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An Efficient Killing Machine

By lex, on February 12th, 2009

“Blackhawk Down” author Mark Bowden interviews a retired F-15 pilot and victor of three air-to-air kills on his experience on the bleeding edge of air combat.

It’s a grand read.

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February 12th, 2009 | Tags: , , | Category: Flying, Military, Tech Lust

12 comments to An Efficient Killing Machine

  • Edward
    February 12, 2009 at 10:56 pm

    A fascinating — and disturbing — article.
    I am astonished at the thoughtfulness of the article. It is not something that I expect in the media these days.
    The last American GI killed by enemy air action was in Korea on April 15, 1953. A kill ratio of 107 to 0. These two statements are indicative of air superiority so great and so long-lasting that it allows the beast of complacency to flourish in the public mind.

    I would rather pay in $$ than blood to ensure the continuation of that superiority. Our armed forces deserve no less.

    That last millisecond HUD image from the Iraqi MIG-29 raises the hairs on the back of my neck.

  • Casey
    February 13, 2009 at 2:05 am

    …On the other hand, one must inquire “Is this too much?”

    Is it appropriate to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on what might be an obsolete approach, once remotely-piloted aircraft graduate to autonomous operation? It’s already self-evident (from various reports) that the AI in even commercially-available flight simulators can frequently defeat

    On the other hand, I can recall many instances where the Mark I eyeball worked as well -if not better- than bleeding-edge sensors.

    It’s a tough call, not unreminiscent of the debate about the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship.

    When and where does bleeding-edge high-tech defeat historical example and experience? When and where does “good enough” defeat technologically-superior?

    All of this ignores the factor of experience and professionalism. There are many examples (from WW2 at least) where the US/allies defeated superior technology via superior doctrine or technique. Take M-4 Sherman vs. Panzer, for example. Or the fact that the P-38 destroyed more Japanese aircraft than any other model in the Allied inventory.

    It’s a tough call.

  • Curtis
    February 13, 2009 at 3:18 am

    Not a believer. If the USAF did its job properly they could instantly deploy at least 120 of the F22 they own anywhere in the wide world where they would overpower, overwhelm and destroy any existing air force all by their lonesome.

    Let’s be honest. Modern combat is not ALL 1v1 or 2v2 actions in the skies. A larger part falls to the N2 aspect; identifies the fuel depots, the air bases, the repair facilities, the runways and destroys them all using other means. Historically, only a small fraction of the enemy’s aircraft were destroyed in the air. I’m hazarding a guess and postulating that most of them were destroyed on the ground or in the factory or failed to get aloft for lack of fuel or other vital parts.

    Unfortunately, the way the system works, only 1 or 2 squadrons of F22 will be “ready” for deployment push comes to shove and they only deploy for 45 days or so which means we have an enormous $ amount of fighters that will never see combat, never deploy and never engage the enemy. Sorta like the way it has been for the last 60 years.

    Necessary economies having been made….

    Say, what happens to the CVW when the carrier goes into a 2 or 3 year overhaul? Do they all push off to Bagram for a 6 month pump or just put their feet up? :)

  • lex
    February 13, 2009 at 7:28 am

    Oh, we maintained 10 CVWs for a 12 CV/N force, so there was always some shuffling when a ship went into RCOH.

    We’ll see what the numbers end up being if we end up fighting an 11 CVN force, but I can guarantee you that the willingness to cut an airwing exists at the highest level, if we can get away with it. No emotionalism there, just bidness.

  • geo6
    February 13, 2009 at 8:14 am

    AIM7 in the face gave me the same bone chilling sphinter closing reaction too. Same feeling one would get to an incoming ATGM, except you wouldn’t have time to say
    “Aww $#!t , this is going to hurt!” like you would in a tank.

  • Scott
    February 13, 2009 at 9:40 am

    Curtis — I worked in the CAOC in Vicenza during Allied Force. As this article relates, we dominated the FRY AF — but it was for multiple reasons. First, we manned seven CAP stations, 24×7 with a division (4 A/C). We could do that, because we had the tankers to do it. We had complete air SA, because of AWACS. We knew when the a/c taxied, because of the Rivet Joint capabilities. As the article relates, we had a death ray missile. The US forces had the training and discipline to be comfortable, from Sortie #1. And, we also had a very capable airframe in the F15. But it was the layers that gave that capability, not just the a/f.

    I’ve seen the Raptor demo — it is eye watering to see the “spin around my axis while I descend in a level attitude” schtick. But as you correctly asked, at what price? And at what opportunity cost?

    PS — we bagged one 29 right at the a/f boundary. Guy was barely wheels in the well.

  • Taxi1
    February 13, 2009 at 11:04 am

    Long article, and they mentioned the F-35 exactly once, on the last page.

