I’m not so sure how long cadres with combat experience really stick around. It’s a more ephemeral thing than it appears, IMO, what with losses due to guys putting in their papers to return to civilian life to fly airlines, etc., RIFFS (often of very capable people) and desk assignments that can take highly experienced people away from the training and/or ops side of the house such that their experience is lost to the FNGs, etc. coming on board behind them.

The Squadron that I joined in England direct from DaNang was, at the time I joined in Dec., ‘68 comprised of only about 20% combat veterans. The percentage slowly rose as we got more people from SEA until at mid-point during my 3-yr stint the entire Squadron (100%) were combat veterans–but that lasted for only about six-months. As guys rotated out we began to get guys direct from Pilot Tng and Nav school plus Navs (we were an F4D outfit) from C-130s, etc. as back seaters. By the time I rotated out in fall 71 the Squadron was only about 60% combat veterans with percentage continuing to decline as the war wound down.

But you’re probably right about the NCO cadres–those people do tend to stick around the direct tng/ops cycle almost 100% of their careers, so I’m in agreement with you on that score.

In WW2 we had soldiers on the beaches in Normany well-trained in how to shoot, throw grenades, seek cover, operate the satchel charge and the Browning 30-cal and the bazooka. As they secured that beach and went inland they found they’d had no training on how to eliminate opposition from a farm house, or counter 88mm’s set up on a road in the hedge-row country.

That’s sort of what I’m asking about here — what does it take to go from mostly effective to very effective in each force, and what percentage share a common training? An army of entirely riflemen would be cheap and quick to deploy, but I suspect and am asking how long it takes to train the tankers, logistics folks, etc… in that group?

Likewise a Navy Air Boss is a one-in-ten-thousand find. If he leaves due to longer patrols, how long and how many man-hours are spent replacing him vs. the swabbie that cleans the heads and mans a phone relaying orders during a drill?

I suspect we’re going to be gutting ourselves of the talent and institutional knowledge that keeps the services going, here I’m looking for information about how deep that gutting will go.

– Max

Remember watching the invasion of Iraq on CNN while eating breakfast in Chinhae? (OK, I do.) The young marines were fumbling around and not altogether sure how to fire their missiles at enemy bunkers. It was obvious as hell they lacked the experience to do it right the first time because their training did not allow each of them that was expected to shoot the thing to actually fire one in training. Today? 100% of those in the platoon know exactly how to fire an aimed missile at an enemy. They’re blooded troops and they will provide the NCOs for the next 30 years of military operations. Right now none of them are ’shake and bake’ draftee sergeants, not that there’s anything wrong with that. I know some great guys who left boot camp for instant sergeant school.
It’s always interesting to have lunch at the food court at MCRD (one mile from where I work) and watch the DI’s and cadre strolling around with their PH and SS and BS and most everybody except the recruits is wearing a CAR and unit award or two. I think they know now how to winnow through what is important and what is bogus when it comes to imparting knowledge to the youngsters who will shortly find themselves on a battlefield. I’m glad I was initially instructed by one of their compadres from Vietnam. He taught us all a lot about leadership and what really matters.

Where to get the money to build a new facility on Guam? Real simple. Steal it from Acorn. They’re going to be flush with a few billion soon thanks to the Lightwalker and Congressional Donkey Party friends.