A Marine Corps report – the JAG report, I presume – is holding Marine Lieutenant Dan Neubauer partially to blame for the mishap that led to the deaths of four people in San Diego back in December:
The Marine pilot whose F/A-18 crashed into a San Diego neighborhood, killing four members of a family, had shown “no unsafe trends or questionable judgment” during his training but failed to stand up to his superiors on the ground when they ordered him to attempt an emergency landing at Miramar Marine Corps Air Station, according to an investigation report released Tuesday.
The pilot “demonstrated an unacceptable lack of assertiveness even given his lack of experience” in not questioning the order to bypass a closer runway at North Island Naval Air Station, the Marine Corps report said.
He’s still awaiting a decision on whether he’ll be allowed to continue in training. Four senior officers at his training squadron have been relieved of their duties, and several more have received official reprimands.
Ultimately the pilot in command is responsible for the safe conduct of his flight, but if he had gone into NAS North Island against the direction of his chain-of-command and lost the jet off the departure end of an unfamiliar field – such things have happened – I wonder what the official response would have been?
Damned if you don’t.
Breaks of naval air.
Blood is in the water, and the men in grey suits are circling. We really should listen more to old Bill Shakespear.
Not to trivialize, but this reminds me of a story that happened to me about 30 years ago. I was working at the local airport and was asked to tow a Beech King Air from the wash rack to a parking spot. I hooked the tug up to the plane and was backing up, when one of the other “line boys” pulled up from behind me in a van and ran into the wingtip, at speed. Caused a bunch of damage.
My boss yelled at me that the accident wouldn’t have happened if I’d had a wing walker. Being kind of a smart mouthed kid, I said, “No, my wing walker would have just gotten run over.” Boss didn’t think it was too funny.
About a hundred levels of magnitude lower, but responsible is responsible. Hope Lt Neubauer comes out of this okay.
(Channeling Foghorn Leghorn)
Naw, ya got it all WRONG son, ya got it all WRONG!
In terms of playing the odds, the good Lt. made the ABSOLUTELY RIGHT decision–it just was his turn in the barrel that day. It goes like this: Even if he had landed SAFELY at North Island, the odds were ONE HUNDRED PER-CENT (100%) that he was going to be in Deep Kimchi with his superiors for ignoring their orders, and thus risk affecting his next FITREP and his budding career. Had he made it safely at Miramar, well, everyone’s happy all the way round.
And whatever the odds were for things to go wrong at Miramar, (whatever they were–given the state of the aircraft) they were certainly far less than the 100% certainty that the “big kids” were going to be PISSED for ignoring them had he proceeded to North Island–even if all had gone well.
The guy played the odds right–it just didn’t work out this time.
(Mind you I’m not saying he made the right decision in terms of flight safety, all I’m saying is that he made the right POLITICAL decision, given the state of play of command relationships, IMHO)
(Remember–you don’t tug on Superman’s cape–and Superman is the Squadron CO insofar as the Jr. Lt was concerned, so you weigh the odds: 100% chance of your CO being pissed, vs something less<100% (you pick a number) of something bad happening in pressing on to Miramar.)
“The race does not always go to the swift, nor the contest to the strong–but that’s the way to bet.” —Damon Runyan
Although I’m not familiar with the specific fuel levels in a Hornet with these cautions, I know what they are in the Rhino. Fuel Lo caution with one motor running you’ve got at most 20 minutes of flying left if you are clean (not gear down and up on the power). Boost LO and you’ve got about 3 -5 minutes tops. Then your plane turns into a glider.
He made the wrong call. Did he almost make it – yes, but even if he had it was the wrong call.
If you aren’t getting a good ass chewing by your superiors, you aren’t doing you job. We’d lose a lot more planes if people subscribed to your suggestions…. a LOT more.
Rhinowso/
Not saying that’s necessairly the call I myself would have made–or that it is the common-sense decision in the self-preservation sense
use of professional good judgment (i.e., “pilotage” skills)–only that Jr. officers are often put in a dilemma by conflicting demands of superior officers on the one hand and the specifics of their particular difficulties on the other, with the one constant being that of knowing what awaits in terms of the big kid(s) whose orders you’ve just disobayed.
