I’m about half way through Bing West’s newest book on Iraq, entitled “The Strongest Tribe.” West walked the Counter-Insurgency walk as a Marine in Viet Nam, and he doesn’t pull any punches in this tautly written work, the fourth he’s written so far on Iraq. In retrospect it’s easy to see – although harder to forgive – how a native national optimism combined with a natural desire to turn it all over to the Iraqi people and get the hell out of there as fast as possible combined to sabotage the effort over the first 3-4 years of the post-invasion occupation. I’m turning pages that chronicle wilful blindness and yes, professional incompetency as fast as I can in order to get to the part where General David Petraeus arrives in situ with a new strategy enabled by an all-in commitment of reserves – what we’ve come to know as the surge.
I’m not there yet even as events pass us by: Petraeus leaves Bagdhad for Tampa, but not before penning a farewell missive that may well go down in history for its charity and modesty.
Here was a man for the times.
I’m 3/4 of the way through the book. Its a good book-albeit a scathing indictment of Paul Bremer.
I’ve already peeked ahead to the end. His conclusions are ones you and I can both agree on particular items. I especially agree with West on his ideas about national service and why the lack thereof contributes to the national division politically.
I can’t locate it at the moment, but recently I read an article quoting in full a private letter from President Bush to General Petraeus, sent confidentially by way of another officer who was retired or about-to-be. At the time of the letter, Petraeus was not in command over forces in Iraq, and his views on how to go about things were strongly opposed by his superiors in theater. This was before he returned to the continental US to write the book on COIN, or shortly after.
The CINC’s letter said basically: ‘Tell David I want him to succeed. Don’t worry about the personnel disputes and political power struggles. That’s my job. The mission is to succeed, and I will not waver from that determination.’
(All that is from recollection from reading it several days ago somewhere, I can’t recall or find the source, I’m sorry.)
It’s a moving testament. Lincoln had found his General, and he knew it. President Bush was working to personally reach out and encourage Petraeus in the face of opposition from his own superiors.
Best regards, Peter Warner.
Re: President Bush was working to personally reach out and encourage Petraeus in the face of opposition from his own superiors.
That could also be a bad precedent to set for the long term. The idea that President will pick and choose his favorite generals has a whole host of implication vis a vis civilian / military relations. What happens if in the future a President backs the wrong horse?
Petreaus’ superiors served at the pleasure of the President-he could have fired them if he chose. That is the way the system is supposed to work.
I suspect the retired officer was Keane.
Thank you, Skippy. Prefacing my search with ‘Keane’ found the source directly.
The article/s are reporting on Bob Woodward’s latest book, ‘The War Within’. Apparently, Bush did in fact act to remove the officers he felt were hampering the surge strategy:
Quote New York Post:
President Bush had his own revelatory moment in a meeting with military experts, when retired Gen. Jack Keane told him, “We don’t have a plan to defeat the insurgency.” When Bush set about getting one – the surge – he had to do an end run around the chiefs.
He fired Rumsfeld, and replaced Gens. Pace and Abizaid. He kicked Gen. Casey upstairs to Army chief of staff in a foolhardy face-saving gesture. Casey had been pulled from the field in defeat, and a new strategy was implemented that – should it succeed – would expose the folly of his own.
Casey thought the surge was all about domestic US politics. Adm. Michael Mullen – the new chairman of the chiefs – thought there was a conspiracy afoot to blame the loss of the war on the military. And Abizaid’s replacement at CENTCOM, Adm. William Fallon, shared their dim view of the surge.
A bizarre multifront battle ensued, with the new commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, fighting against our enemies with the added forces of the surge, and CENTCOM and the chiefs fighting against the surge. According to Woodward, “Fallon was determined to challenge the merit of every personnel request.”
Keane became a back channel between Petraeus and Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Keane warned Cheney, “The Joint Chiefs are more concerned about breaking the Army and Marine Corps than winning the war.” When Bush gave Keane a message for Petraeus saying he’d have all the forces needed to succeed, Petraeus replied, “I wish he’d tell CENTCOM and the Pentagon that.”
Unquote.
The New York Post
http://www.nypost.com/seven/09152008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/the_chiefs_shame_129148.htm
A slightly different perspective is related in the Washington Times:
The Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/08/bush-gave-petraeus-back-channel-support/
I hope none of this spoils the Captain’s reading. All this helps me appreciate how close we came to losing the war in Iraq.
Best regards, Peter Warner.
Let me add one thing to my previous post:
George Bush has a record of allowing his subordinates to finish their term of duty with honor, we saw that with Rumsfield. I think that speaks very highly of him, and I have no doubt that he arranged the changes of command with as much consideration and respect as could have been possible. There is a story behind every strand of gray hair, I’m sure.
Best regards, Peter Warner.
