It happens like clockwork every time the presidency changes hands, especially when it changes parties: Retired colonels and majors, soi-disant “defense analysts” and tenured bureaucratic insiders whose opinions have been unfashionable under the ancien regime emerge to craft a series of Bold Recommendations On Reforming Defense. The latest Group of 13 from the Center for Defense Information throws on the mantle of “non-partisanship” – CDI’s mantra includes increasing international cooperation (read: the perenially effective UN); reduced reliance on unilateral military power to resolve conflict (read: passing the Global Test); reduced reliance on nuclear weapons (read: a second chance to lose the Cold War) ; a transformed and reformed U.S. military establishment (read: another go at re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic); and prudent oversight of defense programs (read: kill your favorite programs, fund mine, I’ll do it for you) – knowing that such will attract the attention of those partisans who never much liked playing soldier, and potentially shield them from those who did.
Defense is perpetually in need of reform, and there’s no doubt the authors are disinterested patriots, but Washington, DC is an expensive place to live and every man could use a little bit more to keep the wind out: The reward for thinking outside the box in a politically congenial way can often open up access to any one of the dozens of presidentially appointed, senate approved jobs that could vault a retired flag or cubby-holed crank over legions of career civil servants into a lucrative Special Executive Service position complete with a six-figure salary and a cushy office on the E-Ring, ready to act on the grudges they’d carefully nurtured while twiddling thumbs in Coventry. Failing that, there’s always there’s always the talk show circuit.
Out with the old, in with the new!
So maybe I’m a bit jaded then, but I read “America’s Defense Meltdown – Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress” with a jaundiced eye, believing that any reform pitched at the new Congress, in particular, will have less to do with reforming DoD and the services than throttling them. Barney Frank has bills to pay, and we’ve already had that whole mandatory vs. discretionary discussion. It ain’t like you can just print the stuff.
The paper is appended below for those who want to read the whole thing (271 pages), but I’ll summarize the summaries for the MTV afflicted:
History: Our military costs too much, takes too long to adapt to changing circumstances, we have too few bodies and the ones we do have are “pampered, sluggish and weak-muscled.”
Shattering Illusions: The Constitutionally appointed power of presidents both Democratic and Republican over the military has resulted in unpopular wars that have diminished our national prestige. This “nation building” stuff is hard.
Leading the Human Dimension out of a Legacy of Failure: People are our most important asset and we suck at managing and leading them. (This chapter is written, in part, by a retired Army major.)
Maneuver Forces – The Army and Marine Corps after Iraq: World War II-style frontal assault with defined battle lines are so last century, and we will never need to launch an Inchon-style amphibious assault again. What’s needed is a more joint, mobile and dispersed construct with Army and Marine Corps forces harmonized into a rotational deployment schedule with the Army. So long, Marines. It was nice having you.
A Traveler’s Perspective (?) on Third and Fourth Generation War: More Marines should be trigger pullers, and they should have fewer officers above the company level. America’s premier 9/11 force is not light and agile enough. Marine aircraft should be cheaper, single mission CAS aircraft rather than more expensive multi-mission machines. I suppose because we’ll always have the Air Force there to help out.
Navy: The carrier strike group is an obsolescent remnant of World War II. Decouple the carriers from their air wings and become a ferry ship for whatever suits your purpose. After all, if your purpose ends up being something so exotic as prompt and sustained combat operations from the sea, you could always wait twelve months or so while the ship and airwing get integrated and trained. Submarines are today’s capital ships, because there’s nothing like the compelling sight of a submarine under the waves to provide a visible reminder of US deterrent power. Shift the focus of a maritime nation’s naval forces from controlling the sea lanes so vital to commerce and security, and become a coast guard for failed states. Because most of them don’t have one. Purchase more CAS aircraft like the A-10, I suppose because we won’t have the Air Force there to help out.
Air Force: Strategic bombing forces are too dominant in Air Force doctrine (which I believe will come as a surprise to both the Fighter Mafia and the strategic bomber bubbas). It is possible to buy 9000 single mission aircraft under current procurement constraints that will be more effective than the unaffordable top-of-the-line world beaters currently in procurement. Because even if we’ve historically managed to sweep the skies of enemy aircraft using the best technologies we can afford, and the best trained pilots to fly them, with the result that no US soldier or Marine has suffered an air attack since Korea, quantity has a quality all its own. And anyway, more replacement pilots are being born every day. Besides, the Navy and Marine Corps are also to buy single-mission CAS aircraft, and we wouldn’t want the USAF to bring different capabilities to the fight.
Air Mobility: More, smaller tankers for Special Operations air warfare. Less strategic and tactical airlift to get them there along with the heavy forces and support. Because those guys are really, really good at camping out for long periods of time, all alone.
Acquisition Reform: Our move away from larger forces to a lighter, more maneuverable, more deployable force has resulted in increased cost per trigger puller and a great deal of maneuver and deployment. Stuff got broken because we used it so much. Now it has to be replaced. This is presented as insight.
The Defense Budget is Out of Control: A new panel of independent, objective professionals should be convened by the president to assess how to fix this problem. We might even know a few guys who could do it.
Out with the old, in with the new!
Americas Defense Meltdown Full Text
Badbob –
It was Merril McPeak. For those that were in the Air Force at the time, he’s a horrible embarrassment. Not that USAF has had alot of sterling senior leadership the last 15-20 years.
Larry,
I understand there is some animus against current USAF CAS based on the fact that they no longer permit their jets to strafe because they lost one a couple of years ago in a strafing run.
Keep it high, keep it clean, keep it safe for the USAF. Sadly, this mindset prevails now within my own service. Risk avoidance dominates operations and hangs like a 500 pound clump on every decision that requires boldness, action and swift determination. All that rot is now offset by those at the other end of the handset which means the bureaucracy is in charge of decision making.
Oh, I dunno that the risk thing has entirely overcome us. Cuppla years back FA-18′s were doing low angle strafe on insurgents in Iraq. At night.
I’d never done that. Never imagined having to. One air wing did it because that was what the ground forces needed. Put together a little training syllabus, qualed the pilots, supported the doggies. Brought the lesson home, now it’s taught to everyone.