The personality/psychological make-up of the pilot certainly comes into play here. Some are confident/aggressive enough to stand-up to superiors, some are not. And all I’m saying is that, objective realities about the airworthiness of the aircraft at the time aside,
the command pressure realities are a known, 100% given. You pays you money and you takes you chances…a roll of the dice.
Look, I’m not suggesting that anyone should obey ANY damn order, no matter how obviously wrong and/or foolish. But the cockpit doesn’t allow a lot of time to play Hamlet
and there ARE often conflicting pressures.
Under far different circumstances I once disobayed a direct order by a senior officer by saying I would follow it only if he put it in writing with his signature bloc–which he refused to do–but just let us say I didn’t make any friends–and I wasn’t sitting in a busy cockpit at the time I made the decision, either.
My choice? Depends. Once I had made the choice that I was putting in my papers because I had decided the Air Force was not at War, but “At Politics” and it seemed only–or all too many–of the Chicken-Sh**t types that I couldn’t stand were staying in and getting promoted, while the really good guys were leaving, I would have had no qualms about the North Island decision. Had I wanted to stay in as a career? Well…
Let’s get real here, some commanders respect Jr. officers who challenge them (respectfully, of course, ) and are independent thinkers who freely speak their minds–and some don’t.
Your career definitely depends on knowing which kind of officer you serve under. A few acid-tongued “un-diplomats” make Flag rank like “Vinegar Joe” Stillwell, but they are the exception. During the 1939 Louisiana War games Stillwell was ranked as the highest rated-General by George Marshall for his performance, with no little thanks due to achieving surprise by jumping off 1-hour ahead of the officially scheduled start-times by disobeying the rules of the exercise. What do you think would happen to an officer who did that today? Think he’d get rewarded? Hell, we don’t even have to ponder. Who was that Marine General that sank the Navy in exercises in the Gulf of Mexico not too long ago by using assymetrical tactics with lots of rubberized swift boats? And whose efforts were totally ignored? Or go all the way back to Billy Mitchell–Courts-Martial city. Or take the case of the intel guy at Pearl who broke the Japanese code at Mid-Way and didn’t keep quiet when his superiors in the Pentagon wanted to take credit for it? He was rewarded by having his talents wasted by spending the rest of the war commanding a dry-dock in SF.
I know I’ve strayed far afield, but only to point out that institutional command pressures are nothing to be sneezed at and are disregarded at the peril to one’s career.
Which all goes to say that Lex is, as usual, correct. Damned if you do….
Lex
Given your post-squadron command and bonus command status, what is your take on “but failed to stand up to his superiors”? Are we now saying that a JO in the air in a less than FMC A/C and a grunch of warning/annunciator lights now must question a decision/recommendation made by CO/Ops/Natops/Paddles? Seems to be one of them slippery slopes we don’t want to stand upon for very long.
Seems destined for tagging as “the Neubauer rule” or “he pulled a Neubie”.
Oh, man… what a mess. Poor guy.
BTW, since when does the JAG get involved these days? In my day the primary investigation was the Accident Investigation Board–a 100% Air Force line officer directed (O-6) affair aimed at determining CAUSE ONLY. Only later MIGHT a “Flt Review Board” be convened to pass on the status of the pilots involved. The JAG, to my knowledge, never even entered into the entire affair unless crininal conduct was alleged to have been involved. Is this “JAG Report” a new PC–driven thing?
There is a JAGMAN investigation whenever there is a Class A mishap. The investigation is supposed to find out not only the cause but whether there was conduct requiring further legal action. The JAGMAN investigators may not use anything from the Mishap Investigation, but the Mishap Board may use information from the JAGMAN, since it is supposedly all factual whereas the MIR may contain opinion and supposition.
The JAGMAN, of course, can be used for punitive action but the MIR may not be (theoretically).
A question, if someone would be so kind as to enlighten me… The linked news story says “The second engine failure was due to flying errors by the pilot and a malfunction in the fuel line.”