I guess it is just me-but I am bothered by the assertion that the other flag officers were acting out of malice against Petreaus-that’s how Woodward’s and the rest of the popular mythology makes it sound. There was a very real concern-based on the refusal of the SECDEF to countenance increases in force structure, that in focusing on making this one particular addition to the house perfect-it would undermine the structual integrity of the rest of the house and in the process bring it down over the long term. People poo-poo that but I think it was very much a concern on the other generals minds-especially when you consider who we were building this addition for. In 2005 and 2006 there was real basis to believe the Iraqis would never get their act together.
Plus we were never in danger of “losing the Iraq war”-rather the condititions were never going to be met so that we could even begin to talk about leaving on terms the President would find acceptable. That’s a very different thing-and is specifically why the surge (which was never a surge) was advocated.
Glad to see my classmate, fellow gold wing wearer, and groomsman, Bill Luti, get the credit he deserves in West’s book for his role in crafting the change in strategy in Iraq. Bill gives lie to the charge of the left — that Bush’s war was the product of a bunch of chickenhawks. It takes a guy with green ink in his logbook to know the limits, and the effects, of hard power. Couple that with a Fletcher School PhD, and you have the worst nightmare of the left — someone who doesn’t mind hammering the shit out of nails, but is smart enough, and erudite enough, to argue when you shouldn’t.
Skippy — there is sufficient evidence that Woodward got it wrong (wow, what a news flash). Micheal Gordon reported sometime back that the surge strategy originated on the NSC staff. As CSA, Casey had a plan to transfer tasks to the Iraqis — basically a continuation of where he was headed when he was MNF-I. I don’t think it was malice toward Petreaus, but rather a hard headed stance that he was right when he was the commander, and nothing had changed that would change his mind.
But the NSC got the idea from someplace else-and I’m inclined to believe it was from Keane.
Go read the article — the NSC look started in October, ’06. AEI, and ergo Keane, didn’t come out until December, ’06.
And your statement is pretty authoritative. Do you have a source that says the idea came from “someplace else”? Or is it a BDS flare up? (grin).
Dr. Luti is indeed quite the character, and I enjoyed seeing him mix it up back in the day. I have some shipmates who worked with him who would follow him anywhere.
Hard to believe that Bill Luti was just another JO back when I was his XO. I’m not sure whether he was a member of our august group of JOs called the “Gutter Rats”.
I must be getting old. Funny, I don’t look old!
Gutter Rats? Including Randy Franciosi?
Franciosi and Hafner were probably the ring leaders.
Wasn’t their motto “no gutter too tall”? There were some wild men in CVW11 on that ’79 cruise — including those 131 guys (Luti was still in VQ1 then). I remember the F14 RIO who spent a month in hack after stumbling on the companion way, and dropping his gym bag. By the time he gets to the OOD, the bag is dripping. Off to the slammer…. Or the famous “wardroom insurrection” over the ENS Kuskie affair, with a Hawk Smth v. Art Frederickson 1v1, right in the clean shirt.
Sorry for hijacking your blog, Lex. This is “Tales of Naval Aviation”, isn’t it?
I have no evidence to support it, but I suspect it may well have been Keane who planted the “surge” bug in some ears.
Skippy, I wouldn’t go so far as to say there was malice against Petraeus by the JCS and others, but to deny there was footdragging by those who wanted to follow a different path is folly.
Skippy says the CinC shouldn’t be reaching out personally to his regional commanders and that it sets a bad precedent long-term. But the operational chain of command from the CinC to the RegComs doesn’t run through the JCS. They are advisors, not commanders. By law the Chiefs are responsible to advise the CinC and to prepare their individual services. The SecDef similarly is not a commander, but is rather analogous to a staff officer. So why shouldn’t the President make the effort to ensure the RegCom has a full understanding of the CinCs intent? If you don’t like the setup, change Goldwater-Nich0ls.
Scott,
Luti was indeed of that “vintage”.
You have to be careful documenting things “on the internets” though. There are those of us geezers who know names..A lot of those folks are still alive and kickin… You wouldn’t want ‘em “coming after you”, wouldya? You gotta admit there was more character in them characters of old than nowadays wouldn’t ya say? : -)
Bunch o’dam ECMOs though.
b2
badbob — even harder to imagine that the current VCNO and NAVEUR were also of that “vintage”!
I wish I could remember the name of the A7 guy with the wife with the enormous hooters who drug her through the dirty shirt (enroute to the clean shirt next door — only on Hotel 66) during an inport lunch in the Med. Duty section enjoying a 2.0 lunch, is stunned into silence. One crusty old VAL O4 says, “Well. There goes all intelligent conversation for the next thirty minutes.”
Is that what you meant by “more character”?
“Hotel 66?” I heard USS America called many things-but never a hotel.
CV-666 maybe, but never Hotel 66.
Then again Scott, I had to make the voyage of the damned on that ship in 1981……..
well, thanks to the Carter Administration, and squeezing OMN, we had more inport days a quarter than at sea days. So, it was a hotel more than it was a warship.
