Courtesy of occasional reader Edward, an in-depth analysis of the weather patterns in the Horse Latitudes at the time of the mishap:
My own opinion of the crash cause, as of Monday night, based on the complete lack of a HF radio call and consideration of all of the above, suggests severe turbulence (see the BOAC 911 and BNF 250 tragedies) combining in some unlikely way with CRM/design/maintenance/procedural/other deficiencies to trigger a failure cascade. We can almost certainly count on some unexpected surprises once the CVR is recovered. Until then, all we can do is await the investigation and hope that the world’s flight operations stay safe until AFR447’s lessons are revealed.
It certainly seems plausible.
Continental interview, Houston TX Dec 2008
Capt: What is the dumbest thing you’ve ever done in an airplane?
Me: Fly an aircraft filled with people including 3 flag officers thru a tropical thunderstorm just to meet an admiral’s schedule.
AFR 447 – So preventable if weather is indeed the culprit.
I’m starting to have a real bad feeling about flying in an Airbus. All that fly by wire, computers doing the thinking, taking the pilot out of the loop…hard to beat the flesh and blood UNIVAC.
Byron/
I’ll never forget an interview I read a few yrs ago with a German Lufthansa (an exceedingly conservative–in the best possible meaning– airline) Capt. who was flying one of their Boeing (another historically conservative org.) Jumbos with direct-read instruments, etc. who, in making the case against “electric jets” made the point that: “Unlike fly-by-wire, I can sit there with one hand resting lightly on the yoke, turn around, have a conversation with the other aircrew or attend to other things and still have a feel for what the aircraft is doing.”
I’d really like to get Nose’s take on that statement since his daily office is an all-electric deal. (Seriously)
Virg,
Electric or not, 98% of each flight is done on autopilot. If the Lufty Captain thinks he’s getting good feedback on what the plane is doing through the autopilot, good for him. Doesn’t really have anything to do with fly-by/through-wire. When I flew E-2′s (certainly not advanced in any way) the “feel” in the flight controls was artificial, someone smarter than me (anyone) needs to weigh in, but I think that when your flight controls are hydraulic, all feel must be artificial.
I was talking to a friend the other day, wondering out loud how long it would be before the “If this were a Boeing it wouldn’t have happened” email/blog post surfaced (like the moronic one that came up after the US Air ditching.)
I’ll hold my opinion until I see some facts.
Nose/
Oh, I realize the auto-pilot bit, alright, I just was wondering what you thought of HIS statement–especially as most of the times one is NOT on auto are not exactly the ideal times for much casual rubber-necking.
Well, I’ll go along with Byron. According to an article in Time magazine, (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1902421,00.html) there have been three instances of the Airbus automated flight controls going haywire for no apparent reason and commanding dives steep enough to injure passengers. If 447 was fighting updrafts and downdrafts between the clouds and got an uncommanded dive signal, how would they know it was the software? I don’t fly ‘em I just ride in them, but my Airbus flights are going to be few and far between if I can help it.
25Z,
If you are worried about uncommanded control actions, read this too:
http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/B-737Rudder.htm
I’m pretty sure you can’t fly Boeing now, either…
That’s true, Nose, but at least they know what caused the 737 rudder problem, and include the incidents in training for the pilots now. I still avoid them if I can. Before I retired the second time, was a “million mile club” member with TWA, and around 300k miles with Pan Am. My travel profile at work specified NO DC-10′s, and avoid 737′s and Denver when possible. The L-1011′s that TWA used never had a fatal accident. If I need to get somewhere and that’s all there is for transport, then “you pays your money and you takes your chances”, but Airbus’ control system issues have been with them since the beginning, and I just don’t trust them. Simple as that.
My bad feeling is that this echoes the casual approach to weather taken by commercial aviation. Quite obviously, the planes aren’t that good.
“Casual approach to weather”
?
I reject your premise. (Polite way of saying you don’t know what you are talking about.)
My company has a Metro department that is best in the business, I’ll put our weather guessers against anyone I dealt with in the Navy. We get route specific updates on Storms, Turbulence, Ozone pockets, even Volcanic ash.
Lack of WX radar is a no-go for flights expected to fly through weather (unlike the Navy, where Hummers STILL don’t have WX radar). We receive annual training in weather and how to use the WX RADAR (but not, contrary to recent reports, how to ditch).
Well, there are some interesting albeit unsourced comments following the article that seem to contradict the whole thesis. But it’s still all speculation, and one is as good as the other.
I think that’s the most comprehensive analysis so far. Thanks for sharing, Lex. Hope you don’t mind my retweet.
