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A Principled Stance

A Operation Iraqi Freedom combat veteran, former Marine Corps company grade officer and foreign service officer of less than one year’s experience has decided that the effort in Afghanistan is not worth the candle, and in fact detrimental to our national security, in consequence of which he has resigned his position as a leader of the civilian component of a three-man, provincial reconstruction team:

(In) a move that has sent ripples all the way to the White House, (Matthew) Hoh, 36, became the first U.S. official known to resign in protest over the Afghan war, which he had come to believe simply fueled the insurgency.

“I have lost understanding of and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States’ presence in Afghanistan,” he wrote Sept. 10 in a four-page letter to the department’s head of personnel. “I have doubts and reservations about our current strategy and planned future strategy, but my resignation is based not upon how we are pursuing this war, but why and to what end.”

This is a principled and courageous stand, for which Mr. Hoh should be congratulated. If he sincerely believes that US and Afghan lives are being lost fruitlessly, his example is truly commendatory.

On the other hand, General Stanley McChrystal, 55 years old, with 3 years less active Army service than Mr. Hoh has breathing, a veteran of two major regional wars, and current commander of some 68,000 US and coalition forces believes that the situation in Afghanistan, while dire, can yet be salvaged with the infusion of additional forces. Furthermore, the general believes that the presence of those forces will both contribute to regional stability and be necessary from a US national security standpoint.

I’m not one to appeal to authority. It may turn out that the former Marine captain is right and the serving Army four-star is wrong. But it will be interesting to note, as the president’s chief advisers dither over partisan political ramifications and declare open warfare on domestic news outlets while soldiers die in the field, whether the general will have the same courage of his convictions should his request for forces go unanswered.

No one is irreplaceable. Not Mr. Hoh. Not, with respect, General McChrystal.

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47 comments to A Principled Stance

  • Spencer

    It seems to be quite the quagmire. Damned if we stay. Damned if we leave.

    I still wonder why Bush took us to Iraq because it was a drain on our resources in Afghanistan. Our mission was to kill our enemy; Al Queda. Killing the Taliban, our old allies, was a by product of that mission. With Iraq its harder to say what the reason was, what the mission was. It appears their neighbors are ahead of them in the WMD game. Are we gonna go in there as well? Do we have the depth for that?

    We don’t have an endless supply of young Americans to keep plugging into these fights. Joe Voter will eventually decide enough is enough and the last election, like it or not, was in large part an indictment of GWB. Iraq and Afghanistan are no small part of that indictment. If not that then overnight our populace has turned into left leaning socialists. I don’t think thats the case. If the right fields some good candidates they should make some gains in the next election.

    Anyway, we’re still there. At some point the Afghanis and Iraqis have to take the reins. Problem is both countries are full of corruption and Afghanistan has been beaten back into the stone ages. They may never step up.

    Pretty sad if short term political gain is behind the White Houses decision. We will likely pay for that later on.

    • The words from this Warrior carry some weight but are not the only opinion worthy of note. Capt. Hoh has the same right as any other professional to bring his concerns to the attention of his superiors and resign if he feels that is warranted.

      That said, I feel that while we were devoting resources to Iraq, as a OIF Combat Veteran, I can say that taking out Saddam was necessary, and we would still be there maintaining “No-Fly zone” and dealing with his brand of stupidity if we had not kicked in the door. The big issue was what happened after we won the War and had no plan for dealing with the country, which allowed the Insurgency to cause havoc for the past 4 years.

      One of the main reasons why AFGHAN/PAK is a problem is the insurgents we kicked arse on left Iraq and went to AFGHAN/PAK as a refuge. The majority of insurgents we encountered in Iraq were NOT Iraqis – they were Yemmenis, Saudis, Egyptians, Syriaians, etc. looking for a fight with America.

      The political wrangling by President Doofus only makes the fight tougher for those in the field. I feel for them as they are doing the toughest jobs in conditions you wouldn’t wish on a dog.

      Be careful what we ask for because when we leave Afghanistan, we will either be the newest Superpower handed our arse by the AK-47 wielding Babrbarians OR the ones who freed them from said Barbarians and provided them with an opportunity to breathe the free air….

  • virgil xenophon

    Hard to read so early on with only the bare press release in hand. Principled resignation or stalking horse/trial balloon for an Obama bug-out? We didn’t want those grapes anyway–they were rotten to begin with–besides, even if a few grapes aren’t, nobody has given us a blueprint to build the ladder, etc., and ladder building is complicated, time-consuming and harrrrd!

