The MiG-21 Fishbed is heading towards parking for the last time, after 50 years of bringing the close-in heat:
An icon of the Cold War, the MiG-21 came to symbolize the military might of the Soviet Union as it squared off against the West in conflicts from Vietnam to Africa and the Middle East.
Now, exactly 50 years after it entered service, the jet fighter is approaching the twilight of its career in frontline service – with NATO, the former Soviet Union’s main rival.
The rugged and agile jet earned a reputation as a versatile and effective short-range interceptor with low operating costs and excellent performance. Just like the Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifle – another robust and reliable weapon that epitomized Soviet power – the MiG-21 holds a unique place in military history.
As a point-defense fighter, it was indeed a Platonic form. Although the idea of building a fighter capable of defending its own airstrip does carry some ontological baggage.
The jet was cheap, relatively easy to fly, uncomplicated and could go like a striped-assed baboon, albeit over very short distances. Like most delta wing aircraft it had one good turn, but in the hands of a skilled operator it could do wondrous things in a slow speed fight with the flaps punched down.
F-8 jocks thought it all good sport, while carving out a 19:3 kill ratio. The Phantom bubbas had a bit more on their hands, with a platform that had been built as a missile truck, but lacked an internal gun. USAF and Navy kill ratios hovered around 2:1, which mean that in fiscal terms at least, we were getting our asses kicked by third world gomers. It was too much to bear.
Too much for the Navy at least. The sea service stood up a blue ribbon commission to study the Fishbed’s performance, and ended up dwelling more on the US fighter pilot’s understanding of his own weapons system. Energy-maneuverability diagrams came next – a USAF innovation that sought to understand areas of relative advantage, but failed to incorporate the intimidation factor of a jet that could break hard and still point the nose at 80 knots – a capability the lumbering Phantom, for all its advanced weaponry, manifestly lacked.
Captain Frank Ault led the Navy where it did not want to go: Train like you fight, fight like you train. The Navy Fighter Weapons school was developed to let guys who had seen the wolf show the nuggets what was what. The better you could simulate the stress of an actual combat environment, the longer a new guy lasted in actual combat, the better his chances were of doing something useful. Navy kill ratios rose to 12:1. We were back in the game.
We didn’t have a jet like the MiG-21 to train our fighter jocks in when I was in the nav. The F-5 made a pretty good high speed simulator, but once you’d raced a guy down and put your best turn on, pretty soon it was bone-jarring buffet. The nimble A-4 Skyhawk couldn’t (safely) go through the number, but in a slow-speed fight it gave many a Hornet and Tomcat pilot more than he had reckoned on. Especially with the slats hooked out and one-third flaps. Half flaps once you’d gotten into a flat scissors. The Fishbed ably covered both sides of the E-M diagram.
We used to dream of fighting Fishbeds. The Patch still shows one in the gunsight to this day.
A noble adversary. One you could beat, if you were on your game. One that would beat you if you weren’t.
Wasn’t it the MiG-21 that turned out to have a really stupid design flaw, once we got our hands on one for flight-testing? I recall reading something about how the center of gravity shifted aft as fuel burned off, until the thing became uncontrollable. About a third of the internal fuel load was thus unusable.
Have a friend back east that owned a bunch of Beech 18s for cargo and a couple of Citations for pax. Got his hands on a MiG-21 for $63K, in crates, and decided to put it together. ‘Course then they had to run it, for FAA approval. Chained down the burner woke the dogs for miles around the Delaware community. And then, naturally, he had to do some taxi tests. One, so his story goes, got a bit fast to stop and the only safe solution was take it around the patch. Well, and down over the Chesapeake a ways, to check low speed handling (and high-speed too, truth be known.) Brought her back after about a .6, and eventually took it to Oshkosh in ‘89. Last I heard it lives down at Brown Field, showed up at the 2005 CAF Wings Over Gillespie show.
Best history of how the Navy got the Fighter Weapons School is a book titled: “Scream of Eagles”. Talks a lot about that little problem the Migs had (though I don’t recall anything about fuel/CoG). If you want to know why Naval Aviators are so damn good, I strongly suggest you read this book.
http://www.amazon.com/Scream-Eagles-Dramatic-Account-Fighter/dp/0743497244
And when you’re done with that, read this:
http://www.amazon.com/Yankee-Station-Naval-Vietnam-Bluejacket/dp/1557504954/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1236091707&sr=1-1
I have one question. Where does the 12:1 figure come from, and what period of time does it cover? The reason I ask is because, analyses of the air combat in SEA during the Linebacker campaign (May 1 1972 – January 15 1973) show that the USN exchange ratio vis a vis the NVAF was more like 4.3:1. There is no doubt this was a massive improvement, as during Rollling Thunder, the ratio was more like the 2:1 you alluded to. Was the 12:1 ratio from a subset of the Linebacker period – maybe Linebacker II?