No, don’t mind a bit. My traffic from Brazil just spiked through the roof
I remember an Airbus losing its vertical stab and rudder after take off due to wake turbulence. It happened just after air traffic was restored after 9/11, if memory serves. Had a carbon fiber stabilizer that snapped clean off after the rudder went full deflection in either direction. I wonder if the same thing may have happened in turbulence in this case. They really need to find those black boxes in case there is some hidden flaw in the aircraft that needs to be found before another falls 0ut of the sky.
The rudder went full deflection because that is what the pilot commanded. We were not told at the time that was bad – we now train to that. Wasn’t a FBW thing.
N
Nose- you usually have the gouge on commercial aviation. (Nose knows!) With the weather products available and cockpit WX, why would they get close to bad weather.
I am reminded of this quote:
“There is no reason to fly through a thunderstorm in peacetime.” – Sign over Squadron Ops desk at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, 1970.
Wilko – it is a great question. But I’m not sure we know they went through the WX yet, do we?
If it is as bad as how that dude paints it and they went Heydiddlediddle (right down the middle) then that’s really really bad.
No such thing as “operational necessity” or “Government time” in our profession…
Reminds me of the football signals the Marx Brothers used in horse feathers. I’ll have to try that next time I’m cleared for a visual approach.
Fair comment on not yet knowing the cause. thx.
I work for a software services company that does lots of DO-178B Level A software verification testing for code going into aircraft systems – including FMS, autopilots, etc. The amount of testing for Level A code (software deemed safety of flight critical) is tremendous. It is unlikely in the extreme that the FBW flight control system just decided – on its own – to command major control surface movements. The code is not written to do that and the systems are not designed to do that – unless the autopilot is engaged, but there are control parameters for the autopilot as well. The exception I can think of would be stick pushers for stall-protection, but – as I understand them – the stick-pusher is a seperate system that is independent of the primary flight control system.
I’m not saying the SW is infallable, but code running on the Airbus for as many hours as it has already run (and with as much up-front testing as it likely recieved) is likely to have by now revealed any flaws of the nature being alluded to here (control surface movements uncommanded by the crew/autopilot).
I would also agree with Nose that the feedback from a non-FBW (read hydraulic) system is every bit as artificial as the FBW, and system redundancy is on a similar level as that of a FBW system, possibly even less-so.
I still believe it was an explosive device that brought down the aircraft. It was simply fortuitous that WX was available as an alternative cause, and able to deflect arguments towards that end.
I posit that this was an attack, and that those responsible are simply taking advantage of the red herring of WX being the primary cause in order to take a “wait & see” approach.
After all, the Pan Am bombing over Lockerbee occurred because the A/C was delayed. The timer had been set to go off over deep water. The object was not to induce fear through bombing, but through citizen’s lack of confidence in the airline’s safety.
respects,
And the Lockerbie bombing is often cited as a “failure” within terrorism circles. Had the plane gone down over water, as planned, it would most likely have never been traced back to the Libyans.
Again, I’m not arguing for any theory of why the aircraft went down, but anyone who argues that it couldn’t be terrorism because no one has claimed credit doesn’t understand the game. Speaking statistically, terrorists have taken down more aircraft than most of the other proposed causes of this mishap, and in the absence of specific evidence to the contrary (assuming we ever get any evidence of what happened) should not be summarily dismissed.
Of course, I should mention that I never bought the exploding empty fuel tank theory for another plane that went into the water, either.
Zane, for your theory to be usable (and I’m assuming the folks who use terrorist tactics are capable of some calculus that would decide if their actions were beneficial to their cause or not), they effectively have two choices.
1) Bomb so many planes that the flying public decides air travel is no longer safe. Sales in Cruise ship tickets skyrocket, the jet set visit Paris for shopping after four days of being wined, dined, and dancing across the Atlantic.
Business folks continue to fly.
2) Claim responsibility for every mishap, crash, bent wingtip and even those disasters they had a hand in.
I’m thinking #1 isn’t going to accomplish much, and is far too broad a goal for a non-state actor. #2? Preying on fear is the definition of terrorism, so if that’s your tactic because you’ve no power to throw at the problem, why not take credit for anything you possibly can?
As it sits now, if this were a terrorist mastermind plot most of the world is thinking lightening was the problem, not the terrorists. It’s difficult to enact an agenda when static electricity has done the work for you, chiefly because you can’t exactly call off lightening if you get your way and the other side knows it.
Suicide bombers might fall for this, but they’re not in it for the long haul anyway. The folks who’ve been at this for decades and are still alive? I’m betting they’re smart enough to know when taking credit where none is due will hamper their efforts.
So, yeah, I’m placing terrorism low on my list, though a lone bomber is a possibility.