    I can see it all unfolding now, as if in a dream, but unfortunately it is not. Reality nightmare perhaps, but
    definitely not a dream…

  • This guy (Hoh) was known to think he had “upgraded” by jumping from USMC to State.

    Just sayin’.

    His words carry weight, and I read his resignation letter:

    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/ssi/wpc/ResignationLetter.pdf

    He’s a solid guy. But don’t think for a second this doesn’t have political undercurrents.

  • Quartermaster

    I’m sorry, but he lost me with the attempt at a comparison with Vietnam. There is no comparison except with the politicians who dither and load the troops with unrealistic ROE. Political undercurrents is an understatement.

    I have to say, however, that going into Iraq didn’t make much sense to me. We knew Sadaam had war gasses, but true WMD he didn’t, and would not for quite some time. The minute he tested something, then go, but not until. Now we have spent ourselves and have no strength to go after Iran, the truly dangerous group. Persia is going to be rising soon. Read Ezekial chapters 38 and 39 for the story.

  • Snake Eater

    VX, Its a nightmare…a recurring nightmare… as I said before and promised not to say again…its deja vu all over again and our kids take the fall. Best

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  • David Curp

    As a civilian I am careful in my criticism of a veteran Marine Captain who has spent time in Afghanistan, but it is still hard to see in his letter the kind of analytical ability we need in this situation. The fact is that the Taliban, who would be the ultimate beneficiaries of any American withdrawal are much more deeply corrupt than those whom we are supporting. Does anyone seriously think that 8 years in which the Taliban have fought with their Al-Q brothers-in-arms has moderated them? Also, right now, the Pakistanis are fighting in the Tribal Areas – does Mr. Hohe think that they are mistaken to be doing this? It is hard to see what he has proposed as nothing more than a consul of despair that we have already tried – we left the Afghanis alone to fester after the collapse of the Soviet intervention (and to compare our intervention to theirs is frankly deeply wrong-headed – the Soviets were conducting a quasi-genocidal war in that country – we are attempting to undo the impact of that war and the Taliban regime that followed – and strangely enough after those experiences Afghanistan is not chock-a-block full of people with lots of integrity and selflessness).

    The other problem is the implication that the Pashtuns (like the Vietnamese) are ultimately inspired by nationalist resistance and not religious fanaticism (question – was Ho Chi Mihn a Communist or a nationalist – the right answer is “yes”) – may I suggest that religion and nationalism make a very potent cocktail – and one which will connect the Pashtuns to broader, international struggles whether we decide to bug out or not? It is worth keeping in mind that Afghanistan has served as a jihadi base before in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal in ways that destabilized large swaths of Central Asia – http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/08/false-comfort-on-afghanistan/ . So with all due respect (and gratitude) to Mr. Hohe’s service, and acknowledging that I deserve every “armchair strategist” insult that could head my way (but then, Pres. Obama and the vast majority of his advisers are not engaged in clearing caves in Afghanistan) his implied preference for disengagement is flawed and historically badly argued – Afghanistan is not Vietnam, we are not anything like the Soviets, and our allies are much less unlovely than our enemies (and esp. their allies), and, as our host has rightly pointed out, there are many who have been in the region longer believe this war can be won – and needs to be won.

    • virgil xenophon

      Amen David Curp! You are so right! And a damn fine job of covering the waterfront! Only thing I would add is to echo what a non-American reporter “of color” said on the tube a week or so ago when the Vietnam comparison was made by one of the lefty journalist “usual suspects” when he utterly rejected the comparison by pointing out that, unlike the South Vietnamese with Uncle-Ho’s Communists from the North, the Afghans have already had the exquisite experience of living under Taliban rule, and are none too anxious to repeat the experience, so are far less likely to provide “aid and comfort” to the fundamentalist religious zealots who are their tribal cousins.

    • Ron Snyder

      AF is not a Nation, it is a collection of tribes, AF has nothing of National Interest to the U.S. other than our not allowing them to provide safe harbour to our enemy.

      David, you have already shown your preferences, and being in the Ivory Tower it is quite safe to make your suggestions. I place far greater faith in those who have had skin in the game as did the Captain, or people like Michael Yon, Michael Totten, Charles Krauthammer, Jerry Pournelle, Victor Davis Hanson, Steven Pressfield and others with equally impressive credentials who have a track record of not pushing a political agenda. No brainer IMO.

