Comments on: Something in the Water

By: xformed

xformed — Fri, 24 Apr 2009 00:30:03 +0000

My experience was: 6 months to really understand it, 6 months to manage it, the next 6 months, you could improve it, without destroying it, as you really understood how it worked. If you go at 12 months, I submit there isn’t the phase for real improvements. If you go at 6 months, then the troops just are stuck in chaos. And it’s the troops that make it consistent for the long haul.

By: Liz

Liz — Fri, 24 Apr 2009 00:14:48 +0000

I’ve way seen too many excellent people passed over for promotion (and completely inept folks continue to advance). I agree with you Navig8r (if I understood what you were saying through all the acryonyms I’m not familiar with).
Another problem with the promotion system (at least in the Airforce) at present is the push to change jobs to make rank. Those on the “fast track” for promotion have to change their job practically every year. In theory this gives the person a well-rounded background, but in practical reality it does everyone a disservice because they move the person out of position when they were just beginning to really understand their job. My husband had a squadron commander at Nellis who was only in that position for six months! It sucked for everyone.

By: XBradTC

XBradTC — Thu, 23 Apr 2009 21:03:00 +0000

Skippy, I’m in complete agreement with you.

**scratches that item off the “Coming of the Apocalypse” checklist…**

By: Skippy-san

Skippy-san — Thu, 23 Apr 2009 19:51:30 +0000

Don’t forget a reliable tanker posit…………

By: Skippy-san

Skippy-san — Thu, 23 Apr 2009 19:49:13 +0000

It is not that would not make good pilots and NFO’s, it is that the Navy could get a lot more use out of them as LDO’s and it avoids all the “wardroom” issues that come with the CWO program.

Plus-as long as it is not open to all avation communities (and it will be a cold day in you know where before you see them grace a hornet ready room…), then I’m not a fan.

By: Blacksmith

Blacksmith — Thu, 23 Apr 2009 01:41:31 +0000

Part of the problem is that the USAF takes care of a number of what you might call “meta-war” functions. The kind of things that don’t directly show up on a battlefield unless things go more-horribly-awry than have ever gone bad for us before. Which means that for the “USAF is to the Army as USMC is to the Navy” plan to work, you still need to setup a system that can execute those kinds of tasks well. I have my doubts to the Army’s interest or (no offense, Green-suiters) top-level competency at space operations, heavy airlift, heavy bombardment (including ICBM capabilities), or cyber-war. Whether all those tasks rightly belong in a Blue suit or not is debatable, but to succesfully operate nowadays, they do all need doing. None of the other services are set up for it.

I can see splitting the USAF, in that situation, into three pieces. Send ground support (and probably air-superiority) tasks to the Army; put heavy bombardment, ICBMs, and space (plus possibly heavy airlift) under a separate strategic department, and put the weather, cyberspace/infowar, and research arms (together with their counterparts from the Army and Navy) under a separate service-support department.

[Edit: By air-superiority and ground-support, I of course mean just the current USAF tasks for those duties. Why break what works with the Navy and USMC?]