– Max
MD, it’s not my theory, it’s what the muj have actually said and written. You’re right that there is a calculus, but the problem is that it is their calculus, not ours (here I refer you to Lee Harris’ The Fantasy Ideology of Al-Qaida (http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3459646.html). The effects you assume they would want to obtain aren’t necessarily the effects they want to obtain, and more often than not aren’t at all what you think they would be. But thinking in a Western sense, if you can’t imagine why a known terrorist group might want to take down a specific flight without claiming any credit or leaving any evidence that could lead investigators back to you, then you’re not thinking hard enough. As for specifics, I ask you to research the early airline bombings of Ramzi Yusef, the Bojinka plot, and the 2005 London plot, for all of which there is a tremendous amount of information available on the net, and none of which I can safely summarize here.
I hate to spend this much time explaining why this crash is in the absence of any evidence for or against entirely consistent with known terrorist plotting, but in the absence of any evidence for or against it’s just as feasible as any mechanical or meteorological explanation. I’m not advocating the theory, just not willing to let it be taken off the table without a good reason, and I haven’t seen one yet. With Nose, below, it’s too early to attribute it to anything.
Boeing vs. Airbus folks please note:
1. A330 had two known critical (but not yet fatal) incidents in-flight, both were not about the fly-by-wire system as such but about the ADIRU (air data inertial reference unit).
2. There seems to be have been at least one similar incident for the B777: http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/777DataFailure.htm
3. The employed ADIRU’s were all American built: Boeing uses Honeywell, Airbus seems to use Honeywell and/or Litton (Northrop-Grumman) (different informations according to source).
Now what did I not say:
a. That an ADIRU failure was cause for the loss of AF447.
b. That one manufacturer isn’t indeed actually better than the other (whoever that maybe).
It’s just too soon to attribute AF447 to aircraft type or manufacturer.
I concur. Take it a step further – it is too early to attribute it to anything!
Roger that.
And the early analysis suggests that the planes, the electronics, the flight control systems, weather avoidance procedures, and commercial aviation culture are not at fault. Guess we just have to hold our breath for AQ to take credit for this and we can all continue about our business.
I didn’t say that those things were not at fault. For all I know, they may be. The point is, people here are making absolute declarations (like your “casual attitude” comment) with zero evidence or knowledge of the subject.
We know only a few things: Plane broke up in flight.
Plane made by Airbus.
Weather along route of flight.
Other than that, everything said is pure speculation.
I’m assuming by your callsign that you are/are closely associated with Navy Flying. You of all people should know that in a situation like this, to speculate outside of the ready room just puts ideas in people’s heads that shouldn’t be there.
I’m sure it is NOT AQ because they would not dare wake the sleeping giant (France) and get their pansy asses into the GWOMCD).
A blog comment in this type of conversation is, at best, a note on a yellow sticky. And if I were in a meeting discussing such a disaster, I’d have penned a note-to-self, “Are we too casual in our approach to weather?” maybe even with some sort of connection to the crash in Buffalo.
Just standard brain-storming protocol. And the hair would stand up on the back of my neck the moment anything was definitively ruled out during an initial discussion, and I think I’d be down right pissed if any idea was shot down by someone saying you don’t know what you’re talking about. But then again, we’re not in such a meeting…and despite the auspicious environs our host is providing, we’re sitting at a keyboard in our cubicle, living room, or kitchen.
That said, the French are still a major force to be reckoned with. Let’s not forget that in defense of the grail, they taunted the English a second time. That takes some serious moxie.
Understand and concur with all your points.
What elicited my shooting was the fact that you didn’t say “Are we to casual about the weather?” You said “My bad feeling is that this echoes the casual approach to weather taken by commercial aviation.” That rankled me the same way me saying “All VQ guys hand their planes over to our enemies” might rankle you.
I’m gonna go find some other thread to take over…
the what? Global War on Mcdonald’s?
Global War on Man-Caused Disasters.
Where the hell have you been?
Here, in Italy, veritable home of man-caused disasters, we would call it SOP, if anything about Italy were standard, operating and had procedures.
GWOMCD–when do I get my ribbon? (A big red splotch on a mottled brown/blue background.)
Air Force guys are getting their ribbons already. It comes with the standard issue of 3 rows when you graduate from boot camp.
“Nature cares nothing for logic, our human logic: she has her own, which we do not recognize and do not acknowledge until we are crushed under its wheel”
Source: Ivan Turgenev
The biggest danger in a thunderstorm is structural failure. Don’t do anything that helps the thunderstorm tear the airplane to pieces. The first thing to do is to slow down. The reason to slow down is that the higher the airspeed, the greater force turbulence can impart on the airplane.
Too slow is not good simply because the last thing needed is to stall and spin in the middle of a thunderstorm.
The updrafts and downdrafts in a thunderstorm can far exceed an airplane’s ability to climb or dive. The pilot and airplane must just ride them out.
The Air France pilot took himself and his passengers into the land of the dragons and did not return. May God rest their souls.