      Even those whose profession is war state that it would take multiple decades, hundreds of thousands of G.I.’s, probably tens of thousands of dead G.I.’s- all for a “possible win”. No thanks.

      Zero evidence that anyone can make AF a nation, thousands of years of evidence that the AF’s will fight invaders/occupiers (such as us). Eight years is enough, and you should damn well know that the country is not going to support decades of money, and more importantly, blood being spent on a hope that maybe we can “win”.

      Pull out and use either bribery or non-conventional weapons needed to prevent our enemy from using AF as a safe haven.

      • virgil xenophon

        I dunno, Ron. Yes, I agree with you about domestic (im)patience for the “long war” as a determining factor, and that eventually we should go, but I don’t think just quite yet. We don’t have to aim for a “knock-out punch” solution that would require hundreds of thousands of troops and perhaps decades of pacification, rather a surge to buy time (as I’ve said multiple times before) to arm/bribe the tribes sufficiently for them to stand on their own and repulse the Taliban on the local level such that the situation, while never “solved” will at least be kept at the level of a low simmer sufficient to serve/advance our interests, leaving only enough forces in-country and the region to provide sufficient air assets and QRA gnd forces to back up the local tribes should the Taliban succeed in massing in a concentrated area in order to overpower a given tribe. Sort of like HIV–it won’t go away, but can be kept manageable with a sufficient combination of drugs (think Magic Johnson) to render its outward manifestations benign (at least as far as our interests and objectives are concerned.)

      • David Curp

        Ron,

        Could you please direct me to where Krauthammer, Hansen and Yon have supported a position like the one you are positing? Not meaning to be snarky at all, just want to know if I’ve not been keeping up with their perspectives. (And Jerry Pournelle, God love him – and I do mean that quite sincerely – has essentially been arguing for a fortress America approach that includes pursuing the willow-the-wisp of energy independence and wants us out of the Middle East and Europe).

        Secondly, the fun thing about debating from the “safety” of the ivory tower is that our enemies really don’t distinguish between our soldiers in body armor or a fat civilian academics walking with his daughters (indeed, they seem to have a preference for striking civilians when they can). So I have “skin in the game” in the sense that me and mine and anyone I value (esp. those living in major urban areas) are “legitimate” targets, which makes me quite willing to push my political agenda of advocating a policy that I think will keep my countrymen safe. I don’t have self-dramatizing fantasies about defending my homestead or departmental office from Pashtuns who’ve been ferried to Athens county, OH via Somali pirates, but at times when I’m in an airport or a big U.S. urban area (or in the capital of one of our very close allies) I know that there are people who think (and more than just think) that it would be just, neat and holy if I and lots of people around me could be turned into burning (or iradiated) corpses.

        And, no, I don’t “damn well know” that our country is unwilling to support a military effort aimed at securing important strategic objective – we did reasonably well maintaining a solid commitment to fighting a cold war that cost many billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives. The question is if it is a strategic objective. I think it is if only because I don’t think Pakistan survives if we try to do what you are suggesting. Given that there are 150+ million people there in a “country” (that is no more a nation than Afghanistan) that has nukes, I think that matters (and my fear is that if we run your experience we get to pay at least as high a butchers bill, see what happens when jihadis get nukes and observe what Southwest Asia looks like in the aftermath of a Pakistani collapse. Again, I would be pleased as punch to discover that Mr. Hoh’s service (or that of Messrs. Pressfield or Pournelle – though I don’t think Dr. Krauthammer served) and willingness to risk his life in and of themselves can change the problem of Pakistan, which alas, really are our problems too (I did not find Mr. Hohe’s suggestion that we attempt an occupation of Pakistan terribly compelling, but then the Ivory Tower can make the idea of occupying a country twice the size of California seem more daunting). And again, I’d be happy to be shown that I’m wrong, because I really get no vicarious thrill (and have no political agenda I would want to be served – beyond protecting the country and maintaining an international order that avoids such things as lose nukes or failing states the size of subcontinents) out of knowing that our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are on the firing line anywhere. But I will ask them to stay there (and persuade others of our countrymen to do the same) to keep me and mine safe if there is good reason to do it.