Just finished Woodward’s book, “THE WAR WITHIN.” If he is right the surge strategy was developed over time and there were several people who were pushing for it in one form or another. General Keane was one, Meahgan O’Sullivan (NSC assistant) was one, Stephen Hadley ( Bush’s NS advisor) was one, and Chuck Robb (Former Dem. Senator on the Iraq Study Group) was another. The eventual clear formation of the policy came from Keane and Hadley. Keane figured out the military details and Hadley got Bush on board.
This book, assuming most of the account is reasonably accurate, scares the hell out of me. It seems that policy, strategy, and the impetus to carry out same have not been executed very efficiently in this administration. People at State, and even in DOD were thinking that Bush was wrong, but did not stand up and say so except on a few occasions. When they did Bush told them he wanted a plan for winning not a plan for bugging out. So, they seemed to work against his ideas in a passive aggressive manner. (Casey, Abizaid, Rumsfeld, Pace, and even Rice engaged in this. As well as many lower ranking bureaucrats.) It’s apparent to me that had Bush not stood firm (or been stubborn as a Texas mule), and had we not had a General with the abilities of Patraeus, we would be out of Iraq by now with whatever horrible consequences that would have wrought. Instead, there is now a chance that Iraq can actually become a stable country living in peace with the West.
Woodward’s book is an engrossing read. I’ll be getting “THE STRONGEST TRIBE” to read next and compare it to the Woodward book.
There seem to be many pieces to the enigma of Iraq. Doug Feith’s , and Michael Yon’s books, help understand some of it. These new books will help understand more. I cannot help but be struck by the fact that we have had some incredible luck/good fortune mixed into the whole thing.
JimmyJ, nothing new there. That’s how this stuff works throughout history. It would scare the heck out of me if it were any different.
Scott,
Every thing I heard about the 79 cruise was that CVW-11 and America were vastly different than in 1981.
For one thing Dorsey was Captain and he and the CAG, “Mr Tomcat” Tillotson did not get along. That set the tone for the ship and the air wing. ( Plus outside of the Varks and Black Lion ready rooms-I don’t think he knew where any of the other ready rooms were. Even the A-6 guys, our next door neighbors said they did not see him very much.) Plus the Flag Staff was working for an Admiral under investigation for abusing government aircraft. I can’t remember his name-but as I recall he was a piece of work.
It was not so much as a ship / air wing team as a ship/ air wing war. Plus remember that was back before the CAG was equal to the Captain so Dorsey could play his trump card which he often did. We spent 245 days at sea and only 18 inport.
It sucked with a capital “S”.
Hey XTC, I understand your point about the President talking to his CINC’s (Screw Rumsfeld-I still call ‘em CINC’s), but in 2005 /2006 it would it would be like the President talking to a three star-who was not even in the chain. The CINC was Abazaid / Fallon.
Also correct me if I am wrong, but SECDEF is still part of the NCA.
And Skippy, the President of the United States, by law, is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the big kahuna with the big fuzzy ones, the HMFWIC. He can talk to whoever he wants to, and anyone in between that chain of command can eat it raw and salute.
B2
Yep, ECMOs were the craziest bunch of guys you could ever assemble. They had to outdo the RIOs and BNs. Besides, half of them were about half smart. It was kinda like having a dozen or so Skippy-Sans in the squadron at once. As CO, you spent half the time worried that they would get you fired and the other half laughing your a&& off at their antics. Life was good then.
“Besides, half of them were about half smart. It was kinda like having a dozen or so Skippy-Sans in the squadron at once.”
Brevity and clarity. BZ, boss
That nut cake CCG would have been Bryan Compton (I made the workups before I went to the RAG). Funny how we go full circle here — he was the CO of VA 163 for their O Boat cruise in 1967. Won the Navy Cross during that cruise. Other small piece of trivia? That was the squadron John McCain transferred to from the Forrestal — the squadron he was in when he was shot down, October 26, 1967. Cruise tally? Five KIA, three POW.
Lex:
Thanks for letting us reminisce about days gone bye. You have been very patient. Some day I’ll show you how to execute an aeileron roll with your hand without breaking your wrist. It comes in handy when making bets at the bar.
With a wardroom full of Skippy-sans you could kick ass.
Just don’t let em go on liberty………….
It gets expensive.
Skippy, you make a good point about the status of Gen. P during the timeframe. But the fact remains that the President can talk to whoever the heck he wants to. Tradition (and statute) would require the subordinate to keep his chain of command appraised, but it isn’t like they can stop it.
We expect the President to nominate 3 and 4 star officers. Usually, these appointments are made based on the guidance of his subordinates such as SecDef or the Joint Chiefs, but if the President sees them as part of the problem, he’s certainly able to talk to anyone he wants. The check and balance on that, of course, is Senatorial approval.
SecDef is indeed in the Chain, but in an unusual position statutorially. He is in the operational chain of command, but is not a commander. He has certain authority to give operational orders, but it gets a little fuzzy from there. For instance, the Chiefs report to him, but were not nominated by him. It is a fairly unique setup.
I grew up in Oak Harbor. The ECMOs were OK once they learned to quit holding hands in public.
All their kids had two heads, tho.