of the unit. All I was asking is why were they not allowed to go after the jihadis that had been picking them apart. It sounded to me (based on what was in the article) that they had been picked apart for weeks, and then were asked to go out and do a “teddy bear mission” or route clearance, or some other sort of mission. IMO, leadership should have said go into town and clean house.

    Can anyone give any insight as to why this didn’t happen?

    Jim C

  • Once a Marine

    Army Girl,

    As a Marine NCO, I too am troubled by the absence of responsibility seemingly being taken by the Officer leadership. Based solely on what I’ve read, it seems the NCOs got hung out to dry when the unit could not function.

    We ask our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airmen to function in a nearly impossible situation. If they can’t do the mission, for whatever reason (too many casualties, too low troop strength, lack of T/E, whatever) they can’t perform. Yes, Lex, it troubles me when another unit has to stand to in the place of a unit which can’t function. However, as Curtis notes, is the result of forcing these Soldiers to take on this mission when they couldn’t another My Lai or Haditha?

    Lex, you are still on the pointy end of the spear. I value your insights. Am I, or are we, missing something here?

    OAM

  • lex

    Actually, I’m pretty damned far from the pointy end these days, OAM. I guess you could say I work at the factory where policy on spear-carrying cases is set.

    I’m just a long-distance observer troubled that it could come to this.

  • Albany Rifles

    A couple of thoughts from someone sitting miles (and years) away.

    As someone asked…where was the platoon leader? The second or first lieutenant who is in charge of that rifle platoon? Where was the company XO?

    And finally, where was the first segeant? It was the first sergesant of Alpha company who committed suicide. I did not see anywhere in the article any mention of the Charlie Company’s first sergeant. 2nd Platoon was one of HIS platoons…where was he?

    Where was the battalion Command Sergeant Major? He is the battalion commander’s eyes and ears and is supposed to be out looking into an dfinding these kind of issues before tehy become a problem.

    My say on this? The soldiers of 2/C/1-26 INF were not punished because I believe the chain of comamnd of the 1-26 INF realized they had failed that platoon.

    Final note; decades ago as brand new second lieutenant I showed up for my first assignment. I was made the platoon leader of 3/C/1-26 INF. I was also the only commissioned platoon leader in the company. 1st and 2nd platoons had SFCs(E7s) as PLs with E6s as PSGs. I wonder if 1-26 INF was in the same boat…a shortsage of company grade officers.

  • Snake Eater

    AR, I agree… the entire chain of command ( totally F**ked-Up)…” failed that platoon” …and when that happens good/young men die. Best

  • EJ Smith

    In the end it is the troops that suffer the failings of their leaders. NCO, or officer, or both.

    It is the troops in this sad incident that concerns me the most.

    How will this affect them, and their judgment later on down the road when they take the reigns as leaders?

    After all, they are the future leaders that we will depend on to carry out their duty.

  • My take on this is that the platoon found themselves in a position (one that is beyond my scope of knowledge) that had them facing a double-edged sword.

    They either go back out, after suffering horrifying losses, only to unleash their rage, their anger, and their desire for revenge upon the town or they refuse to go out and take time to step away from the above-mentioned emotions. Either way, the consequences are not pleasant.

    Regardless of what aspect of their leadership failed them, they faced a no-win situation.

    I cannot imagine.

  • Grumpy

    Lex, there are many issues which are not even begun to be addressed. This platoon did absolutely nothing wrong! When men are pushed to the breaking point, this is something that is percieved by the men themselves. Let’s get above this situation. Let’s look at this like a stop-action movie. I know this couldn’t be done at the time, but we should do it at this point in time. There are different authority structures in place at this time. We have the human “chain of command”, peer group/ your platoon, self-discipline. There are 2 other concepts, we have the “Rules of Engagement” and ALL of these military aspects are under the UCMJ. If these members of this platoon felt out of control, they should be taken out of the loop under UCMJ. Also under the UCMJ, this would make any order for them to go out on patrol, an “unlawful military order.” Hint- a handful of pills does NOT get around this issue. If we don’t have enough troops to win, then do whatever is needed to grow a larger force. There should be no action taken against this platoon in any way! This platoon should NOT even be broken up, they did ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WRONG!

    Grumpy

  • Brian

    Setting aside the obvious issues of responsibility for actions taken or not taken up and down the c of c, I see this as having high value as a leadership case-study.

    Look at the discussion generated here, with the many good points brought in from a wide variety of knowlegable participants. If the Army knows what’s good for it this case will not soon be forgotten, and many future JO’s and upcoming NCO’s will have learned from it.

  • Grumpy

    Lex, I should have completed my thought in #33. Going back many years ago, the military had this concept. Your soul may be the Lord’s, but your ass is U.S. Government Property, TAKE CARE OF IT! In today’s world this would have a much broader meaning.

    Grumpy

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