  • philip

    Re your last sentence, I add “nor you.” My wife is going over there, and I do not want some half-assed LBJ-style war for her. I know it is a tough terrain, but we can not let it go.

  • David Curp

    Virgil,

    The only thing I would add is that alas, some Afghans – elements of the Pashtuns at least – know what they are getting with the Taliban and are still signing up. I’m willing to grant Mr. Hohe’s point that there likely are places where the insurgency could be popular, but that doesn’t make them any less our enemies – indeed, the degree to which the Taliban have achieved popularity among some of the Pashtun (as opposed to simply terrorizing the population into passively supporting them) is what makes our struggle both more difficult and more necessary. Rather than Vietnam, I think we have the Eisenhower nightmare scenario at the end of WWII of the Nazi Werewolf insurgency gaining traction. Anyone who is willingly fighting with the Taliban knows for what kind of Afghanistan they are fighting, and likely as not has outsized ambitions for the rest of Central Asia as well. (The NYT reporter whom Lex linked to a couple of days ago describes an atmosphere that is quite chilling – http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html?pagewanted=all ).

    • Quartermaster

      I would normally discount the article linked, being in the Old Grey Hag. Occasionally, however, they will allow something through. General incompetence, I’m guessing.

      The article is chilling. I don’t think we can afford to let go in AF. I firmly believe that one will follow us home. The goal of the NVA was RVN, not the US. In the case of AF, the US is the object. Iraq really was a distraction we should not have taken on. Obama needs to get on with his job and quit campaigning.

      • David Curp

        Quartermaster,

        The whole series is even more chilling, since the reporter in question spent a great deal of time in Waziristan and saw what a Taliban state-within-a-state looked like. While I hope our very uncertain and dangerously wobbly Pakistani co-belligerents can put paid to that para-state (and what will the situation look like if they decide to really press into the tribal areas – might that not change the equation in Afghanistan?) I doubt they will try to do it if they know they are alone. Indeed, even more worrying than a Pakistani collapse is a Pakistani mutation into a more fundamentalist-coddling regime.

  • I lament the lack of people willing to resign on principle, so I echo your admiration for Mr. Hoh. However, I’d rather listen to this officer.

    He seems better informed.

    • virgil xenophon

      Marc/

      Thanks for the link! A GREAT find! The Major is advocating focusing on the very thing I’ve been pounding the drums about here for months–the tribes. Trite, but true–A MUST READ!

    • Reading Jim Gant’s treatise on AF is an education all on its own. Add to that “The Taliban” (Ahmed Rashid); “Al-Qaeda” (Jason Burke) and “Three Cups of Tea” (Greg Mortenson) and I think that I have a glimmer of comprehension of the CF that is “The War on Terror.” Reminds me of a quote from another poster in a previous discussion- “…this one will follow us home.”

      IMHO – the veneer of Islam glued onto the existing tribal culture combined with the lure of real money courtesy of the Taliban sanctioned drug economy means a “win” might not look anything like we think.

      Narrator’s voice: Back at the ranch, politicos sit in fancy-schmantzy armchairs arguing about what to do and covering their ample asses should things go South… [sound of gunfire stage left]

      • Ah. Credit where credit is due. It was Quartermaster who posited that AF “…will follow us home.”

      • I’d also add “Inside the Jihad, My life with Al Qaeda” by Omar Nasiri. Provides an enlightening look at the rhetoric of Jihad from perspective of someone who attended the training camps.

  • chaps

    With the greatest respect to warriors on this blog and elsewhere, i think you are arguing the wrong questions. The question is not CAN we win in A’stan but WILL we? The question is not whether the fight is worth it but does the Administration think the fight is worth it. The question is not whether Gen. McChrystal’s strategy can win but rather whether the Administration will support any strategy. The question is not whether A’stan is analogous to Vietnam but what aspects of the A’stan war are analougous to Vietnam. As I see it, the hard cold reality is that domestic politics and the consequences of war decisions on domestic politics are FAR more important to the President than the success of our troops, their being protected from unreasonable risk, the success of any given strategy, or even the security of the U.S. That is the analogy with Vietnam. Like Nixon, Obama is looking for a way to lose the war without being blamed for losing the war. Nixon dithered for four years while tens of thousands of Americans died. The numbers are not so high with Obama but the principle is the same. He will not do what is necessary, no matter what, and any of our people who die between now and the time he ultimate runs out of A’stan are purely wasted.

