The Greater South East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, that is. At least in the mind of a certain recent chief of staff of an unnamed Asian country. Whose initials are “Japan.”
Japan’s air force chief has been sacked over an essay in which he claimed his country had not been an agressor (sic) in Asian conflicts.
In his article, which appeared on a website, General Toshio Tamogami also said Japan had no option but to go to war with the US.
Strangely, the general does not apparently go on to explain how a country that had no option but to go to war with the US had the option of losing that war – not to mention the lives of 2.7 millions of its own citizens – before becoming an economic powerhouse and liberal democracy in a post-war alliance with the US.
Somewhere between six to ten million Chinese, Indonesians, Koreans, Filipinos and Indochinese could not be reached for comment.
I’ve read in other places about this opinion of the war that the US somehow pushed Japan or manipulated them into the conflict. I’ve never seen it explained fully though, so I’m not sure about the ins and outs of it all. I do find it comforting though that the guy was fired within hours of the essay going public.
The apologist line of argument comes from the US cutting off Japan’s oil supplies. Kind of a “now look what you made me do!” thing.
Here’s more about the specific incident involving the General:
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24590991-2703,00.html
The article was the result of an essay competition sponsored by a Japanese developer, and he won a prize of 3 Million Yen along with the publication of the essay. The fact that it’s a winner means that this attitude must be popular with at least some part of the political spectrum in Japan – which I find kind of alarming.
Of course, I might be biased – my great uncle was a Naval officer stationed in Guam in Dec. 1941. He survived (barely) the Zentsuji camp but never really recovered his health and passed away in the early 1960s. He’s not available for comment either.
Understand Shinto to understand this type thing coming from Japan.
No path to redemption. Ergo, admission of wrong is a wee bit more problematic for you, your ancestors and descendants than for folks with most other world views.
A few links:
http://i154.photobucket.com/albums/s261/G6AS/PREEMPT001.jpg
http://i154.photobucket.com/albums/s261/G6AS/PREEMPT002.jpg
http://www.usni.org/store/item.asp?ITEM_ID=1604&DEPARTMENT_ID=25
I acknowledge that “had no options” is a different level than morally right or wrong.
Chenault’s group - 60% of whom were naval aviators, by the way – was fighting to defend the Chinese from their Japanese “liberators”, which muddies the water a bit.
And as for the rest, well you know us: We were also preparing for an offensive war against England and Canada, up until the Axis stepped up and made us stop fiddling and choose sides. (Pearl Harbor made that easier on us.)
Busy beavers, we war planners. There are ever so many countries.
Oz was “Scarlet” O’Hairy in that plan? Cool. (Plan) Reds under the beds indeed.
I always knews you Nasty Yanks weren’t to be trusted!
The Jap General may have a point.
The historically-minded among you might like to check out “Day of Deceit” by Robert B Stinnett. I’ll try to give the thumbnail sketch as I remember it. It’s been a few years since I read the book.
It documents, among other things, a 1940 ONI memorandum to the director of ONI by one LCDR Arthur H. McCollum, and endorsement by CAPT Dudley Knox. This memo describes an 8-step set of operations intended to goad Japan into commiting an overt act of war. McCollum’s action plan seems to have been largely followed, leading to the attack on PH.
When Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, Roosevelt had a tool which he could use to get us into the war. Once Japan was signatory to that Pact, any act of war against Japan would be met be opening of hostilities by Germany and Italy against whoever that aggressor might be.
Roosevelt could not make a case for declaring war on Germany, but if Germany could be induced to declare war against the US, then we could get into the war to help England.
That inducement would be the US Declaration of War against Japan resulting from Pearl Harbor. Once PH was attacked, the US public would demand a Declaration of War, and the rest is history, though not necessarily the history written by the victors.
Stinnett has done a scholarly job of researching the archives and has photocopies of some very interesting documents. Lots of his leads were dead-ended by Top Secret classification of many of the contemporary documents, although most docs from that era are in the unclassified archives. There’s a good analysis of our crypto capability and discussion of the intercepts preceeding hostilities.
It’s well-enough researched to make me wonder about the official version.
Quite the clever observation, Michelle
If you think that Nasty Yanks are bad, you ought to see us Nasty Rebs!
Regards
Mike
War Plan Red wasn’t so much because we wanted a war plan to fight the Anglosphere, but rather, they were the toughest notional enemy to be found. If you could craft a workable warplan against the worst case scenario, you should be able to craft workable plans against the second stringers. As such, it was an excersice in planning, not a plan to go to war.
Day of Deciept is revisionist history of the worst sort.
