Writing in the US Naval Institute’s online blog, Barret Tillman asks, “Why do we need so large a Navy, if we scarcely ever use it?”
In defining “usage,” Tillman – perhaps intentionally - invokes the 19th century vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan‘s decisive clash of fleets at sea.
If we found ourselves with 320 ships tomorrow, what would we do with the extras? Or, in the public relations arena, does it even matter? Where public opinion counts, it’s not hard to conclude that perception trumps reality. As the popular Internet mantra says, “The Army and Marine Corps are at war. America is at the mall.” So where does that leave the Navy?
To many observers, it leaves the service hard aground in the post-naval era. If “the naval era” is defined as the era of sea control, it ended in 1945—the last year of Fleet-size combat operations. Because the most recent sea battle worthy of the name occurred in October 1944, we are now into the seventh decade of the post-naval era.
The global war on terrorism is essentially a rifle fight. As much as partisans rankle at the notion, navies are largely irrelevant to its conduct, and the Air Force has been marginalized. In fact, unmanned aerial systems represent the growth industry, approaching the importance of manned aircraft. Meanwhile, the air superiority mission is nearly extinct: American pilots have shot down only 55 hostile aircraft in 36 years, the last one in 1999.
Of course, Mr. Tillman is smart enough to understand that we haven’t engaged in fleet-scale battles for 60 years for much the same reason that our air campaigns have been so lopsided: There has been no peer competitor rash enough to challenge us, while our civilizational allies generally view the US Navy as a force for good (so long as we’re sober, or at sea – preferably both).
Building a capable oceangoing fleet is dauntingly expensive for all but the most technologically and economically advanced countries, which rules out anything but local area denial capabilities for Third World or emerging nations. It’s a capability wholly out of reach of GWOT-style non-state actors, even if they could forgo their notorious reluctance to put on uniforms and fight in the open like men.
But the oceans are the lifelines to international commerce, which is a part of the reason why the Somali piracy issue has been elevated to a level of public interest far above its intrinsic strategic impact. For an island nation like ours, hugely dependent upon foreign commerce, unfettered access to the sea is and will remain crucial, and no one else is stepping up to the plate to ensure that access.
Finally, we are “using” the fleet, using it every day, and not merely in kinetic operations over Iraq and Afghanistan (although the latter, in particular, provides an important demonstration that evil cannot believe itself safe within an inland fastness).
It’s good to have worldwide access to the maneuver space of the sea. When a carrier or expeditionary strike group enters the Western Pacific or Arabian Gulf, it not only provides that stabilizing presence without which rogue actors might be tempted to opportunism, it also becomes a potent display of capability and will. Allies are engaged through mutual self-interest, and absent a strong power to balance regional competitions, countries that now offer access to US ground and expeditionary air forces might be tempted to make alignments not in our interest.
Finally, our humanitarian assistance in Indonesia after the Boxing Day tsunami (just for one example) – while not the “knife in the teeth” vision that some people think they are signing up for in recruiting offices – probably took more potential enemies out of the fight than any number JDAM deliveries or door-kicking expeditions.
The mission of the US Navy will always be to fight and win, but deterrence and dissuasion are far cheaper over the long haul. The issue that Mr. Tillman is highlighting is not one of strategy, relevance or force structure, but rather message: Getting the American people to understand what it is they are getting for their tax dollar when a strike group leaves port.
If only there was some other channel to get the word out.
Your last line in your blog may give us some “out of the box” reflections about Tillman. How WOULD your recent Nimitz GOB (gathering of bloggers) read and react to Tillman’s premise? We don’t need convincing – they and their readers do.
I’ve worked for the Navy since 1980…and the last time anybody did decent PR was when John Lehman was SECNAV.
He left in 1986, IIRC.
People forget just how much stuff gets shipped. You don’t see it unless you are in the industry, do maritime surveillance, or take a look at something like AIS Live (worthwhile, BTW). The number of merchant vessels is staggering. Cars, wheat, even mundane stuff like American toilet paper holders (saw one in the UK). The lifeblood of commerce.
Not to mention that the sea services offer both strategic flexibility and independence of action. The Fleet goes where it is needed. At the grand strategic level, the European, Central, and Pacific theaters are three different chessboards. Army and Air Force pieces can be moved only with great difficulty, while Navy pieces can be moved from one board to another with ease.
