Question: How long will emergency battery power on a 757 energize the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus?
Book Answer: 30 Minutes.
Field Test: One hour, forty minutes.
The 185 passengers on an American Airlines 757 en route from Seattle to New York had no way of knowing the serious trouble their jet was in last month when the pilots switched to backup battery power because of a problem that occurred soon after takeoff.
Those batteries supply power to the plane for only about 30 minutes. But nearly two hours later, with the jet in cruise flight over Michigan, the electrical systems in the cockpit and, then, the cabin began to fail because the batteries were drained.
Without power, the plane’s intercom went out and a flight attendant had to pass a note under the cockpit door to communicate with the crew.
As Flight 268 made an emergency landing at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, vital systems to control the jet were not working, including some wing flaps. When the jet touched down, the engine thrust reversers did not work to slow the Boeing 757-200 and it barreled down the runway, leaving a long trail of skid marks as the pilot pushed hard on the brakes to try to stop.
The jet did stop, finally, with all three main landing gear intentionally off the side of the pavement in the grass and the nose of the plane only 100 feet from the end of the blast pad pavement, which extends some 397 feet past the departure end of the runway.
Test pilots, gee. Aren’t they swell?
And this is why I’ve decided not to fly any more unless Lex is my pilot …
And a maintenance man he trusts is maintaining the plane …
Marianne
it left a long trail of skid marks??
i should think so!
I smell an A.D. coming…..
Am I missing something or is this gross Pilot Error? The operating manual says Battery Backup is good for 30 minutes, the pilots switched to it shortly after take-off due to a different problem and continued the mission? Sounds like American Airlines should be hiring, or at least has two excellent candidates for cost cutting.
Nice job not wrecking the plane on landing. “attaboy”
Not declaring an emergency when going to a rated 30-minute battery backup? “ohshit”^2
We all know how THAT ratio plays out.
juvat, my thoughts exactly. Me thinks they’re in trouble. At least they saved it, but causing it in the first place? Not so good.
Yeah, someone missed a line on the checklist, methinks.
Yeah, the line on the checklist reading “land immediately”.
Well, others noticed, so I’ll just joined the chorus.
In little bitty airplanes (all I’ve ever flown) we were taught (for urgencies detected on or soon after take-off) to get as much altitude as possible, get around the pattern (depending on the exact nature of the urgency)(never getting out of glide-range), declare if able, land.
If necessary, do the last step first, straight ahead, rather that risk a stall with steep turns.
My instructor did that once–paper aircleaner soaked by line-boy-with-water-hose ingestion.
But landing straight ahead after take-off is that not that big a deal early in a flight from VNY’s 16R in those days.
He never said why pre-flight and run-up didn’;t detect the problem, and I was not in the plane at the time.
I always watched for signs of a recent bath, and I like a METO run-up anbd to hold it on the brakes on TO for a bit.
They obviously thought it was recharging itself when it wasn’t..It says they talked back with company maintenance when they first found the problem..So much for company experts. All pilots got a blind spot on one or another system on the aircraft they fly because it puts ‘em to sleep (NATOPS blue pill) or it’s too hard to understand. Sometimes electrical distribution can be like that. Not anymore for those two!
Lack of attention to detail, lack of systems knowledge, lack of observation powers…RAC1.
b2
One of my best friends in the Squadron I was in in England had a “minor” electrical (among other things) emergency and was rtb to the home drome. He was also having problems with ac control and had already lost PC1. Depending on a replacement senior Maj Nav in the backseat to run down the checklist he made it down ok only to find that his Nav had forgotten to remind him to extend the RAT. And he had been preoccupied with ac control problems and also overlooked the “last” (literally) item on the ER checklist. If things had gone further south, this oversight could have proved fatal–or at least caused the loss of the ac. SOoooo—-badbob is oh so right.
Attention to detail…..ADD types need not apply.
erm, EMR checklist, no emergency rooms in the sky–unless you’re in the rear of a medevac C-141.