Mike: “Roosevelt could not make a case for declaring war on Germany…”
Three words bear mention. USS Reuben James.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Reuben_James
(Edit: The link doesn’t like parentheses. The one I mean was DD-245.)
What with Halloween being before Thanksgiving and all. Nevermind December.
Hajo-hi, I’d mention “USS Panay” in a similar context, but I imagine I’d be wasting my breath, and thus shall refrain.
XBrad – Thank you.
“The Jap General may have a point.”
Yeah, on his head.
Cheap shots are all that type deserve.
Blacksmith,
DD245 wasn’t sunk until 10/1941 (the month of my birth), by which time the Pacific provocations were well underway. Who knows what plans were laid in 10/41? It is clear that we weren’t yet fully mobilized, industrially or troop-wise, in 10/41. Perhaps a delay was strategically desirable in 10/41. The attack of 12/7/41 removed any possibility of a delayed response.
It would probably have been a hard sell to the neutralist-oriented US majority that the sinking of Ruben James was to be unexpected. Here’s an American warship escorting a British war cargo , that got itself in a deeper pile that it could get out of. No disrespect to the James or her crew intended; they bravely accepted and undertook a dangerous mission. I’m just looking at the incident from a viewpoint that might be popular with the anti-war crowd back in ’41. Yes, many people were angry at the sinking of Ruben James; Woodie Guthrie even wrote a song memorializing the ship “Ruben James” and her crew.
But obviously not angry enough to go to war over it. Could Roosevelt have made Ruben James a casus belli? Maybe. Fact is, he didn’t, for whatever reason.
Contrast that hypothetical popular response to the one which happened as the result of the “sneak attack” at PH. I put that in quotes because I’m reasonably convinced that the attack was anticipated, and that US forces in TH were used as bait.
We will probably never know the whole truth of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor. Even if the classified archive material were declassified, I’d bet that it’s incomplete.
- – - – -
Mike, there’s an old quote (or misquote) about “contempt prior to investigation” that might serve you well. History is written (or spun) by the victors, and ain’t necessarily exactly how it happened.
- – - -
I don’t much like the implications of Stinnett’s research, but it deserves a look, IMO.
Regards
Mike
I believe it was the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, not “South East Asia.”
hajo-hi: your second reference seems fantastical. B-17′s didn’t have the range to bomb Japan from the Philippines except on one-way suicide missions.
BMG Mike,
Did the US anticipate an attack by the Japanese? Sure. But they sure as heck didn’t anticipate it at Pearl Harbor.
The attack has been poured over a gazillion times. Rather than reading that revisionist crap, go read “At Dawn We Slept” by Gordon Prange.
And if you want a real mystery to solve, be the first to figure out what was going on in MacArthur’s headquarters that the Japanese got the jump on him a full eight hours after they learned of the PH attack.
I’ll leave aside the phrase “Pacific provocations.” Those were diplomatic solutions to what actions we didn’t like in China, taken by the IJA. Think of it like enforcing a no-fly-zone over Iraq between 1991 and 2003 if you prefer – the trade restrictions we took were perfectly legal. We found their actions boorish, and decided we didn’t want to be associated with literally fuelling their war machine. End of story.
“It is clear that we weren’t yet fully mobilized, industrially or troop-wise, in 10/41. ” – Three more words then. “Arsenal of Democracy.”
The Draft started in 1940. Aircraft production here in 1939 (all types) was a hair under 6,000 airframes. By 1940 that number was doubled (with much of the output going to the UK, sure, but much staying here too). So to say “we weren’t ready” in October 1941, but somehow that an attack in December would find us ready?
Sorry. Ain’t buying what’s selling.
I occasionally correspond with a Han person, Kristina Chew. I’ll ask her what she thinks of this. In my experience, the Chinks are right grumpy about the Nips, and with good reason. I recall reading that before he died, Colonel Tibbets was effusively and ebulliently greeted by a ChiCom general who just couldn’t shake his hand enough in thanks, and said it was a damn shame we only had two nukes to use on those guys.
Then I think of Nancy C., daughter of a USAF Sgt. and a Japanese woman. I think she’s reasonably sure that her Dad was overhead dropping incendiary bombs while her Mom was running from them. (20th AF, my Dad’s outfit)
Anyway, she said that you can always easily identify the bad guys in Chinese martial-arts movies.
They look Japanese.
Lot of bad blood between China and Japan. Goes back a lot of years. For that matter, goes back a lot of centuries.