It makes a big difference when you are dealing with an unpredictable post-Cold War world.
We’ve GOT the case. All the Navy has to do is stand up and make it.
Another great promoter of navy power, albeit long ago, was T Roosevelt. The “Great White Fleet” sent around the globe to demonstrate power and blue-water navy capability.
Big Stick if you will.
It’s hard to place a price tag on the value of “deterrence and dissuasion” and that’s where we run afoul of bean counters but Lex is right. It IS cheaper in the long haul.
A contemporary Czech politician addressed a similar question for his own country – why does the Czech Republic need an army – he argued an Army is like an insurance policy or emergency responders – you don’t need ‘em most of the time, but when you do, you need it to be complete and in good working order asap.
Get some TV network to start running “Navy Log” and “Victory At Sea” again…..
(And I’m only half kidding)
(Although, as funny as hell as it was/is, maybe they’d better skip “McHale’s Navy”
)
I should add to the re-run list a little remembered (Even I can’t remember the title of it) GREAT TV series based on Capt Edward L. Beach’s first book, “Submarine” which was an EXCELLENT compilation of fact-based war stories about famous combat cruises of various subs in the Pacific. Each TV episode featured a different story/sub from Beach’s book.
Anybody out there old enough (and obviously not as senile as me) to remember the name of that tv series?
Just remembered, I think it was called “The Silent Service” and usually came on the same night as Navy Log, just prior or after, IIRC (However hazily)
Point is, EACH of these 3 would be just as fresh today as when they were aired, IMHO. (V at Sea is avail on VHS/CD, but the other’s aren’t)
I Googled “The Silent Service” and they had a list of all the (by now) famous/semi-famous actors who guested in the series. But just to show that Wiki doesn’t always have everything, it fails to list Dennis Weaver (of Gunsmoke and McCloud fame) and Weaver’s own filmography on Wiki doesn’t either–yet I’m SURE he starred in one of the episodes, as it seemed so note-worthy because I thought how incongruous it seemed at the time, as he was starring in Gunsmoke at the same time and I had THAT image fixed in my brain.
Victory at Sea is available on You Tube. I watch it there.
My initial awareness of the existence of “The Silent Service” came from Bob Newhart’s routine “The Voyage of the USS Codfish” which he started out by saying it was an episode he had seen. When I was deployed to the Med in 1977, we used to get episodes occasionally as part of the SITE TV tapes. The only actor I remember was Frank Gorshin. At the end of each episode, they would have some of the real life Navy men who had been part of that patrol. The one that sticks in my mind was the story of a patrol where a JG swam into shallow water from his sub to rescue a downed airman and was awarded the Silver Star. At the end of the episode he was introduced wearing a Roman collar and it was explained that he had entered the Society of Jesus and was in the seminary. As some of you have figured out, his name was Jake Laboon and he returned to the Navy as a chaplain, retiring as a CAPT and is now honored by having the DDG 58 named after him.
When I was in my teens, I was a member of a volunteer fire company is a semi-rural area. In Spring and Fall (brush fire season) on weekends and afternoons, we’d open the doors to the truck bays, put our chairs and sit in the sun, waiting for calls. We would often get a lot of stuff from people, especially one guy, about sitting around doing nothing. You guessed it. The field behind that man’s house caught fire and because we were at the station and ready, we easily saved his house.
If you want cheap stuff from India and China just to name two, you need a strong U.S. Navy. As Lex says, no one else is stepping up to keep the sea lanes open.
As I sit in Shanghai on the 29th floor of the Sheraton with a copy of David McCullough’s “The Path Between the Seas” (construction of the Panama Canal), I continue to marvel at the ignorance of history so many American leader’s have and their willingness to err on the wrong side of caution. Where is our next Teddy Roosevelt?
I also marvel at Lex’s timely choice of topics–just finished the chapters on Mahan and TR’s intellectual bonding…
China Station signing off.
66% of the surface of the earth is water.
Why do we need a Navy?
Duh!
“The global war on terrorism is essentially a rifle fight. As much as partisans rankle at the notion, navies are largely irrelevant to its conduct…”
Yeah, Riiiight.
That’s why ever since 1945, whenever there has been a crisis in the world, the first question out of the mouth of the President is, “Where are the Carriers?”
“I joined the Navy to see the world, only to discover the world is two thirds water”