I’m not a pilot, but I do remember reading “Flight of the Intruder” (I believe it was), where it’s mentioned that on the A-6 there was an emergency generator that flipped down and was run by the wind operating a propeller(?). When you are talking about a jet worth tens of millions and lives on board worth so much more, why is this not something that all large commercial jets would have?
Engineering safety margins – you gotta love ‘em.
I know the weather here in Seattle has become a bit cold, rainy, and foggy of late, but really guys…was turning back such an ugly notion?
Any bets on what the note from the Flight Attendant said? Probably nothing particularly flattering…
“When you are talking about a jet worth tens of millions and lives on board worth so much more, why is this not something that all large commercial jets would have?”
I believe a B-767 does have a Ram Air Turbine, at least… that was how the famous “Gimli glider”, the 767 that Air Canada ran flat out of gas over Manitoba, Canada, remained flyable until it could be glided to a landing at a disused airstrip that was being used for drag-racing!
Several years later, but back in the day when you could still visit the cockpit, I was up front in an Air Canada 767 and mentioned that I was a glider pilot. The co-pilot remarked “Well, we are ready for anything today… and pointing to lights in the distance, added”there is Gimli, we have a glider pilot on board, and we’re flying the one and only Gimli Glider itself!”
If they were under the impression that the battery was being charged, shouldn’t they have been able to detect the problem by observing a fall-off in voltage coming out of the battery?
All I can imagine is that these guys must’ve been suffering from near terminal Gethomeitis.
I don’t understand how they could’ve ignored the QRH.
I know of a similar situation when a 757 ended up on battery only over the Canadian Pacific coast.
That crew -acutely aware that they had only minutes left and few pieces of adequate concrete upon which to alight amid plenty of nearby lofty granite- was mighty happy to hustle into Ketchikan before things went from Bad to Ugly.
Might add too that this should serve as a cautionary tale for those who advocate taking modern civil aircraft -little modified except for painting them gray- and transforming them into high value assets.
“Affordable” solution?
How many (of the too few inevitably bought and even fewer in theater) can you afford to lose?
Faux Warbirds….
The Captain will be having an unpleasant conversation with the FAA. The switch to battery power only on an airliner indicates the need for something long made of concrete about 5 minues ago.
Consider – SeaTac and O’Hare are about 1800 NM apart, and they supposedly did this in about 90 minutes. When did Boeing put afterburners on the 757? Ad hoc SST research perhaps?
If SeaTac was too messy, there was Spokane, Portland, Boise. Casper or Cheyenne at the outside. FAA vs AA Captain. I don’t envy his position.
Mongo:
The wx in Seattle is ALWAYS cold, windy, drizzley and foggy from mid- Sept until after the July 4th parade. That’s my judgement from having spent 16+ years on Whidbey Island.
Seattle Rain Festival, Oct 1 to Sep 30.
re “A-6 there was an emergency generator that flipped down and was run by the wind operating a propeller”
Actually it flopped up- pnematically driven. Rest correct.
b2
VX, Re your comment # 11 above, I deciphered most of it…pucker factor in high gear indeed… superior skills in evedence… got home safe and sound…good job all around Zoomy guys …Hoo Rah and all that…
that said, would you please, for the benefit of the Lex Babes ( they know who they are) and me… translate into standard English the terms “PC1,” as in lost PC1 and ” RAT” as in the Navs failure to remind him to extend …not all of us out here know the jargon or the secret hand-shake. Best
PS, Sid, Re your comment # 19 above the same request…” ignored the QRH?”
Leading to the ever popular memory device:
“Deploy the RAT-take a trap.
Snake Eater — PC1 — one of multiple (usually two) hydraulically powered systems on an aircraft. PC1 usually powers all of the flight controls, and the “nice to have” items — flaps, powered brakes, spoilers, landing gear, and for the very lucky, speed brakes, anti-skid brakes and hook retract. Another system, PC2, usually powers the flight controls only.
RAT — ram air turbine. Supplies wind driven back up power — always electric, sometimes also hydraulics. Problem is, that on run out after you land, the turbine slows below the speed necessary to generate the power. Ergo, a slide into darkness.
