Fascinating article – truly, history’s first draft – on retired Army four star Jack Keane’s behind the curtain efforts in support of the Petraeus surge, and ultimately behind his elevation to CENTCOM. All of this in the face of stern Joint Chiefs of Staff hostility to the plan, and Keane’s part in furthering it.
As Keane was laying out his view (to Vice President Cheney), President Bush walked in.
“I know you’re talking to Dave (Petraeus),” Bush said to Keane. “I know that the Joint Chiefs and the Pentagon have some concerns.” The JCS had not favored the surge of 30,000 troops that Bush had decided was essential to quell the escalating violence in Iraq; the chiefs were deeply worried that the surge left no strategic reserve for an unexpected crisis elsewhere…
Bush said he wanted Keane to deliver a personal message to Petraeus from his commander-in-chief…
The two men sat alone. Keane took out the piece of paper and read the president’s message, verbatim, aloud to Petraeus:
“I respect the chain of command. I know that the Joint Chiefs and the Pentagon have some concerns. One is about the Army and Marine Corps and the impact of the war on them. And the second is about other contingencies and the lack of strategic response to those contingencies.
“I want Dave to know that I want him to win. That’s the mission. He will have as much force as he needs for as long as he needs it.
Members of the JCS objected that Keane, as a retired officer, lacked accountability for the consequences of his actions. While themselves accountable to the president, the service chiefs also undoubtedly also feel themselves accountable to their services. An institutional loyalty, if you will.
The engaged commander in the field is wholly committed to victory. So too, at least theoretically, are the Joint Chiefs of Staff back home. But their commitment as contrasted to the deployed commander’s is as the chicken’s compared to the pig when it comes to the making of a ham and egg sandwich. The service chiefs sit atop an institution with both a history and a future, while the combatant commander is invested with the fierce urgency of now.
Believing – as they must – that the country’s future and that of their own institutions are inextricably intertwined, a service chief might even be willing to lose a war he thought inconsequent (or unwinnable) in order to preserve his service for future fights. In an admittedly uncharitable peering into mens’ souls given the caliber of those involved, the stink of failure in any case would cling to the deployed commander and the politician who sent him forward, not to services which had each of them given it “their best.” In this we hear the echoes of Secretary Gates’ struggles with the USAF hierarchy.
Bush is a famously successful card player, and in this decision he set all his country’s chips on the table: Win the war we are in rather than attempt to manage the consequences of potential failure. It now appears (although this is by no means certain) that history will vindicate that decision, although no one should think that it was anything like a no-brainer for those on either side, nor that either path was without enormous risk.
This is no doubt part of the reason why the Founders, in their wisdom, placed civilian leadership atop the military. A the end of the day, it has everything to do with accountability.
Update: More like this.
when it comes to Texas Hold ‘Em, sometimes ya just gotta go all-in.
Outstanding analysis. Are you sure you’re not prepping to be a “Grand Strategist,” Lex?
I am reading W.E.B. Griffin’s series of books. This entire episode could have been taken from any of several of these novels. Precis: POTUS wants to know what is really going on and has some retired officer keep an eye on things and report to him directly or through an intermediary. Very seldom , if ever, is JCS depicted as anything other than an obstacle.
Of course, this is fiction; no bearing on reality, right?
Interesting.
Once again, the JCS has rendered themselves useless.
I guess they didn’t read Dereliction of Duty…’cept this time we win.
Ultimately, the decision to surge was the president’s and there is nobody that can censor his communications with his subordinates. My memory is shot but who was the CJCS when the argument about whether or not surge was roiling in the Pentagon?
If the JCS were concerned about the lack of a strategic reserve than they were probably doing exactly what they trained to do and being very reluctant to let go. Think about it, they stripped a brigade out of Korea while they knew we were still disputing nK over their nuclear ambitions. When the historian looks back and asks why the Americans let themselves get sold a bill of goods by nK, they will have to consider that all we could our lonely Brigade and support troops still left in Korea is our thanks for dying bravely if push came to shove….and a little naval aviation support.
I don’t think the JCS members were as concerned about a lack of strategic reserve as they were about their Title 10 responsibilites, and that is a sad commentary — more dedicated to O,T & E than winning a war. The excerpt I saw yesterday had them seeing this as an ongoing 15 Brigade Combat Equivalent committment. I don’t think even Bush would have gone there — this was going to work, or we were out, with our tails between our legs.
The story of 2004-2007 was a story of timidity, I have to believe. We tried hunkering down in the FOBs — waiting out the “dead enders”, while we bled to death from a thousand paper cuts — playing right into AQ’s hands. Rumsfeld and Abazaid and Casey, in some ways, played the Clinton hand — the American people wouldn’t tolerate high death counts. They tried the standard Army way — overwhelming sustainment. History will record that Petraeus will be the Grant or Abrams, to Abazaid and Casey’s McClellan/Burnside/Meade or Westmoreland.
Once again, we have proven, fortes fortuna juvat.
The Surge was unsustainable. There was no way to maintain the extra 30k troops past one deployment cycle. That’s what made the strategy risky. What if AQI and AIF just melted away for a year or 15 months? Indeed, had the Anbar Awakening not been an integral part of the strategy, that almost certainly would have beeen their tactic.
