Comments on: Systems Knowledge http://www.neptunuslex.com/2008/10/28/systems-knowledge/ The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy! Fri, 10 Feb 2012 04:27:55 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: John F http://www.neptunuslex.com/2008/10/28/systems-knowledge/comment-page-1/#comment-273097 John F Sun, 02 Nov 2008 19:54:25 +0000 http://www.neptunuslex.com/?p=5858#comment-273097 Sometimes batteries actually work. Back in the day, the T-33 battery was usually expected to last about long enough to tell the world you had a problem if you had generator failure, if you were lucky. A couple of guys in my squadron were on a weekend cross country in a T-bird. It was night and pretty solid weather from 5000 feet on up. They took off fron Presque Isle (airport of entry) and had just leveled off at FL 350 when the rear main bearing on the engine let go and the engine came to a screeching halt while sawing through the lower longeron in the fuselage. Fortunately, no fire. They immediately hollered for 'Tiny Tim' (a generic call sign for GCI) and declared an emergency. FAA didn't have much radar coverage back then. GCI gave them vectors to Dow AFB at Bangor Maine, about 150 miles away. The T-bird is an all-DC airplane. They kept the UHF radio and the transponder going, and the 'peanut inverter" for the flight instruments. Remember, solid weather. GCI did a superb job. They broke out of the weather at 5000 ft directly over Dow. They put the gear down with the emergency system (mains will free fall, accumulator for the nose gear) and used the battery to put down the flaps (normally electric). They made a 270-degree turn and put it down right on the threshold. The battery held up long enough for them to report clear of the runway as they rolled off onto a taxiway. If that battery had not held up for almost 35 minutes they'd have had to punch out. Sometimes batteries actually work. Back in the day, the T-33 battery was usually expected to last about long enough to tell the world you had a problem if you had generator failure, if you were lucky.
A couple of guys in my squadron were on a weekend cross country in a T-bird. It was night and pretty solid weather from 5000 feet on up. They took off fron Presque Isle (airport of entry) and had just leveled off at FL 350 when the rear main bearing on the engine let go and the engine came to a screeching halt while sawing through the lower longeron in the fuselage. Fortunately, no fire.
They immediately hollered for ‘Tiny Tim’ (a generic call sign for GCI) and declared an emergency. FAA didn’t have much radar coverage back then. GCI gave them vectors to Dow AFB at Bangor Maine, about 150 miles away.
The T-bird is an all-DC airplane. They kept the UHF radio and the transponder going, and the ‘peanut inverter” for the flight instruments. Remember, solid weather.
GCI did a superb job. They broke out of the weather at 5000 ft directly over Dow. They put the gear down with the emergency system (mains will free fall, accumulator for the nose gear) and used the battery to put down the flaps (normally electric). They made a 270-degree turn and put it down right on the threshold. The battery held up long enough for them to report clear of the runway as they rolled off onto a taxiway. If that battery had not held up for almost 35 minutes they’d have had to punch out.