Now, gentlemenly aircraft have an Auxillary Power Unit — a small jet engine to supply backup power. This RAT thing is so tres un-chic.
Scott, Many thanks…now all is revealed…you are indeed a mensch. Best
QRH = Quick Reference Handbook…Procedures for inflight abnormal conditions and emergencies.
With AC BUS failure our QRH says to land “at nearest suitable airport”
The 757s I deal with have HMGs (Hydraulic Motor Generators), but in BOLD there is a WARNING note that says if both AC busses are unpowered you only have 30 minutes.
Bottom line: Glass Cockpit + Bus Troubles = Today is not the day to push it…
Begs a question Sid. I don’t know much about heavies but doesn’t a 757 have an APU? Reckon not. Gee, even a Hornet does. Nose?
b2
Bob/others,
Yes, 757 has APU and, I think, a RAT which has the capability to produce electrons. (In the ‘Bus, it is through a hyd driven Generator.)
I concur with Sid (except for the part about 757 being “glass”
The monday morning QB in me leads me to believe that these guys, with help from their Dispatch/Maint, bypassed lots of good fields (including the one where they eventually turned around and went to) with a relatively serious problem.
Here is Nose’s take on Airline “abnormals”:
1. I’m never, ever on “Government time.” There is never, ever a reason to compromise safety in any way.
2. When you divert to a city where you don’t have regular service, you usually get put up in a pretty nice hotel.
So, there.
b2, yes the 757s have an APU. Somebody at PPRUNE brought up a good point that the NTSB didn’t mention its use or non use in this case…not sure they wanted to start it given other power issues.
The RAT powers the hydrualics for flt controls
To Nose’s point above about folks in the loop. Seems that mx control may have not given them the best gouge. In our shop we have the equivalent of duty squadron reps in standards and training and also duty fleet leads we can call.
I’m mighty quick to get them on the phone about Odd Issues.
After all the problems are traveling just about as fast as our voices can carry….
“NTSB didn’t mention its use or non use in this case…not sure they wanted to start it given other power issues.”
Also not sure that it would’ve done any good given that this was a relay problem (but not diagnosed at the time). Could APU power have gotten to the busses anyway?
Fate Is The Hunter.
Sorry it had to happen…..
Damned glad it didn’t happen to me.
I came across this blog on the Seattle PI website:
http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/aerospace/archives/152485.asp
It links to some passenger accounts of this incident and includes excerpts of an email from the Boeing engineer who *designed* the 757 APU – he wonders why the report doesn’t mention it, too. Interesting stuff.
Another good thing to know when forced onto battery power by generator failure (interestingly, I think the Stormscope was “seeing” a generator problem developing) when IFR with no RAT is the electrical draw of stuff, e.g. the transponder should be turned off, ATC willing (and they were).
I’ve been out of the Boeing for 7 years now but I still remember some of this stuff. I can’t believe these Bozo’s (and their Dispatcher) elected to continue on battery power. That’s a no-no. A quick check would have shown that the battery wasn’t charging.
As for help from maintenace control, my experience has been that although they may know the books, they don’t know the systems very well . I have had some very bad advice from them . An uninformed or inexperienced pilot would have been led down the path to disaster.
One of the biggest difficulties I had adjusting to the airlines after 23+ years in the military, was the joint decision making responsibility between the Captain and the Dispatcher. I was used to getting all the info, then making my own decision….no “mother may I?”.
Here is the NTSB Preliminary Report
NTSB Identification: CHI08IA292
> Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of American Airlines, Inc. (D.B.A. American Airlines)
> Incident occurred Monday, September 22, 2008 in Chicago, IL
> Aircraft: BOEING 757, registration: N197AN
> Injuries: 192 Uninjured.
> This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
>
> On September 22, 2008, at 1342 central daylight time, a Boeing 757-223, N197AN, operated by American Airlines as flight 268, diverted to Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) due to electrical system anomalies. During the landing on runway 22R (7,500 feet by 150 feet), the airplane veered off the left side of the runway resulting in minor damage to the landing gear. There were no injuries to the 2 flight crew, 5 flight attendants, or 185 passengers. The domestic passenger flight was being operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight originated from the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Seattle, Washington, at 0802 pacific daylight time, with an intended destination of the John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York.