I don’t recall hearing about the “flying errors.” Does anybody know what that’s about, and how the fuel line issue figured into the errors? Based on the reporting, it almost sounds like the fuel line problems were considered manageable but the pilot didn’t “manage” it correctly.
OK, let’s review. You take a guy who has, from the beginning, been taught that he is in a junior to senior military relationship. He’s been taught to contact Base when there’s a problem airborne, another junior to senior relationship. Despite having been NATOPS qualified in every aircraft flown in training, there are many people on the ground with a much deeper understanding of the aircraft’s systems. Discussing problems with the experts on the ground only makes sense, and is part of Cockpit Resource Management, which is so popular nowadays, and for good reason. However, in the military culture, deferral to the experts is more the norm. We were all taught from Day One not to question, at least openly, our seniors. Eventually, we learn to do that, in fact the RAG might be the first place where that is introduced. The 2vX scenario is the one scenario where the concept of directing the fight regardless of rank is introduced. However, that is just one unusual scenario in thousands of instances of a fairly rigid culture. Once the Knock It Off is called, it’s back to the Lead/Wingman, junior/senior relationship.
So here’s a very junior Naval Aviator, task saturated, probably never having seen this particular emergency in the sim, seeking help from the people he’s been taught to obey. Does he even have enough knowledge of the aircraft systems to diagnose what’s going on to tell Base exactly what’s happening? I don’t know, but I suspect not. Does NATOPS address this particular failure and does it specify Land As Soon As Possible, vice Land
As Soon As Practicable? I’m sure someone can answer that one. Should he have landed at North Island? In retrospect, yes. However, had the engine run another minute or so, he would have been a hero within the RAG for having returned the jet.
The findings in the report take Monday morning quarterbacking to new heights. If there was a NATOPS violation, fine, he obviously should be found at fault, but to claim that a Marine O-2 should flout the direction of his seniors, that he would have the knowledge, insight and experience to do so, and that he should violate all the tenets in which he has intensely lived and breathed for his entire military existence, is flawed logic. I wonder who was on the JAG investigation. Did they just get done reading about the Nuremburg Trials?
Anyone who has been through the Training Command and RAG environments can think back on that experience and ask, “Would I have done any better?”
Single Engine / Boost LO = LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Had the motor run another minute, he would just be a stupid but lucky son of a @#$%. Hero wouldn’t be anywhere close to how he should have been described had that occured.
Now if he had done what he was supposed to do and landed in North Island, then he’d be a hero who saved his own behind.
Yes, as a aviator, there are times in the jet were you have to tell your superiors to shut up. They aren’t in your jet, they don’t know the situation. That is when your training should kick in and Natops Procedures followed. When you get the jet back in one piece, then you can talk about it.
It’s just the nature of the tough game of Naval Aviation.
And you ask if he should be able to perform to this level while still in the RAG? I hope so, because in a couple of months he could have been dropping bombs in combat, supporting troops on the ground. Mistakes there are even more costly and rarely is there an exact procedure to follow…
“Had the motor run another minute, he would just be a stupid but lucky son of a @#$%. Hero wouldn’t be anywhere close to how he should have been described had that occured.”
Agree, but many heroes are just lucky goats.
You obviously have forgotten your humble beginnings.
I’ll be the first to admit that I’d rather be lucky than good, but I prefer both…
As someone stated in an earlier post, we’ll never know what transpired on Com 2 between the PIC and the ODO desk. That said… as a high-time Hornet pilot, I might be comfortable overruling or disregarding advice or direction from less experienced folks on the ground. But a Cat I RP disregarding direction from a superior/much more experienced IP (who was making decisions at 1G and zero knots) would not go over well post-flight. Blame the pilot for poor airmanship (he had to spiral down because he stayed high too long) or systems knowledge (motive flow/feed tank levels) – fine. But to blame him for following direct orders is a terrible injustice.
I should have added: Seems to me the Navy has combined the Accident Investigation part (What happened and why) and the “Flt Review” part (i.e., the pilot’s–and others– appropriateness of judgment part) all in one report.
JAG is involved due to the loss of life, $ value of the jet, and publicity of the incident. Pretty standard, I’ve seen them for much smaller incidents.