The Surge was a one-shot weapon. If it didn’t work, we’d be pulling out by now, with our tails between our legs.
I think that comparison is terribly unfair-the analogy fails on so many levels. However it is useful in that Woodward is helping to enhance the canonization of Petreaus.
I’d also point out the same argument that was made against the generals who criticized Rumsfeld-Keane could have stayed and influenced policy as Army Chief of Staff. He turned down the opportunity.
I’d love to know what Fox Fallon really thought-cause I respect his judgment a lot more than I do the others. If he really disliked Petreaus (something that has never really been proven) there would have had to have been a good reason.
Greetings:
The only thing that I would add is the effect of the Congressional approval process for flag officers.
They have to maintain a relationship with that constituency also.
I’d like to point out that we won WWII
managing a 16 million man Army without a JCS. In answer to the demands of Army advocates of a traditional General Staff system post war, and using the experience of the war to justify it, Secretary of the Navy Forrestall (who opposed the JCS system) replied: “By this I take it to mean that you want a system just like the one that won the war? I find it hard to believe that the war was won by a system that has never existed.”
Of course, Forestall’s opposition was overcome by appointing him the first SecDef, but the point old Virgil here wishes to make is that there is nothing sacred about the JCS framework and post WWII history has not been kind to
those who champion it’s cause as the best and only way of doing business.
Re: Skippy’s mention of Woodward’s new book…
Can anyone tell me why the hell people are talking about a TS program (apparantly a *very* successful one) that is responsible for wiping out quite a number of AQ and other baddies in Iraq? Why would anyone tell Woodward about it??? It’s not like he’s gone and written any well-known books or anything. Geez – what happened to OPSEC???
Sorry for the mini-rant and moving off-topic, but that stunt has really got me spun up.
Brian
Virgil, while the JCS didn’t exist de jure during WWII, it did exist de facto, primarily as a result of how we had to deal with the British IGS. Whether the way it was structured under the acts of 1947 or Goldwater Nichols (which removed the senior officers from any responsibility for winning or losing a war!) was a good idea, is another question.
In order:
1. Bob Woodward writes great fiction. How many of these conversations do you think he was personally present at to know the exact words and expressions (verbal and physical) used by the persons involved?
2. What if AQI and AIF just melted away for a year or 15 months? Mmm, what’s to say that hasn’t been exactly the strategy, and how exactly would we know the difference?
3. Brian, I missed the spin on the new book, what’s it supposedly about?
I see institutional loyalty put before “winning” every day despite my attempts to work around it. The ol’beaurocratic stiff arm I call it.
Manifested by “leadership” such as concerns about COCOM (them) “appetites” for critical mission aircraft over the plans and visions (planned acquisitions) of a service (not just USAF).
Yep, I said it “Killer”- “Appetites”….. burp.
b2
It just seems like the service chiefs have lost their ways — they exist to organize, train and equip forces to meet the needs of the Regional Combatant Commanders. AF apparently lost sight of that over Preds, the Army over Crusader and Comanche (which was really what got Shinsheki “fired”). Is taking the service chiefs out of the warfighting loop the dark side of Goldwater-Nichols? Problem is that most people read this thing from Woodward and have no idea of the proper roles of everyone — and instead view it through partisan lenses.
Interesting point, Scott. If one looks at JCS and service chiefs as force providers in a supporting role to the Unified and JTF Commanders Goldwater-Nichols makes more sense. The conventional top-down heirarchal management model usually seen (and expected) in military organizations leads to the conclusion that the CNO “runs” the Navy and the CJCS “runs” the entire military structure. But is this right or proper? After all, PACOM, CENTCOM, STRATCOM, JFCOM, etc. are all full Generals/Admirals, just like the service chiefs. It seems proper that they would be the supported commanders in any operational situation.
Let me go out on a limb and say what may be needed to emphasize the JCS as supporting force provider is the temporary establishment of specific war-time commander(s) to oversee and execute GWOT strategy across theater and COCOM boundaries. If we’re really fighting a war (and I do believe we are) might it not be appropriate at least during periods of significant combat operations to appoint a General of the Army, Fleet Admiral and/or General of the Airforce, each accountable only to the Commander in Chief?
There are a lot of folks smarter ‘n me posting here who know that for some ‘problems’ there are no fixes. FOGOs with 30+years of background in the service of their choice have rigorously followed the rules, otherwise they faced mandatory retirement at 30 years.
Each service competes for every asset against each and every other service. Always been like that, always will be like that. The COCOM can paint himself purple and reap every benefit BECAUSE he doesn’t pay any of the costs for the assets he burns on whatever he regards as his 5 #1 priorities.
Just look at those DEPORDS! Services will capture all costs….They are unbudgeted costs It’s the bubbas back in DC who have pay the costs and who are the only ones held accountable for the costs. We divorced accountability from any job title above 07 when it comes to readiness and training. It’s not the BG CDRs fault or the Flt CDRs fault when things go bad. It’s the CO’s fault. And the guys in the Pentagon can shrug and say they tried to get the resources; not their fault the President didn’t buy their argument for increased funding and they struck out with the supplemental.