The Brits are heading home from Iraq Basra, and not all of them are doing it with their heads held high:
(British commanders) also know… (that) there are those in the Washington corridors who say Britain allowed the militias to effectively take over Basra and that the city was only freed by the Iraqi army.
They say British forces were overstretched and under-resourced and there was not the political will to support them in the fight against the militias.
“I’ve had senior military officers say to me that the Army is broken as a result of Iraq and Afghanistan”, said Lord Ashdown.
Others believe that the legacy of Iraq has weakened Britain’s will to use force globally without a clear mandate.
“I don’t think we’ll ever do that again,” said Sir Jeremy, “without a clear UN resolution… and a much wider partnership.”
Well, if there are those in Washington corridors saying that Britain allowed militias to take over Basra that’s because they did. And the city was liberated from tyranny by Iraqi troops partnered with American soldiers. In the British area of responsibility.
From everything I’ve read and seen, I still believe that the private British soldier fights as bravely as he can considering the support he gets. I’m less than entirely certain that he is led as well as he might be. Less certain that, once a political decision has been made, the general staff and officer corps are able to put aside their private reservations in favor of committing to the fierce urgency of victory. That they understand that it’s more useful to fight the foe on the field than look down your nose at your allies in barracks. That it might be better to fight the enemy as hard as you can as and where you find him, rather than attempt to gracefully manage the consequences of defeat.
We’ve come a long way since Churchill vowed that he had not become prime minister in order to “preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.” I wonder if it rankles his inheritors that they followed a former subject into a fight that they lacked the political and martial will to win, and allowed another former client to rescue what they could not. Whether secretly, having fallen so far, there were not those among them who looked forward to seeing their inheritors taken down a notch.
It gives me no pleasure at all to write this. For over a hundred years, Britain remained our staunchest military and cultural ally. As the lion retreats to his den with fretful backward glances, our own constraints multiply in the face of world that grows rather more chaotic than otherwise.
But we must deal with the sea as we find it, not as we would wish it to be.
Once that acronym, British Area of Responsibility BAOR stood for British Army of the Rhine and we trusted it. It’s sad how far they have fallen.
The days of the Empire, its post-WWII echoes; even the compact but independent and puissant nation that handed defeat to Argentina; are long gone, in a storm of PC nanny-state garbage at home.
The UN, and the international climate it encouraged in the fifties, sapped Britain of its wonted freedom of action – and Resolution 1514 certainly didn’t help.
The whole Suez affair, wherein the Western world stood behind a governmental theft, likely didn’t help matters.
Not pointing fingers, but, from my poor memory of things, certain US presidents were less than helpful to the Empire, post-WWII, even as far as simply allowing it to find a new form.
Leave all of the above in the hands of a Labour government, representing the stupidest portion of the British governmental establishment, and this is what you get. Not that I like many Tories, either, but the ingrained arrogance and conservatism of the breed seems uniquely fitted to overcoming Britain’s handicap: being a small, crappy island on the coast of Europe.
Still, the British armed forces have recovered from poor leadership before; the regimental system being massively resilient on the “intangible” end of things. Pity it has to happen again, though.
Enough rambling…
A German general in WWI described the British soldiers he faced as “lions led by donkeys”, and I guess that’s just as true a century on.
Sounds about right… once in a while a leader worthy of his battalion-level troops makes it to the fore; Wellington and Montgomery come most readily to mind; but not often enough.
Even more rarely, the Kingdom chances on a decent PM…
Sounds like the Generals have a case of the Field Marshal Montgomery disease; go slow and sneer at your allies.
But the incubator for such rot –and Montgomery represents rot– is when a country gets down to its last army. Montgomery couldn’t gamble with the British Army in Northwest Europe because it was the last one England had–there were no reserves behind it to make up losses in manpower.
That’s understandable; but because Montgomery was the arrogant, insufferable jerk that he was, he felt perfectly competent to gamble with someone else’s army and resources.
This kind of caution could come upon our Army and its generals as forces get wound down–same for the Navy. As for the Marines? It’s always going to be hey diddle diddle straight up the middle until there are no more than two Marine platooons left. And under Obama and his minions, we might get there yet.
What was it a commandant once said, If it’s just me and one other good Marine, it’s still the Corps?
And to be honest, I can sympathize with the British Army. What could they gain from Iraq? Nothing. They have a long history of fighting there, and none of it happy or particularly successful. They haven’t the manpower to do much more there than show a presence. They sure don’t have the power to “flood the zone” especially since they are also helping out in Afghanistan.
They might have seen it as a good training exercise for things to come on their home turf. Particularly probable if they don’t show some gumption.
What could they gain from Iraq? Nothing.
Same statement can be applied to us.
All the British bashing ignores the political reality at home in Britain-the war was considerably more unpopular there than it was in the US and since 2004 it was not exactly popular in the US either. Its seems clear that British military leadership recognized a lot earlier the lesson we still have not learned, “the presence of British [US]troops in Iraq “exacerbates the security problems” for the UK[US] around the world.”
Skippy, you and I will continue to disagree on the prudence of our decision to invade Iraq. I don’t think this thread is the place to discuss that, but will clarify that I didn’t argue that it exacerbates the security problems” for the UK[US] around the world.” but rather that there was no real potential upside for the British. The only benefit to them was to remain in good standing with us, which they could have maintained through other means.
One might opine that Montgomery had to play it safe and cautious because he had no reserves, whereas Patton was audacious because he had reserves and supplies and it was only when the supplies stopped that he had to dig in and halt his advance.
One might also opine that a General who can’t make the case for supplies, replacements, and the lot is probably being hung out to dry by his superiors.
All that said, the Marines have learned that attacking beats defending, Patton knew that as well. Montgomery preferred the cautious, defensive approach. When he tried the attack, we were given Operation Market Garden.
Best to not change horses in mid-stream, and all that.
– Max
Of course, if we talk about how and why Montgomery fought the way he did, we should look at some of the historical reasons and results. Please allow me to pimp my blog:
http://xbradtc.wordpress.com/2008/06/29/why-are-we-here/
I think the comparisons to WWII Montgomery are not particularly helpful; Montgomery won in North Africa when nobody else could; his operation Market-Garden in 1944 was if anything too aggressive rather than too cautious. And the Brits were at the tip of the spear in that one. Different time, different war, different politics.
In Iraq, the Brits were willing to go with us but they were not willing to take any risks. And they were ready to lose – either because they lacked capability or will, or both. At least the Germans in Afghanistan are up front about it – they say, we’ll go but don’t put us in a combat role. That’s the unfortunate reality of where the Brits really are. They’d like to help, but they don’t have the will to fight. Nothing illustrates it better than the boat full of Royal Navy Marines that surrendered to the Iranians rather than risk a firefight. It’s hard to fathom, but that’s what they’ve become.
I was in London during the July 05 islamic terrorist bombings, oh excuse my non_PC label, the London “man-made disaster”, and the immediate attitude was vastly different from the stoicism I’ve read about when they suffered the Blitz. All of my UK employees had the attitude of “if we leave them alone, they will leave us alone”. Certainly can’t run an Empire like that. Right then and there I felt that within 25 years the UK would be predominantly muslim-maybe not in population but in its effects throughout society and its cultural impact.
And WRT Monty, Sir Harold Alexander deserves much of the praise given to Monty for the 1942 desert campaign success.
If you want a better example of an outstanding World War II British general, then look to Bill Slim
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Slim,_1st_Viscount_Slim