The training changes instituted by the Ault Report definitely seem to have had a strong impact. USAF exchange ratio during 1972 remained around 2:1.
Well, Randy Cunningham, who shared a JO jungle berth with a FWS graduate and who spent every minute in the air learning from his roommate, got 5 of those kills, 3 in one day. He fully credited what he learned from Top Gun for his kills. “Scream of Eagles” breaks the numbers down, as does “On Yankee Station”. And the reason why Air Force lagged so far behind is that it took a few more years for the Air Force to start Red Flag.
Byron/
On the shelf right next to “On Yankee Station” should sit “Over the Beach” which highlights the tour of the Oriskany in 66-67. A great read also.
See http://www.ospreypublishing.com/store/Red-Eagles_9781846033780
for a history of the US operation of MIGs during the cold war.
I found it at my local library 2 weeks ago.
Sorry, gotta say it…Duke shoulda stayed in the Navy.
Duke did stay in the Navy, retiring as a Commander. He didn’t just learn at the feet of a FWS grad, he was one. He later served as an instructor at FWS, and IIRC, he finally served as the CO there as well.
Not being a killjoy and all, but it should be pointed out that 16 of those 19 kills by the Crusader were against the MiG-17 and at least two of the Crusader losses were to MiG-17s.
- SJS
The concept of training used by FWS and later Red Flag also contributed to the Army’s decision to implement the National Training Center, where the whole idea was to get the “first 10 missions” out of the way before combat. Much like at FWS, the OPFOR at NTC does everything they can to induce stress on the BlueFor. If you can hack it there, combat doesn’t become easy, but it does become a lot more successful.
[...] pilot/Top Gun instructor Neptunus Lex waxes avionic on the virtues and vices of the MiG 21 Fishbed, now in its dotage … and [...]
Brad, unless I’m wrong, Duke went to FWS after his combat tour. Also, the biggest inovation that the FWS used (besides teaching students to get to the edge of the envelope and to use that knowledge in combat) was dissimilar tactics. Prior to FWS and the Ault Report, disimilar was forbidden. And yes, information gained from secret hops on a Mig that came along with it’s defecting pilot helped greatly, as weakness’s in the flight regime were exploited (IIRC it was that in lower and denser air, the Migs turning radius above a certain speed would cause the controls to lock up).
If that’s supposed to be a Fishbed on the patch, someone should get their money back. Looks like a MiG-19 Farmer to me.
Those wings look swept, not delta.
SSGJ: Then to be picky it looks like an A-4 gunsight reticule on that MiG – which ‘are’ cool.
The capability of the MiG-21J Fishbed of that era should not be underestimated.
Indeed, while the actual numbers are in dispute, the VPAF did have more “aces” than our combined US forces for the entire war. (However unlike US pilots, the VPAF pilots were there for the duration, thereby flying more total sorties over time, and if they lived, had more opportunities.)
As mentioned above, a large number of US kills were against MiG-17s and MiG-19s and are included in the aggregate kill ratios. It would be interesting to see the kill ratios for each type aircraft since their respective numbers and performance capabilities differed greatly from the MiG-21. And the more experienced Vietnamese (if not Russian) pilots were mostly flying the Fishbed.
Nevertheless, the Ault report leading to the initial establishment of NFWS had an extraordinary and nearly immediate impact, and changed US air warfare training for decades.
But in the final analysis, it is not the machine so much – MiG 21, F-8 or F-4, each with their own respective strengths and weaknesses. Rather, it is the skill, specialized training, and experience of the individual pilot and not the platform that makes the difference….. As the NFWS so aptly demonstrated.
The NVAF benefited, no doubt, from interior lines. If one ejected and survived he could literally fight another day. Those on our side, however, were destined to spend the duration in wretched confinement.
Filterman, I have that data at home, and will try to post tonight or tomorrow. Nordeen’s “Air Combat in the Missile Age” compiles a fairly comprehensive list of the losses and victories in Vietnam for both Rolling Thunder and Linebacker.
That’s where I got my exchange ratio data from, among other sources I’ve seen with similar, but less complete, data. I am yet to see a detailed source that shows a period of time where the USN achieved a 12:1 kill ratio.
I’m not trying to minimize the effectiveness of changes in USN air combat training, or the efforts of those involved at the time. I think the 12:1 claim may have originated without basis in fact, unfortunately.