  • Lex:

    I bet COB6 a beer that GEN McChrystal will resign on principle if he doesn’t get the troops asked for…and I think GEN Petraeus will resign, as well.

    Want to bet a beer on GEN McChrystal?

    Snowman

    • Ron Snyder

      I hope they both gave BHO an expicit timeline and, that they told BHO that they will resign if not given the troops and other resources they need.

      No more games. If senior military leaders do not resign because of continuing political waffling, the are carrerists, not leaders.

  • Bill K.

    I’ll probably get shouted out of the room, but to play devil’s advocate, why not just pull out of the Af? Assume the Taliban come back in power, Al Qaeda resurfaces, and they have another go at us. Are our intelligence services so poor that we cannot prevent another attack with mass casualties? What about the home-field advantage that would accrue?

    And if such a disaster happened, would our nation celebrate its “diversity” or would national opinion and resolve make a new “greatest generation”? Would our current political overlords continue to claim “we, the few, the political elite, know best”? Would Joe Voter be arguing over “cash for seniors”, executive pay, and what’s best for “Government Motors”? Would we remain the “infantile society”, to use George Will’s phrase? For [our fathers] disciplined us for a short time as seemed best to them, but he disciplines us for our good. So why worry?

    • chaps

      I think our intelligence services have been devastated by the new Administration. Threats of prosecution and such do not make for high morale nor a burning desire to work hard and take risks. That’s not to mention the intent to do away with useful surveillance tools. Again, the question is not one of ability; it is one of will. The current Administration does not intend to defend the U.S. or allies and does intend to hamper those who will.

    • Bill K – interesting and chilling. Speaking for my own selfish interests – I have no desire to see this country go thru another 9/11 – or worse. I’ve done my grieving for a friend on that date; I have no wish to grieve again.

      We need to change the ROEs in AF so that our warriors have a chance to get the job done. We know they want to – I suspect they are itching for a really good fight that right now they aren’t allowed to have.

      Bring it. Bring it hard. Keep the fight from our own shores – home field advantage doesn’t really help against people so hellbent on annihilating Americans.

      Give our warriors all the support they need; trust that the men & women who are there, who have the experience, know what is needed. Give it to them, now.

      Political dithering is really quite repulsive when the lives of our own are not just at stake, but being lost daily.

  • Grb

    I think it interesting Mr. Hoh mentioned our persistent presence there was fueling the insurgency. Not exactly a new idea, I know, but I’m reminded that, according to some interviews with Afghan insurgents posted here a while ago, the Taliban’s actions against the U.S. were the decision of their Arab leaders (referred to as “Camels”), and the fallout, ie. our reaction, was apparently demoralizing enough to make the whole thing regrettable.

    Additionally, if we have no clear intentions there right now, no defined plan to achieve a specific goal, we look pretty weak, carrying a BIG stick notwithstanding, AND we come across as imperialists (at least that’s what I’d think if I were a local).

    Our leaders owe us leadership, being elected by us and all, and whether we stay 1 year or 20 in Afghanistan, they need to make a decision, tell us and the world, and DO IT. Oh, and I suspect the son’s of Afghanistan may respond better to integrity, even if they lack it.

  • Had dinner tonight with my sister, the cuñado, and my precious niece. Talked about my kids — her niece and nephew. Turned to the LCpl, and his potential deployment to the AF. Sis says, that if a hair on his head is harmed because The One failed to put enough combat power in theater, she will haunt his existence in a way Cindy Sheehan only dreamed of — my sister is dangerous, because she is sane (unlike La Sheehan).

    Get in, or get out, Mr. President. We families of our fighting men and women deserve no other choices. We gave your our best — don’t waste their devotion.

  • Ron Snyder

    Hillsdale College has a very active program for speakers of national renown.

    Worth a look: http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis.asp

  • SCOTTtheBADGER

    If only Mr. Obama would take the principled stand that we are in AF, and we should finish the job, rather than just doing nothing, and hoping that it all just goes away. It would appear that we have a coward in the White House.

    • RonF

      If only Mr. Obama would take the principled stand that we are in AF, and we should finish the job,

      One problem is that he did take that stand during the campaign. At the time he was accused of not meaning it, and only saying it for partisan advantage while his supporters continued to support him knowing that he didn’t mean it. Now it appears that this very cynical viewpoint was in fact true.

