Comments on: Éminence Grise

By: Curtis

Curtis — Thu, 11 Sep 2008 01:34:38 +0000

There are a lot of folks smarter ‘n me posting here who know that for some ‘problems’ there are no fixes. FOGOs with 30+years of background in the service of their choice have rigorously followed the rules, otherwise they faced mandatory retirement at 30 years.

Each service competes for every asset against each and every other service. Always been like that, always will be like that. The COCOM can paint himself purple and reap every benefit BECAUSE he doesn’t pay any of the costs for the assets he burns on whatever he regards as his 5 #1 priorities.
Just look at those DEPORDS! Services will capture all costs….They are unbudgeted costs It’s the bubbas back in DC who have pay the costs and who are the only ones held accountable for the costs. We divorced accountability from any job title above 07 when it comes to readiness and training. It’s not the BG CDRs fault or the Flt CDRs fault when things go bad. It’s the CO’s fault. And the guys in the Pentagon can shrug and say they tried to get the resources; not their fault the President didn’t buy their argument for increased funding and they struck out with the supplemental.

By: submandave

submandave — Wed, 10 Sep 2008 17:21:16 +0000

Interesting point, Scott. If one looks at JCS and service chiefs as force providers in a supporting role to the Unified and JTF Commanders Goldwater-Nichols makes more sense. The conventional top-down heirarchal management model usually seen (and expected) in military organizations leads to the conclusion that the CNO “runs” the Navy and the CJCS “runs” the entire military structure. But is this right or proper? After all, PACOM, CENTCOM, STRATCOM, JFCOM, etc. are all full Generals/Admirals, just like the service chiefs. It seems proper that they would be the supported commanders in any operational situation.

Let me go out on a limb and say what may be needed to emphasize the JCS as supporting force provider is the temporary establishment of specific war-time commander(s) to oversee and execute GWOT strategy across theater and COCOM boundaries. If we’re really fighting a war (and I do believe we are) might it not be appropriate at least during periods of significant combat operations to appoint a General of the Army, Fleet Admiral and/or General of the Airforce, each accountable only to the Commander in Chief?

By: Scott

Scott — Wed, 10 Sep 2008 15:49:18 +0000

It just seems like the service chiefs have lost their ways — they exist to organize, train and equip forces to meet the needs of the Regional Combatant Commanders. AF apparently lost sight of that over Preds, the Army over Crusader and Comanche (which was really what got Shinsheki “fired”). Is taking the service chiefs out of the warfighting loop the dark side of Goldwater-Nichols? Problem is that most people read this thing from Woodward and have no idea of the proper roles of everyone — and instead view it through partisan lenses.

By: badbob

badbob — Wed, 10 Sep 2008 15:03:03 +0000

I see institutional loyalty put before “winning” every day despite my attempts to work around it. The ol’beaurocratic stiff arm I call it.

Manifested by “leadership” such as concerns about COCOM (them) “appetites” for critical mission aircraft over the plans and visions (planned acquisitions) of a service (not just USAF).

Yep, I said it “Killer”- “Appetites”….. burp.

By: Zane

Zane — Wed, 10 Sep 2008 08:37:43 +0000

In order:

1. Bob Woodward writes great fiction. How many of these conversations do you think he was personally present at to know the exact words and expressions (verbal and physical) used by the persons involved?

2. What if AQI and AIF just melted away for a year or 15 months? Mmm, what’s to say that hasn’t been exactly the strategy, and how exactly would we know the difference?

3. Brian, I missed the spin on the new book, what’s it supposedly about?

By: XBradTC

XBradTC — Wed, 10 Sep 2008 05:40:19 +0000

Virgil, while the JCS didn’t exist de jure during WWII, it did exist de facto, primarily as a result of how we had to deal with the British IGS. Whether the way it was structured under the acts of 1947 or Goldwater Nichols (which removed the senior officers from any responsibility for winning or losing a war!) was a good idea, is another question.