]]> By: oldskydog http://www.neptunuslex.com/2008/10/28/systems-knowledge/comment-page-1/#comment-272849 oldskydog Sat, 01 Nov 2008 21:16:55 +0000 http://www.neptunuslex.com/?p=5858#comment-272849 I've been out of the Boeing for 7 years now but I still remember some of this stuff. I can't believe these Bozo's (and their Dispatcher) elected to continue on battery power. That's a no-no. A quick check would have shown that the battery wasn't charging. As for help from maintenace control, my experience has been that although they may know the books, they don't know the systems very well . I have had some very bad advice from them . An uninformed or inexperienced pilot would have been led down the path to disaster. One of the biggest difficulties I had adjusting to the airlines after 23+ years in the military, was the joint decision making responsibility between the Captain and the Dispatcher. I was used to getting all the info, then making my own decision....no "mother may I?". Here is the NTSB Preliminary Report NTSB Identification: CHI08IA292 > Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of American Airlines, Inc. (D.B.A. American Airlines) > Incident occurred Monday, September 22, 2008 in Chicago, IL > Aircraft: BOEING 757, registration: N197AN > Injuries: 192 Uninjured. > This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. > > On September 22, 2008, at 1342 central daylight time, a Boeing 757-223, N197AN, operated by American Airlines as flight 268, diverted to Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) due to electrical system anomalies. During the landing on runway 22R (7,500 feet by 150 feet), the airplane veered off the left side of the runway resulting in minor damage to the landing gear. There were no injuries to the 2 flight crew, 5 flight attendants, or 185 passengers. The domestic passenger flight was being operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight originated from the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Seattle, Washington, at 0802 pacific daylight time, with an intended destination of the John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York. > > While en route the flightcrew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). The flight crew then referenced the quick reference handbook (QRH) regarding the AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, "The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes." The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power. The flightcrew then reviewed the MAIN BATTERY CHARGER procedure referenced in the QRH. > > Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. The airplane was over western Michigan and the captain elected to turn around and divert to ORD. Also, the flight attendants discovered that public address (PA) and the cabin/cockpit interphone systems were inoperative. A flight attendant wrote a note and slipped it under the cockpit door to inform the flight crew of their communication problems. A short time later, the cabin crew was informed that they were diverting to ORD. One of the flight attendants then walked through the aisle informing the passengers of the unscheduled landing at Chicago. > > While aligned with the runway to land, the flightcrew declared an emergency with the control tower as a precaution. As the airplane neared the runway on final approach, the flightcrew discovered that the elevator and standby elevator trim systems were inoperative. The captain then assisted the first officer on the flight controls and the approach to land was continued. The systems required to slow the airplane on the runway appeared to indicate normal, and with the elevator control issues the flightcrew did not want to perform a go-around to land on a longer runway. Pitch control of the airplane was difficult so the flightcrew elected to stop the flap extension at 20 degrees. The touchdown was smooth despite the control issues, however, the thrust reversers and spoilers did not deploy. The captain attempted to manually deploy the thrust reversers, but still was not sure if they deployed. The captain was concerned about the brake functionality and accumulator pressure so he made one smooth application of the brakes, which did not “perform well.” Due to obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain elected to veer the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass. > > As the airplane touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway witnesses heard loud pops. Skid marks from the left main gear were evident near the point of touchdown and 165 feet further down the runway skid marks from the right main gear were present. These skid marks were visible for the entire length of the runway up until the airplane departed the pavement. The airplane came to rest with all three main landing gear off the left side of the pavement and the nose of the airplane came to rest approximately 100 feet prior to the end of the blast pad pavement which extended 397 feet past the departure end of the runway. > > After coming to a stop, the flightcrew was not able to shut the engines down with either the fuel cutoff valves or by extending the fire handles. The engines were subsequently shutdown by depressing the fire handles. The passengers were then deplaned through the L1 and R4 doors using portable stairs. > > Post incident investigation revealed a failure of the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay. With the standby power selector in the AUTO position, this failure would have resulted in a loss of power to the battery bus and the DC standby bus, which would have resulted in the AIR/GND SYS message and illumination of the standby power bus OFF light which the flight crew received. > > With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered. I’ve been out of the Boeing for 7 years now but I still remember some of this stuff. I can’t believe these Bozo’s (and their Dispatcher) elected to continue on battery power. That’s a no-no. A quick check would have shown that the battery wasn’t charging.
As for help from maintenace control, my experience has been that although they may know the books, they don’t know the systems very well . I have had some very bad advice from them . An uninformed or inexperienced pilot would have been led down the path to disaster.
One of the biggest difficulties I had adjusting to the airlines after 23+ years in the military, was the joint decision making responsibility between the Captain and the Dispatcher. I was used to getting all the info, then making my own decision….no “mother may I?”.

Here is the NTSB Preliminary Report

NTSB Identification: CHI08IA292
> Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of American Airlines, Inc. (D.B.A. American Airlines)
> Incident occurred Monday, September 22, 2008 in Chicago, IL
> Aircraft: BOEING 757, registration: N197AN
> Injuries: 192 Uninjured.
> This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
>
> On September 22, 2008, at 1342 central daylight time, a Boeing 757-223, N197AN, operated by American Airlines as flight 268, diverted to Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) due to electrical system anomalies. During the landing on runway 22R (7,500 feet by 150 feet), the airplane veered off the left side of the runway resulting in minor damage to the landing gear. There were no injuries to the 2 flight crew, 5 flight attendants, or 185 passengers. The domestic passenger flight was being operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight originated from the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Seattle, Washington, at 0802 pacific daylight time, with an intended destination of the John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York.
>
> While en route the flightcrew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). The flight crew then referenced the quick reference handbook (QRH) regarding the AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, “The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes.” The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power. The flightcrew then reviewed the MAIN BATTERY CHARGER procedure referenced in the QRH.
>
> Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. The airplane was over western Michigan and the captain elected to turn around and divert to ORD. Also, the flight attendants discovered that public address (PA) and the cabin/cockpit interphone systems were inoperative. A flight attendant wrote a note and slipped it under the cockpit door to inform the flight crew of their communication problems. A short time later, the cabin crew was informed that they were diverting to ORD. One of the flight attendants then walked through the aisle informing the passengers of the unscheduled landing at Chicago.
>
> While aligned with the runway to land, the flightcrew declared an emergency with the control tower as a precaution. As the airplane neared the runway on final approach, the flightcrew discovered that the elevator and standby elevator trim systems were inoperative. The captain then assisted the first officer on the flight controls and the approach to land was continued. The systems required to slow the airplane on the runway appeared to indicate normal, and with the elevator control issues the flightcrew did not want to perform a go-around to land on a longer runway. Pitch control of the airplane was difficult so the flightcrew elected to stop the flap extension at 20 degrees. The touchdown was smooth despite the control issues, however, the thrust reversers and spoilers did not deploy. The captain attempted to manually deploy the thrust reversers, but still was not sure if they deployed. The captain was concerned about the brake functionality and accumulator pressure so he made one smooth application of the brakes, which did not “perform well.” Due to obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain elected to veer the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass.
>
> As the airplane touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway witnesses heard loud pops. Skid marks from the left main gear were evident near the point of touchdown and 165 feet further down the runway skid marks from the right main gear were present. These skid marks were visible for the entire length of the runway up until the airplane departed the pavement. The airplane came to rest with all three main landing gear off the left side of the pavement and the nose of the airplane came to rest approximately 100 feet prior to the end of the blast pad pavement which extended 397 feet past the departure end of the runway.
>
> After coming to a stop, the flightcrew was not able to shut the engines down with either the fuel cutoff valves or by extending the fire handles. The engines were subsequently shutdown by depressing the fire handles. The passengers were then deplaned through the L1 and R4 doors using portable stairs.
>
> Post incident investigation revealed a failure of the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay. With the standby power selector in the AUTO position, this failure would have resulted in a loss of power to the battery bus and the DC standby bus, which would have resulted in the AIR/GND SYS message and illumination of the standby power bus OFF light which the flight crew received.
>
> With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered.

