Net centric warfare is the next “revolution in military affairs,” theoretically permitting a networked force to efficiently get inside an enemy’s OODA loop, create local windows of superiority in command, communication and fires permitting a smaller force to swarm and overcome enemy forces through “information superiority”.
When it comes to stealthy aircraft however, it turns out that NCW is harder than it looks:
The designers of the first VLO (ed. very low observables) aircraft adopted low probability of intercept (LPI) as the watchword for RF systems. This includes power management, frequency ability and tight beam control with small sidelobes — but it was founded on transmitting as little as possible, which in the pre-network days meant not at all. Both the F-22 and F-35 use RF intra-flight data link systems, which generate steered, stabilized, pencil beams on a handshake arrangement, so that the beams lock on to the receiver aircraft. The Harris Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) on the F-35 uses six phased array antennas to provide spherical coverage around the aircraft. The signals cannot be intercepted unless the listener is on the beam, which is constantly moving…
These systems have two drawbacks, however. Each pencil beam can talk to only one aircraft at a time and needs a dedicated transmitter to do that, so it is not a network device. And the intra-flight links only talk to other aircraft of the same type.
What about JTIDS/Link-16? Not LPI, and while the F-35 has a two-way Link-16 the Raptor’s is receive only.
You’ve probably seen this one, but I thought I would send it to you anyway.
http://www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/nawcwd/news/2007/2007-10_mids_testing.htm
Well, that’s one way to avoid infoglut…
re- “The signals cannot be intercepted unless the listener is on the beam, which is constantly moving…’
LPI is 1980′s Cold War requirements deferred until recently and were actually developed and funded in the late 90′s….the pre-9-11 world. LPIA RADALT comes to mind…
Look. I don’t think “Abdul” has the technology to intercept or interpret and unlikely to any time soon..Plus look at it even if it was feasible..Does this mean 4 stars and their staffs will direct air-to-air engagements-personally?
How about the warrior factor? SA in the B-space ain’t control back at REMF headquarters. Thank G- not yet. Just think of all the decisions McKloskey had to make during the dynamics of the Battle of Midway, alone. He didn’t need Strike/Cag CSG/CAOC to clear it through and then big Kahuna to approve, vetted by JAGs o’course.
On the other hand, if you have to train 21 year old midshipmen how to drink at the academy…
Talk about loops.
b2
I don’t know that it’s so much a factor of general officers helping a guy with his sort contract so much as it is providing the right info to the spear carrier on an as-needed basis. It’s also true that with sub-meter resolution of AESA radars there’s gucci ISR gouge that could be passed back into the net as well that’s currently being stovepiped.
Yup, there is a big over-sell on NCW stuff. It is important and useful but you still need a good command sense and training to control it all or you will just have really great situational awareness of what will end up killing you anyway. The big question is that if JSF was based on being so NCW, how … given the limits of realistic and achievable NCW, can it be effective in complex strike work ?….where in the case of the USN ( not pickin on anyone just a good example ) is so wed to the idea that the two seat Super Hornet ( especially the upcoming Block IIs with superb avionics ) are the preferred strike platform where the two man crew rocks. Kind of makes one wish that JSF would be better ( although shorter range ) if the fuel space ( or STOVL liftfan space ) was yanked out to accommodate a two aircrew. Look at the other AV week article on JSF about the Israel looking at JSF. The downcheck list of JSF things they aren’t impressed about, speaks for itself. Yet some out there ( Australia ) are sold a bill of goods that NCW can make up for weakness in platform. Yikes. At least the Navy with Super E/F and coming G and all the improvements and the improved Hawkeye, have an NCW topology that they can depend on and is viable.
And of course, the inscrutible Orientals are totally oblivious to all of this sort of stuff. They would not dare think of using all that technology we gave them, err- THEY MAKE FOR US, and using it in this fashion.
Nah, I didn’t think so.
With their nifty torpedoes, they may not find many targets left.
So solly.
BINGO, Lex! Hand the man the kewpie doll!
There’s a whole lot of intel that can be passed – tracks, imagery, etc. If BAMS pans out, it’s going to be eye-watering. Basically, we’re hitting the fog of war with a good fog lamp.
It poses some interesting questions about command methodology.
It also poses some good questions about informational overload. Pilots have a lot to do already. If the technology can help build situational awareness, a nice 3D model of where everybody is, so much the better. If on the other hand it provides information he doesn’t need, can’t use, then filtering that out takes time otherwise spent on more primary duties.
– Max
ELP-
Yet some out there ( Australia ) are sold a bill of goods that NCW can make up for weakness in platform
Would you like to elaborate on this point a little?
What the Israelis are saying about the influnence of NCW on fighters.
Nonetheless, he worries that the JSF will start showing its limitations within five years. Among the drawbacks will be its one-person crew. As a result, “we can’t operate the F-35 by itself,” the retired general says. “We really need two-seaters, with one person concentrating on flying and someone else focused on the strike mission. One man can’t take advantage of all the options,” particularly since JSF capabilities will include jamming, information warfare and network attack.