There’s also a Field Flight Performance Board (FFPB – same as a FNAEB) to judge pilot’s future potential.
Having had my share of IFEs in my career… I know that it is difficult to “sort the wheat from the chaff”, especially when you let someone else climb in the cockpit (aka, ask for outside help).
However, this pilot decided to fly to Miramar having two indications that he was going to starve the operating engine of fuel – a FUEL LO and L BOOST LO Cautions. Additionally he had a L AMAD caution, a possible indication of further problems with his one operating engine.
Yes, he was dealing with superiors tell him to go to Miramar, but he was the PIC – he signed for the jet and it was his responsibility to do the procedures correctly to attempt to get the aircraft on deck safely. He failed to sort out the important facts in the emergency and execute appropriately. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE – that says it all for at least three of his emergencies. NAS North Island should have been his choice, regardless of what he was told by the ODO sitting in the ready room.
In the end, he ran his jet out of gas after passing up a suitable piece of concrete. We all know what is going to happen when any modern aircraft turns into a glider and it isn’t good.
Sorry bro, you made the wrong decision and it cost four people their lives. Harsh, but true.
Virg,
JAG investigations are always done for Class A mishaps. They are completely separate from the SIR, although they can share evidence. JAG is conducted by an aviator, not a lawyer (thank goodness), but that doesn’t mean they can’t make mistakes. A few years ago a Hornet threw a turbine blade on take-off from Nellis. Cut through a main fuel line (causing fire) and hyd lines (affecting flight controls). The PIC heroically steered the jet away from downtown Las Vegas before shucking out of it over barren desert. SIR found NO ONE at fault, which is almost unheard of (typically, whenever an investigation starts to look at a squadron, they will find SOMEONE to blame). The JAG, however, came to a different conclusion, saying that the PIC should have had faster hands (something we’re trained to avoid) in pressing the (not illuminated) fire light.
Let’s just all be sure that we don’t compromise any privileged information that could jeopardize the MIR process. Especially those of us with actual knowledge of the MIR contents.
JAG investigations are fair play for open discussion, but MIR contents are and ought to be considered FOUO, and this isn’t that.
The pilot’s statement is available on the internet – that is the only information I am basing my comments on. I haven’t read or seen anything else (nor will it).
But thanks for keeping us honest Lex.
With that, I’m out on the topic.
http://www.10newsblogs.com/pdf/JetCrashReport.pdf
Rhino
Thanks for that link. Never having flown the electric jet, some of the acronyms are foreign, but the lesson I gleaned after reading, was yeah, he shoulda gone to NI. Overflying a good field with a bad jet that kept telling him “something else ain’t right-I’m getting sicker” is hard to justify. He could very well have said “my NATOPS says land as soon as possible” and I don’t think anyone could have or would have said anything for being too safe and too cautious. This one will be studied to death at Safety School. The end of the green table with no ashtrays is a lonely place to be. I hope they don’t cashier the young man, he has a learned a lesson paid for in blood, and he can help others learn without them paying that price.
Lex, et. al.:
Thanks for getting the ball rolling on the discussion. Although a Whale/Intruder bubba (yes, I am THAT old, thank you) and not a Hornet guy, the human factors that the JAGMAN Investigation raises are fascinating. I’ve worked enough with the Marines to say the command climate is different from, say, a Navy RAG. Much more authoritarian and hierarchical than we’re used to. Not better or worse, just different. Thus I can imagine the subconscious pressure on this young lad to “get her home” was fairly intense. Add to it he’s a freakin’ nugget and, well, we know the rest of the story.
One other thing has occurred to me as well. When I was a lad, back when pterodactyls ruled the sky, “Naval Aviation News” ruled the Ready Room. More specifically, “Granmpa Pettibone.” NO ONE wanted to be “that guy” who’s frab-up wound up in the cross-hairs of “Grampa’s” write-ups. More than once, after some sort of anus-clenching adventure or another, my pilot and I both noted we refrained some doing things even more hare-brained because we didn’t want to see our narrowly averted mishap written up there. Now “Approach” is ascendant, and the stories are terrific, but somehow I have to wonder that while Grampa is still around, he’s no longer the final arbiter of stupidity and the threat of winding up in his write-ups is simply not the restraint on self-inflicted stupidity he once was.