      • virgil xenophon

        Gee, RonF, why are we not surprised? That great philosopher Lilly Tomlin looks better all the time; “I try to be cynical, but I can never catch up.”

  • G-man

    Marc- good find on Gant. Guess my problem with Roh is timeline. In country all of 5 months and he is an expert? And his letter is simply filled with what not to do. No suggestion on the positive except leave them to their own infernal hell. We Americans tend to have a very short attention span to issues like this. Mao was prepared to live in the mountains for generations and he knew he would win. Same with Ho Chi Minh. 8 years? Most Americans forget he was fighting the French long before us, asked us for help and we declined. The Pashtuns, and probably others, know that like the Soviets, we will leave and the rabble will rule again. So why risk your tribes future by siding with the temps. If the Germans had started a guerrilla campaign after WWII I am sure the Marshall Plan would have been boxed up and returned to sender. We’ve spent 8 years doodling about, now it is time to move in, settle down, flush the covey and start killing.

  • Nose

    BTW, got that from Herbal’s FB post (credit where credit is due, and all that)

    • virgil xenophon

      Good read, Nose, good read…confirms my initial gut feelings from my limited perspective, but didn’t have much to back them up with..very helpful stuff from the horses mouth, so to speak..

  • oyster

    My 2 cents, from an email exchange with a deployed shipmate today:

    XXXX,

    Just read Capt Hoh’s letter. Reminiscent of Col David Hackworth going on (I think) 60 Minutes, while deployed in Vietnam, to denounce the war and the way we were fighting it. As the most decorated man in the U.S. Army at the time, it got some attention.

    I will pay attention to the blogs written by those much smarter than I, to gauge reaction.

    From my amateur seat, I find the majority of what he says spot on. Tribes vs modern society, corrupt governance in Kabul, attempting to modernize a stone age culture may very well be a Sisyphean task… What disappoints and surprises, considering his military resume’, is the fact that he offers no answer other than to quit. Not what I’ve come to expect from my experience with the Marines I’ve known. Just quit. No acknowledgement of the colossal consequence of such an action. And believe me, it will be a colossal consequence. First, they defeated the Soviets. Now, they will have defeated the undefeatable Americans.

    Perhaps he will provide some options when he becomes a fellow at some Institute in D.C.

    Don’t forget that bin Laden, in his initial fatwah declaring war on America, specifically listed our cutting and running from Somalia as proof that America was a paper tiger. A defeat in Afghanistan, even if we slowly slink away over many years, will be viewed by the throat-slitting freaks as their own Battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Or their own version of the U.S. Embassy shame of 1973 Saigon. 10, 15, 20 years from now, our children will pay the price of emboldening the Islamists now if we choose to provide them this victory.

    We have no choice but to fight them.

    We can, however, choose when to fight them. I predict that our Commander in Chief will take the “slink away” option, because he has shown himself incapable of making the hard choice in any aspect of his public life. He doesn’t vote “Yea” or “Nay.” He votes “Present.” He will bend with the political winds because he has no courage and no principle other than to himself. But in the end, that’s really neither here nor there, what matters is that at some point we will need to nut up and face the fact that 8 years of war may be forever to us, but to our enemy it’s the blink of an eye. They will not stop. Their ultimate goal is to convert or kill every one of us. I think the American people understand this fact but don’t want to face up to it. I’m not sure what it will take to make us, collectively, as Fuzz would say, “strap a sack on.” 9/11 obviously didn’t do it. Los Angeles or New York under a mushroom cloud? Chicago? Perhaps attacking the Super Bowl would do it. Or the set of American Idol. I don’t know.

    So. What do we do when all our options completely suck? I don’t have the answer to that, but as a nation, we have to decide if we will buy a decade, maybe two, of relative calm by dithering now or whether we will confront this evil head on and fight like a cornered hyena.

    I suspect I know the answer and, sadly, I expect it won’t be this:

    “I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone. At any rate, that is what we are going to try to do. That is the resolve of His Majesty’s Government-every man of them. That is the will of Parliament and the nation. The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades to the utmost of their strength. Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.”

    The only problem is, we are the New World. When we look over our shoulder, all we see is our own shadow.