In connection with another such discussion, I once went back and made up a list of “provocative” acts taken by the United States during 1941. Half a dozen or so incidents, all between the US and Germany, all in September and October 1941. Three of them involved shooting: an inconclusive encounter between destroyer USS Greer and a U-boat on 4 September, destroyer Kearny torpedoed but not sunk on 17 October, and finally the sinking of Reuben James on 31 October.
I think there’s enough evidence to be pretty sure that FDR wanted Japan to attack, expected it, and tried to issue subtle warnings to all station commanders to be ready for it. But the attack was expected against US bases on the other side of the Pacific. No one expected the Pearl Harbor attack, because no one knew how big or how good Japan’s carrier fleet was.
I will never understand why MacArthur kept his commission, let alone remained on active duty. The admirals and generals in command on Hawaii on 7 December never held positions of any importance again. And MacArthur had much more warning than they did.
Larry pointed out:
I believe it was the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, not “South East Asia.”
Yes, and many people in Japan regard it as proof of Imperial Japan’s good intentions. It was promoted as an effort to resist, then overcome, the domination of the White Man and the West. I have little doubt that many Japanese living today privately wish it had succeeded.
The Admiral’s offending sentiments have a wide following, unfortunately. I hear spokesmen for it speaking their tirades against American domination from the roof of their PA buses parked outside the local subway station on occasion. Needless to say, it is deeply unsettling. And those black buses with no windows blaring martial music give a special chill when they roll by, although thankfully those creeps seem to be generally unwelcome.
I think it’s healthy for every nation to feel pride in itself, so I’m sympathetic to Japanese nationalists and their effort to protect their national anthem (which is strongly disrespected by the teacher’s unions). On the other hand, there is an element of racism, along with an air of superiority against other Asian peoples that is strong and poisonous in Japanese society, and carefully taught to each Japanese generation. Whenever it appears, it is stifling.
Japan is not trusted by its neighbors, for good reason. It’s a shame the US military has to provide for Japan’s defense, but from what I’ve seen it’s the best solution for a rotten situation. I often wonder how many Americans in uniform have been killed in training accidents while stationed in Japan, and deeply regret that their service and sacrifice isn’t appreciated.
I’m no expert on this- and I’m a little afraid to research it, frankly. I’m just speaking from personal observations.
Best regards, Peter Warner.
“Mike, there’s an old quote (or misquote) about “contempt prior to investigation” that might serve you well. History is written (or spun) by the victors, and ain’t necessarily exactly how it happened.”
My contempt for revisionism is based on a lifetime of investigation. As is my contempt for “research” that is based on a single source, especially if it’s of the “all the other sources are wrong” type.
We (at least the military/government we) knew at the time that we would eventually be at war with Japan and Germany and were making plans accordingly. It was only a question of when and how, and would our mobilization be anywhere near ready. As for PH, it’s one of those things that looks so obvious in hindsight that it’s hard to fathom how it could have been “allowed” to happen. Such hindsight tends to overlook things like human nature and bureaucratic inertia.
The idea that FDR used the forces at PH as bait is one of the more reprehensible ones that revisionists have come up with. It’s also very old and tired.
Larry: Admittedly Daniel Ford’s work on the AVG is contentious. Yet, search on the internet gives distance Manila – Kyoto as 1677 mi, while combat radius of B-17 seems to have been at around 1800 mi and range 3700 mi (depending on where you look). So it might just have been true.
Blacksmith, Lex: I have an agenda only insofar as I prefer political history unfiltered. I was accidentally reading a book about the Korean war which made me curious about this (somehow related) issue, so I looked for more information.
Peter,
My mother was a teletype operator in MacArthur’s HQ in Oz. She was from the Tweed River District, and met my dad whilst he was on a short stint there waiting for his next command.
To her last days, she never had a good word for the Japanese, having lost a brother and a cousin during the war. My dad still carries a major grudge from his being part of a group of Marines that recovered the Archbishop of New Guinea and a couple dozen sisters from Japanese confinement, as well as being assigned to escort American POW’s back to the states from Japan after the war. He was a Pharmacist’s Mate on independant duty with the Marines through much of the war.
Respects,
“Pharmacist’s Mate on independent duty with the Marines.” Dang, he was lucky to survive that. AW, it is unlikely that you exist. Yah, I know that applies to all of us. Had the Federal Minie ball gone a quarter of an inch to one side at Chancellorsville and gotten my Great-Granddaddy’s brain instead of just an eyeball, I wouldn’t exist.
P.s. To those who put up those annoying “These Colors Never Run” bumper stickers, I say yup, they did, and were chased on that occasion by my direct lineal male ancestor and his comrades. (27th Georgia)