VR,
Comjam
This is nothing new at all. Remember the Whale accident on the Nimitz back in 1987? The poor guy trying to CQ was ordered not to bingo, given a sour tanker (with no ready spare available), then when he told the brass of his intentions to bail-out, was ordered to attempt a barricade landing into a rig that the brass KNEW was not properly rigged (but the pilot did not). And after the crew died and the plane was lost, who was blamed? The pilot, for not diverting.
http://books.google.com/books?id=wYeNwE7B0zkC&pg=PA164&lpg=PA164&dq=whale+accident+nugget+navy&source=bl&ots=9-WLMWSM1i&sig=FHx-UeDhoSFbFDWDMsNMWak-KbI&hl=en&ei=IWrKSdaEBYzsnQfxw7yUAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA164,M1
I applaud Rhinoswo for his adherance to the company line and fantasy that says a PIC rules his domain. Trouble is, that domain extends just to the boarding ladder, and doesn’t extend to the FITREP. I just pray that he is never faced with the real-world situation where he has to tell his CO, his CAG, and the CVN CO “No”.
First, the kids a RAG student. Last time I checked we got NOB (Not Observed) fitreps. Hell, when I was in the RAG I didn’t even know what a fitrep was!
Either way, you have to make your choice. If your career is worth killing someone (including yourself) because you don’t have the “fortitude” to stand up to someone when they are flat out wrong, regardless of rank, go for it. I certainly wasn’t worth it to me. A “radio failure” is not a bad way out if you need an escape hatch and want to vent the heat, but I preferred the direct, honest route.
And yes, I’ve told Skippers and CAGs they were wrong (never had to tell the CVN CO or Admiral). The ass chewings were worth it. Especially because the jet(s) always came back in one piece. Usually I was able to make them see that the reason I did something was the right way to handle things when considering all of the facts. Bringing the jets back helped, I’m sure. But sometimes they didn’t see it my way and I lived with the corrective action they handed out. Small price to pay for a clean conscience.
Someone told me that if you aren’t getting you butt chewed from time to time, you aren’t doing your job. But then again, what do I know?
Whether you knew what a Fitrep was or not isn’t really germane, since we both know that while under instruction, one almost always gets an NOB, the CO can write a graded Fitrep based on outstanding or adverse actions for ANYONE while they are in his/her command.
I’m also happy that you are totally immune to command pressure and/or get-it-done-itis. To never bow to either, and to never worry about whether your fellow JO’s would consider you a “non-hacker” makes you a man to be reckoned with, surely.
And consider if he had attempted the landing at NI, and that had turned out badly. People died, and he was disobeying a direct order at the same time. But at least his superiors would have been spared, then, and that’s what is really important, right?
I am a civilian and way out of my league and maybe not even in the same ballpark, but,… a multi-million dollar trained rookie pilot has trouble, seeks advice from superior/more experienced pilot, follows said advice, and is now deemed at fault? I have to call bullshit on this one. The pilot is a man, not a god. Unless he was given an order that was unlawful he took the correct action. The comment about him being in charge of the plane is a crock to let his superiors off the hook. He got advice/orders and followed them, if he mishandled the flying, then that is a training or negligence issue that can be addressed.
“I am a civilian and way out of my league and maybe not even in the same ballpark” – Yes, you are correct by your own admission.
It’s called responsibility and not everything can be explained away.
His superiors took the fall as well.
From the open press I read the Navy (CO of the carrier) sent him to North Island as the divert. The gospel according to the Skipper.
He obviously switched over to radio 2 for instructions from his Marine bosses. IMO, a man should only listen to one radio at a time…
Benefits of single seat was the SFA I thought.