US Air-to-air victories Part 1 and Part 2
Vietnamese Air-to-Air victories Part 1 and Part 2
- SJS
Thanks, SSJ.
For those that don’t want to wade through the ACIG site (which is generally very good) data, here’s the condensed version (and my memory was slightly clouded):
For the period 1970-1973, USN air combat victories: 22. Losses: 5. Kill ratio: 4.5:1.
USAF ratio in the same period was actually lower than I remembered, it was 1.8:1.
During the period 1965-1968, the numbers were USN: 36 kills, 14 losses, ratio 2.6:1.
Byron,
Cunningham went to FWS after his first cruise, but before he killed any Migs. His many interviews credit FWS with the training to give him the edge.
Interestingly, while I was very disappointed when he was caught being a crook, I can’t say I was terribly surprised. He was the most narcissistic Naval Aviator I’ve ever read. Every other ‘hooker understands that in telling a tale, you have to be somewhat self-deprecating. That’s just how it is done.
I don’t remember when FWS was established but in March of 1968 I had the opportunity to fly A4 and A7 a/c against a Mig21 in project “Have Doughnut”. I was with VX5 out of China Lake, the Mig was at Groom Lake. We would hold at the Nellis 360/55nm fix, escorted by USAF F4’s, and wait for the Mig. The Mig is hard to see and nearly unbeatable if it “Bounces” you and climbs away. Only two a/c in the US inventory could out turn it under 20k, the A4 and the A6. We got the 21, and later the 17’s( Have Drill) from our friends the Izzies. Captured during the 67 war.
Bill C,
Dunno how a fight between a Fishbed and an Intruder would come out, but I’ve got a lovely pic my dad took from an A-6 of the tailpipes of a somewhat surprised F-4.
Brad: I stand corrected.
Bill, sometime after Have Doughnut. I remember from the book that the people that set the school up got access to the data from that project.
Guy I trained with was a Hip pilot once upon a time. He tells me that after the one guy defected from Iraq with a Mig-21 to Israel, two things happened:
–All the Iraqi plans were fueled only halfway fuel, to prevent them going out of country
–All the pilots got jailed and tortured. Guy tells me it took him years to get out of jail and leave the country.
Steeljaw-great link. While I knew most US pilots were lost due to triple A and SAMs, I never realized how many were downed in aerial engagements. Interesting that many of the Vietnamese pilots names are identified.
There’s a MiG-21 located at our airport but flies much less these days due to fuel costs. I’ll have more to talk about with the owner next tyime I see him.
Some interesting reports on both lists, including this:
28Dec72 B-52 See Notes# MiG-21
# Reports that the explosion of this B-52D destroyed the MiG-21 that shot it down.
Well, I know the 12:1 claim was part of the “standard” squadron pitch when I was at the school. Given the place’s rep for being hyper-anal on facts – and the legions of TOPGUN critics – it’d surprise me to learn that the scoring was apocryphal.
Ben Lambeth is an analyst at RAND, he’s quoted at this wikipedia article with a slightly more favorable slant:
I suppose I could run an excel parser on SJS’s links, but I can’t stand to have a cherished illusion shattered
#16.2.1 SteeljawS – Thank you for the links. That is the information I was looking for.
#17 XBrad – Cunningham was known to often embellish his résumé in his many interviews. Although he was obviously assigned as a FWS instructor following his kills, I tend to agree with Byron that he did not “officially” attend FWS earlier.
Wilcox in Sream of Eagles tells us that while he was stashed for a while in the RAG, he intently studied NFWS tactics and performance publications, and may have flown back-seat as an observer. Later in the turnaround between his cruises, I believe another pilot was selected by his squadron to attend FWS.
In fact it is my understanding that his requests to augment from Reserve to Regular Navy had been denied, and he was to be involuntarily separated from active duty at the end of that cruise, when his initial reserve commitment was up. Of course all that was later OBE and naturally changed.
Flit, I’ll defer to your position, as I suspect you’ve studied it more.
Harrumphh
Friggin “Led sled Fishbed” Sundown gets more press than the Viking going away a couple weeks ago from our own formerly capable airwing of just a decade ago…
Figures. ; -)
No BAMS for another decade minimum, P-3’s in the crapper, P-8 wishful thinking, JSF looking like a bridge too far and an Obama admimnistration to boot..man on’man we are in a world o’hurt. The train is off the tracks and impact is pending.
b2
Amen, B2….Viking was the Rodney Dangerfield of the Air Wing.
Although I’m a zoomie, GOT to say ANOTHER amen to both b2 & Chunk on all counts!