    VR/Oyster

  • claudio

    Oyster,

    very well put above. What I can’t figure out is why all the attention to a guy with less than a year in his State post in AF. I realize he has incountry experience, but he’s still pretty junior. Like you, I can’t find much to disagree with in his analysis of the current situation yet find his recommendations for action severely lacking. You’d figure since he has enough chutzpah to make the assessment of the situation like he does, he’d come up with some solutions, or COAs. That’s what we beat into our JOs and leaders in the military. I know whenever I went to my skipper with a problem or an issue, I better have at least 2 or 3 recommendations for him. Otherwise, I might as well just be an oxygen thief. Pretty much useless.

    I happen to work at one of the main institutes for analyses in the greater DC area. I have yet to see anything that endorses a cut and run, “quit” attitude. Most recommendations seem to lean towards McChrystals take on the situation. An increase in ground troops and refocus on specific centers seems to be the way. Especially when you look at COIN strategies and methodologies applied to the population and area coverage (terrain difficulty) encountered in the AF.

    Had a chance to listen to CJCS yesterday at my place where he spoke about priorities and had a Q&A session. His take on the situation is that he’s okay with the deliberative process currently underway. Thats about all he’d say. I do wish that it wouldn’t take this long (over 60 days so far) and hope that between he and Gates they can exert enough influence to ensure the right decision is made.

    Claudio

    • Comjam

      Claudio:
      Out of curiosity, have your colleagues and/or you had the time to look at MAJ Gant’s piece? While I understand the natural propensity to look askance at anything not generated within one’s own organization, your thoughts and reflections on the piece would add to our conversation here.

      VR,
      Comjam

    • Curtis

      Check out the senior foreign policy advisor for Obama’s campaign up until last month when he decided to once again take up his mantel as a Reserve Navy LTJG.

  • Maybe he figures Murtha’s getting long in the tooth and is positioning himself for run at that seat. /snark

  • claudio

    Comjam,

    I’ve gone through it, can’t say about others at works. Great work, great examples, wish others engaged would put their experiences, recommendations down on paper.

    Lots of questions, but should definitely be discussed as an option up the food chain.

    For starters, where are we going to get the troopers to do what he proposes? Can’t use anything but SOF for that. The push now is to get the forces back to at least a 1:1 deployment ration. Most are making gains towards that. The SOF guys, not so much. Even though most of them would rather stay there, it does affect them.

    Also, is there enough patience available for the proposed system to work? Is there enough intestinal fortitude to stomach the losses and like he puts it, the poss dissapearance of some of the guys? But patience, is there enough?

    Also, what IS the endgame in AF. Democratic government, keep dreaming. Taliban out? Okay, we can possibly get the tribes on our side (many incentives/support/etc). Then how do you keep them out when we leave? End poppy production? A separate issue, but tangent. Talib get their cash from poppies. But, so do the tribes, if they don’t grow poppies, how are they going to feed their families? Please don’t say Organic veggies?

    The Soviets had a similar dilema in the late 80′s. They knew it was an unwinable war for them. They tried a whole bunch of tactics, yet nothing worked. (They didn’t try aligning the tribes, they pretty much killed them indiscriminately, around 800k of the locals). They kept the war going for several years while searching for an “honorable” end? In 89 they pulled out, and two years later, they were done. A quote I read recently about their experience there is that they didn’t want to “leave in their underwear….Or without it.” Also, “Afghanistan was their Vietnam…only worse.”

    A lot of questions, but the bottom line is that he is right, whatever ressult is desired as the end game has to start at the tribal level. But where does it end?

    • virgil xenophon

      claudio/

      Re your reply above to comjam:

      Agree with you on manpower and homefront patience issues, but to repeat myself from a previous post, endgame is to keep it “manageable” much like we now do with HIV, i.e., the problem ain’t going away, but can be kept tamped down with the right combination of drugs (think Magic Johnson) such that insofar as OUR interests are concerned, Taliban incursions can be kept at a low, benign, ebb. Would probably have to leave enough air & gnd assets in-country and region to use as QRA forces to reinforce if Taliban concentrated to overwhelm any single tribe. As for opium trafficking? Would probably have to buy up crop at mkt-rate prices, but we in effect do that with our land-bank program that pays our own farmers not to plant certain crops, so what’s the diff–what’s so hard about that? A lot cheaper and less thrashing around losing men & equip. in the long-run to achieve the same end a successful (assuming that were even poss.) drug eradication/interdiction program would.

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