I still think this points up an OPCON/ Services /CV NATOPS issue. ‘Course the Navy hasn’t spoken on this as far as I can tell.
re the theme of the article: I am a big one for accountability but what did this young feller know? Not much. Look higher I say.
b2
@prowlerguy:
I knew the Nav on the mishap, and it happened in one of my old squadrons. The bird that was lost is in my logbooks. All I feel comfortable in saying in this public venue is that author of the book you’re linking to has a very definite POV and is using examples, at least one of which I know to be highly selective in the details it describes, to prove his thesis.
@Rhinowso:
While I concur in the philosophy you espouse, I would respectfully submit that we need to look at the situation, as far as we outside the Mishap Board understand it to be at the time. Jet with known, apparently downing discrepancy is upped to make CQ. Tons of pressure to make the evolution from both within and without the RAG; parts and people are all at KNKX; nugget in the cockpit. Knowing what a Dilbert I was as a JO nugget, there but for the Grace of the Almighty…
VR,
Comjam
Comjam,
I’m sure there were outside pressures on everyone – “Get’er done-itis”, whatever you want to call it… Almost every mishap does… and hidesight is always 20/20… such are the bad breaks of Naval Aviation…
VR,
Rhinowso
Russ, IMHO our Oz Mil pilots are taught that they alone have responsibility (much like the ship Captain) for their aircraft. Pilots are taught to think and act responsibly for themselves – of course advice from the outside is welcome. As others suggest the ‘nugget’ was in a difficult situation but given good initial advice it would seem. A loooooooong time ago now I can recall being advised to bingo East to NAS Nowra – knowing full well said airfield was WEST! Should I have gone East to New Zealand – flaming out at night – only a short distance from the carrier I guess?
SpazS-
Carrier ops, even CQ carrier ops, are different than Aussie ops. In some ways it’s a strict dictatorship at sea. Read the manual (its otta date but good enough):
http://www.skyhawk.org/specials/cv-natops-21oct99.pdf
BTW, US Navy carrier pilots can think on their own and make PIC decisions..thank you.
b2
b2, I could have added I was ‘bingoing’ after hitting the ramp on my second night deck landing – does that qualify as CQ? The wheels were broken and I had little gas to get back to Nowra dirty with no utility hydraulics. All the caution lights were illuminated except fire warning. Advice was coming from all quarters but only on a single radio frequency. However I knew what I had to do (according to NATOPS at that time which later had slightly different advice). That is: short field arrest on empty drop tanks. All worked out OK but the aft kicking afterwards did not stop! I guess I was lucky (apart from initial bad advice) any subsequent advice did not detract from what I intended to do anyway – get back and walk away from the unusual landing.
BTW, that link is foul. I’d hang the SOB who gave it out. Now the whole process is polluted.
b2
Haaa! The second oldest sea story in the Navy. I heard it was an F-8.
Spaz
We had a true dilbert in our squadron. His ultimate wash out trick was to fly a westerly heading after a bingo divert to North Island. We were about 150 miles off the coast. The AJB-3 all attitude gyro god would sometimes precess 180 out on heading. Repeated calls to check his heading were rogered. The ship sent a bird to catch and get him back. He landed back aboard with 150 # internal. When asked why he had not checked his heading with his wet compass( right up on the front of the canopy bow). He said he couldn’t see it very well because the late afternoon sun blinded him.
Now that’s funny right there. I don’t care who you are.
Kind of like the student who failed to put the wheels down because he was distracted by all the wave-off flights, signal flares and the beeping sound in his headset…
Maybe the sun in his eyes should have been a clue, huh?
Bill & Lex,
ROFL! Now see, that’s why I’m not a naval aviator–those are exactly the kinds of things I’d do.
“He said he couldn’t see it very well because the late afternoon sun had blinded him.” BWAAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!
(Those late western sun-sets CAN be a bitch, tho, I remember hitching a ride on an old Navy C-118 from Denver to Moffitt in SF and as we came over the Tehachapi’s letting down on approach, I was standing in the cockpit shooting the bull with the crew and it seemed like those old windscreens were sand-blasted, the light was so diffused. I said to myself that if they can see out of this damn thing to shoot the final off the Pacific water’s glare they’re better men than this little AF 2ndLT. LOL!)