  • ELP
    February 13, 2009 at 1:39 pm

    Yes it is good to mention AWACS and Rivet Joint et al. However in a Super SAM environ, those aircraft can’t get close enough to do any good. The F-22 as an air domination and SEAD/DEAD machine and because the 30 or so apertures on the jet combined with the stunning AN/ALR-94 which determines if the APG-77 is even needed, will be the only thing that can go in and take out high end threats. F-22, B-22, RC-22, EC-22….

    USAF already figured out the numbers needed. Enough to support 10 AEFs. And well the USAF being the biggest buyer of the Just So Farcical, doesn’t even need that Buick. USAF can do the job with new build legacy aircraft and F-22s.

    F-22 cost is already sunk and mature. After the dummies cancel it because the U.S. can’t pull anymore credit out of our backside, the marketing spinners will hype the F-35 even more (if that can be imagined) and if that isn’t cancelled. The Buick of Stealth growing costs will make anything we have done before seem not so bad. And the F-35 is not just a mini F-22.

  • XBradTC
    February 13, 2009 at 1:43 pm

    ELP hits a key point. We aren’t going to get any ROI on sunk costs for the F-22 if we don’t build them. Right now, the only thing we have to pay for is parts and labor. If we had stuck to the original buy numbers, the unit cost would probably be less than the flyaway cost of the future JSF.

  • virgil xenophon
    February 13, 2009 at 2:05 pm

    Scott/Curtiss

    At what price/opportunity cost is a valid question but I’m afraid the logic than goes along with such a question is unfortunately almost always subsumed by the political equation as Lex notes here@4. As someone once said about Vietnam, “We were at politics, not war.” IMO, the overriding mindset of all to many in Congress is, as the article suggests, complacency in thinking the possibility that we might actually lose a conflict as beyond the pale. Hence the “either or” bean-counting mindset, as opposed to “both and.” $ for constituents pays big dividends for politicians immediately upfront. The bill for lack of preparedness “may”come due (in the politician’s minds) far, far, in the future–if at all. And for those who say that the needs of the Armed Services are theoretically limitless and it is impossible to fund everything, I would point out that presently we are spending less on Defense as a per-centage of GDP than we did prior to Pearl Harbor.

    There is a price for doing something and a price for doing nothing. The cost of doing something is unfortunately upfront and leads to politically unpleasant choices. The cost of doing nothing is only revealed much later–and with a potentially mind-numbing price tag. What dollar figure do you put on losing a war?

    We are all whistling past the grave-yard here and playing beggar thy neighbor in arguing as between the F-22 and more, say, LPADs. We are just today voting on a bill that will spend hundreds of billions of dollars for pure (and dubious) ephemera that will be soon dissipated (As in, “Gone With The Wind”.) At least when you build an F-22 the thing sticks around for a while as a useful implement–plus you employ people to build the thing.

    As to the purely tactical need for the F-22? I would respectfully point out that the “multiple layers” of our current “system” are designed and built to support only one thing: the tip of the spear. And while the nature of wpns development has been such that in recent years it has been cheaper to hang new pods and missiles onto current jets to upgrade electronics and wpns rather than build new airframes, that game has reached (in my mind, anyway) the point of diminishing returns. If we’re not careful pretty soon all those support systems are going to be used to support an inferior tip of the spear.

    It’s like having two offensive tackles that are highly intelligent and can learn the entire play-book in 30 min. They never jump off-sides and have every blocking technique–run & pass–down to perfection. Only problem is–they both weigh only 150lbs.

    Ya got to have the horses…

  • Larry
    February 13, 2009 at 2:31 pm

    I was very impressed with the generally balanced nature of the article, and the fact that it attempted to go into some detail describing aircraft systems that normally get glossed over. However, I think the notion that the US has not experienced contested air supremacy in over 50 years is hooey. Have US troops been exposed to unfriendly air attack since Korea? No. But the US never managed to establish air supremacy in the skies over N. Viet Nam. It was a pitched battle from 1965 onwards, with countermoves by both sides and neither ever gaining a decisive advantage. The US was able, under brief, local circumstances, to gain air superiority, but never established air supremacy.

    Why? The force – Navy, Marines, and USAF – lacked the training, doctrine, and technology to overcome their adversary. All three were equal legs of a compromised overall air strategy. The article posits that, with a reduced buy of F-22s, one of those legs could again become compromised. With further reduced military budgets in the offing, and an unrelenting ops tempo, it is quite possible that the other legs may begin suffering, as well. That could well lead to future scenarios where the US has almost 1 to 1 exchange ratios in air-to-air, and an inability to meet national objectives through air power.

    It costs alot to have a world beating air power capability. It can cost alot more not to have it.

  • JRandom
    February 13, 2009 at 2:33 pm

    An interesting article, but the idea that the radar is “bouncing electrons off the ground” and the F22 “absorbing electrons” is goofy. The downside of having an English major write about avionics, I guess.
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