>
> While en route the flightcrew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). The flight crew then referenced the quick reference handbook (QRH) regarding the AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, “The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes.” The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power. The flightcrew then reviewed the MAIN BATTERY CHARGER procedure referenced in the QRH.
>
> Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. The airplane was over western Michigan and the captain elected to turn around and divert to ORD. Also, the flight attendants discovered that public address (PA) and the cabin/cockpit interphone systems were inoperative. A flight attendant wrote a note and slipped it under the cockpit door to inform the flight crew of their communication problems. A short time later, the cabin crew was informed that they were diverting to ORD. One of the flight attendants then walked through the aisle informing the passengers of the unscheduled landing at Chicago.
>
> While aligned with the runway to land, the flightcrew declared an emergency with the control tower as a precaution. As the airplane neared the runway on final approach, the flightcrew discovered that the elevator and standby elevator trim systems were inoperative. The captain then assisted the first officer on the flight controls and the approach to land was continued. The systems required to slow the airplane on the runway appeared to indicate normal, and with the elevator control issues the flightcrew did not want to perform a go-around to land on a longer runway. Pitch control of the airplane was difficult so the flightcrew elected to stop the flap extension at 20 degrees. The touchdown was smooth despite the control issues, however, the thrust reversers and spoilers did not deploy. The captain attempted to manually deploy the thrust reversers, but still was not sure if they deployed. The captain was concerned about the brake functionality and accumulator pressure so he made one smooth application of the brakes, which did not “perform well.” Due to obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain elected to veer the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass.
>
> As the airplane touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway witnesses heard loud pops. Skid marks from the left main gear were evident near the point of touchdown and 165 feet further down the runway skid marks from the right main gear were present. These skid marks were visible for the entire length of the runway up until the airplane departed the pavement. The airplane came to rest with all three main landing gear off the left side of the pavement and the nose of the airplane came to rest approximately 100 feet prior to the end of the blast pad pavement which extended 397 feet past the departure end of the runway.
>
> After coming to a stop, the flightcrew was not able to shut the engines down with either the fuel cutoff valves or by extending the fire handles. The engines were subsequently shutdown by depressing the fire handles. The passengers were then deplaned through the L1 and R4 doors using portable stairs.
>
> Post incident investigation revealed a failure of the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay. With the standby power selector in the AUTO position, this failure would have resulted in a loss of power to the battery bus and the DC standby bus, which would have resulted in the AIR/GND SYS message and illumination of the standby power bus OFF light which the flight crew received.
>
> With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered.
Sometimes batteries actually work. Back in the day, the T-33 battery was usually expected to last about long enough to tell the world you had a problem if you had generator failure, if you were lucky.
A couple of guys in my squadron were on a weekend cross country in a T-bird. It was night and pretty solid weather from 5000 feet on up. They took off fron Presque Isle (airport of entry) and had just leveled off at FL 350 when the rear main bearing on the engine let go and the engine came to a screeching halt while sawing through the lower longeron in the fuselage. Fortunately, no fire.
They immediately hollered for ‘Tiny Tim’ (a generic call sign for GCI) and declared an emergency. FAA didn’t have much radar coverage back then. GCI gave them vectors to Dow AFB at Bangor Maine, about 150 miles away.
The T-bird is an all-DC airplane. They kept the UHF radio and the transponder going, and the ‘peanut inverter” for the flight instruments. Remember, solid weather.
GCI did a superb job. They broke out of the weather at 5000 ft directly over Dow. They put the gear down with the emergency system (mains will free fall, accumulator for the nose gear) and used the battery to put down the flaps (normally electric). They made a 270-degree turn and put it down right on the threshold. The battery held up long enough for them to report clear of the runway as they rolled off onto a taxiway. If that battery had not held up for almost 35 minutes they’d have had to punch out.