Spaz,
I’m not sure if a ramp strike qualifies as CQ…LOL. Sorry. Just kidding.
Was your incident in an A-4? Did you shortfield on stubs or were the mainmounts busted up? Did you get qualed after your aft-kicking?
b2
b2, I guess the RNZAF A-4Ks never had to suffer indignities of CQ but I was in the RAN FAA A-4G. The (garbled) story is told in an online PDF. Short story: another airborne A-4G looked closely at broken mainmounts (source of lack of utility hydraulics). No utilities meant had to be dirty for the thankfully shortish transit to Nowra with fuel only for a waveoff if first approach no good. Otherwise U/C was flopping in the wind. Had read an APPROACH article about such things with NATOPS advising short field drop tank arrest. Subsequently ‘sprogs’ had to have more experience before night DLs. I had over 20 day DLs at that time (we had no capacity for DLs in other aircraft). After some cruise time day qualled got a quickie night qual for a few night DLs at various Pacific night spots.
http://files.filefront.com/RampStrike01Sept71storyA4Gpdf/;12844254;/fileinfo.html (7Mb PDF)
Spaz- Quite the adventure. Bonus: Face time with the admiral, membership in the Grand Order of Tape Dragons and fame within your squadron.
It just doesn’t get any better than that.
Nicely written narrative of the event and the outcome. It looked…expensive.
Thank you for sharing that… quite an experience… although nothing that exciting happened to me behind the boat, I did fly with a pilot of questionable talent who liked to try flying slow around on the hook to final after a number of bolters, so he wouldn’t have to slow to landing on-speed… follow that up with wrapping it up to not overshoot final… woohoo! Approach turn stall at night, anyone? No thank you please! Make it stop, make it stop! Thanksfully, we made it stop…
BillC, Talk about ‘flying to New Zealand’! After my time one chap tried to take a Macchi MB326H ‘to NZed’ at very low level over water heading East after a simulated ship strike waiting for leader’s call to turn back West for restrike. Too low to hear the call our chap continued on oblivious to his lowering fuel. OOPS finally realised he needed to climb and head EAST he managed to glide/ flame out with enough energy to do a fast engine out landing (hole in the overcast) at a closed airfield nearby NAS Nowra. Good job for the save but not for the poor headwork beforehand.
Gees, and now a Raptor goes down. Between the FedEx, the Pilatus, and now the F-22, guess that makes the trifecta. The gods must be fed.
Yes, it always comes in threes…
“It’s called responsibility and not everything can be explained away.”
Rhino, Where was the lack of responsibility?
Spaz, Was the advice that he was given easily recognized as 180 degrees off.
I’m just looking at it from a civilian standpoint with only a second-hand knowledge of the military. What I see is a man that made a judgment call on the recommendation/order of his superior that was not an East to West type of wrong, but the 60 second kind of wrong.
Are you really supposed to argue with a superior over something that close?
I’m really just trying to understand.
Russ – I was referring to your comment on ” multi-million dollar trained rookie pilot has trouble, seeks advice from superior/more experienced pilot, follows said advice, and is now deemed at fault? “. He signed for the aircraft – it’s his responsibility. Again, they don’t give you a free pass when it comes to flying an aircraft worth tens of millions of dollars.
FYI, in Naval Aviation, a “60 second kind of wrong” is extremely long – an eternity. A half-second wrong can kill you or others around you. Hell, you can be completely right and bite the dust due to no fault of your own.
I doubt an arguement happened in this situation. There simply isn’t time for it when dealing with an emergency. He was simply given bad information / instructions and decided to follow them. If you need help, you can ask the assistance of others but that in no way relieves the aircrew of the responsibility (that word again) at following proper procedures. If you don’t like what they are tell you or think its wrong, I would say “Unable, I’m doing X, Y, and Z.” If they keep blabbing at you on the radio the next response is “Standby” followed by either a “STFU” or I just turn the radio to a different channel.
Was this guy dealt a $hit sandwich? No doubt. Having a jet fall apart all around you is not a good feeling. I can’t imagine how he (or those who had a hand in leading him down the decision to go to Miramar) feels.