]]> By: Tommy H. Thomason http://www.neptunuslex.com/2008/10/28/systems-knowledge/comment-page-1/#comment-272837 Tommy H. Thomason Sat, 01 Nov 2008 20:55:27 +0000 http://www.neptunuslex.com/?p=5858#comment-272837 Another good thing to know when forced onto battery power by generator failure (interestingly, I think the Stormscope was "seeing" a generator problem developing) when IFR with no RAT is the electrical draw of stuff, e.g. the transponder should be turned off, ATC willing (and they were). Another good thing to know when forced onto battery power by generator failure (interestingly, I think the Stormscope was “seeing” a generator problem developing) when IFR with no RAT is the electrical draw of stuff, e.g. the transponder should be turned off, ATC willing (and they were).

]]> By: JRandom http://www.neptunuslex.com/2008/10/28/systems-knowledge/comment-page-1/#comment-271895 JRandom Thu, 30 Oct 2008 17:14:42 +0000 http://www.neptunuslex.com/?p=5858#comment-271895 I came across this blog on the Seattle PI website: http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/aerospace/archives/152485.asp It links to some passenger accounts of this incident and includes excerpts of an email from the Boeing engineer who *designed* the 757 APU - he wonders why the report doesn't mention it, too. Interesting stuff. I came across this blog on the Seattle PI website:

http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/aerospace/archives/152485.asp

It links to some passenger accounts of this incident and includes excerpts of an email from the Boeing engineer who *designed* the 757 APU – he wonders why the report doesn’t mention it, too. Interesting stuff.

]]> By: sid http://www.neptunuslex.com/2008/10/28/systems-knowledge/comment-page-1/#comment-271854 sid Thu, 30 Oct 2008 15:44:15 +0000 http://www.neptunuslex.com/?p=5858#comment-271854 "NTSB didn’t mention its use or non use in this case…not sure they wanted to start it given other power issues." Also not sure that it would've done any good given that this was a relay problem (but not diagnosed at the time). Could APU power have gotten to the busses anyway? Fate Is The Hunter. Sorry it had to happen..... Damned glad it didn't happen to <i>me</i>. “NTSB didn’t mention its use or non use in this case…not sure they wanted to start it given other power issues.”

Also not sure that it would’ve done any good given that this was a relay problem (but not diagnosed at the time). Could APU power have gotten to the busses anyway?

Fate Is The Hunter.

Sorry it had to happen…..

Damned glad it didn’t happen to me.

]]> By: sid http://www.neptunuslex.com/2008/10/28/systems-knowledge/comment-page-1/#comment-271843 sid Thu, 30 Oct 2008 15:18:59 +0000 http://www.neptunuslex.com/?p=5858#comment-271843 b2, yes the 757s have an APU. Somebody at PPRUNE brought up a good point that the NTSB didn't mention its use or non use in this case...not sure they wanted to start it given other power issues. The RAT powers the hydrualics for flt controls To Nose's point above about folks in the loop. Seems that mx control may have not given them the best gouge. In our shop we have the equivalent of duty squadron reps in standards and training and also duty fleet leads we can call. I'm mighty quick to get them on the phone about Odd Issues. After all the problems are traveling just about as fast as our voices can carry.... b2, yes the 757s have an APU. Somebody at PPRUNE brought up a good point that the NTSB didn’t mention its use or non use in this case…not sure they wanted to start it given other power issues.

The RAT powers the hydrualics for flt controls

To Nose’s point above about folks in the loop. Seems that mx control may have not given them the best gouge. In our shop we have the equivalent of duty squadron reps in standards and training and also duty fleet leads we can call.

I’m mighty quick to get them on the phone about Odd Issues.

After all the problems are traveling just about as fast as our voices can carry….

]]>