However, the simple fact remains procedures were not followed, people died, and an irreplacible asset (the jet) was lost.
There is a reason we say NATOPS was written in blood.
Because it is.
And again, this is just my opinion from having read open source facts… as worthless as that is…
Rhino, do us all a favor, get on the message board, read the SIR, remember what it was like to be a student, put yourself in his shoes(oh wait, you’re a WSO so that’s impossible) at his skill level and then re-evaluate your posts. This is not a personal attack but you offer alot of uneducated opinions based on what you are reading to be fact admittedly from the ‘internet’. I would also caution you in reading into the conclusions of the JAGMAN as 100% gospel. While I respect your opinion that the guy who signs for the jet is responsible for that jet and where it goes, as a FRS IP current in A-F, a NATOPS evalutator in the A-D for 4 years and a CRM instructor, this was not your typical NATOPs check or exercise in CRM. This was 20 slices of swiss cheese all lining up to allow the light to shine through so to point the finger in one direction as a final analysis is a stretch. AGAIN, READ THE SIR, all of it not just the narrative!
Speaking solely as an outsider on this subject…the thought occured to me at some point mid-way through all the heavy breathing and self-referential commenting around these parts… that my/our sympathies/thoughts should be reserved for the unfortunate Lt . Neubauer…whom, I surmise , in his quiet moments relives this mission over and over again… thinking of the innocent dead and the what might have beens…a personal hell…I think…
…indeed as ComJam said … # 20 above..” there but for the Grace of the Almighty “…I hope he survives. Best
Exactly, Snake. Mixing together the conflicting orders, his limited experience, and a plane that (as I understand it) really shouldn’t have been flying in the first place…. yikes.
I keep coming back here to comment on some of the technical and chain-of-command things mentioned that get me thinking, and then I just erase it… because all it comes down to is that multiple people failed to make the right decisions in a chain of errors and now four people are gone, a father-husband grieves, and another man lives with the torture of having been a direct part of the cause (not to mention the people who hopefully recognize their more distant contributions). It’s awful.
Russ, my comment is coming from an earlier era – perhaps in a different environment – but it would seem to me that ‘Rhinowso’ is saying the point I’m attempting to make in a general sense. Yes as a military pilot I would have some choices to be responsible for, despite other circumstances, including a direct order. Of course I would then have to be able to justify my actions. Please bear with me that I’m unable to comment on the difficult situation the Hornet pilot faced in his unique circumstances. Pilots have advice printed in NATOPS (pilot flying manual) which clearly states recommended or mandatory actions in emergency circumstances. I would have thought NATOPS overrides the ‘ground based’ advice with pilot judgement superior (even if he is a nugget). I guess we all agree on the lack of experience of the pilot concerned. I’m only expressing an opinion based on an environment long gone from Oz.
Thanks Spaz,
Blameitonrio,
It is a very old sea story, July 1963 USS Midway.
Definitely qualifies as TINS. I never heard about the F-8, but that crowd certainly had the capability to create any nearly unbelievable stunt. You should have been on the platform waving them aboard at night with a moving deck.
Bill, did you ever know my first CO, Gerry Arbiter? Flew A-7s for sure, might have flown A-4s too.
When I signed up for my paddles, he told me in his typically clipped and terse way that he had, over the course of a long LSO career, seen seven or eight ramp strikes, many of them F-8s.
I kept my own counsel (for once), but thought to myself, “Should have moved the wave-0ff window out a little bit further, skipper.”
Then one day on the Connie in ’87 we had a “guest paddles” day for the old timers. Biter came up to the platform, took the controlling pickle and waved two or three Hornets off because the deck was still foul (wire coming back) as they rolled out of the turn.
Eventually CAG paddles, whispered to him, “We let them get a little further nowadays, skipper.”
So. What did I know?
Lex,
I know the name but not the man. I had an F8 hit the ramp on me one very moving night EIGHT seconds after he got the wave off lights and call. He hit burner, stalled and hit 31 feet left of centerline. He killed himself and our enlisted phone talker and took the entire mirror platform off the side of the ship. I remember that night very well, it was bad.