Weapons system acquisitions are fraught with danger generally, both from a programmatic perspective and professionally. I successfully dodged Pentagon duty for three decades, but when I was growing up, I often heard from grizzled veterans wearing Navy blue “inside the building,” that the Air Force had a tendency to beat the pants off the Navy in Congress by putting up slick marketeers to pitch their programs – professional acquisition corps folks who really knew how to deliver a pitch.
The Navy, on the other hand, had a tendency to advance bespectacled flag officers with engineering backgrounds who couldn’t quite come up with the same flash and dazzle as their brothers in bus driver blue, and who never quite seemed to understand why they would have to explain the intricacies of the nuclear steam cycle (just for one example) to the wet-behind-the-ears staffers who were the real power behind the congressional throne.
But everyone I spoke to with Pentagon experience said that the US Marine Corps took second place to no one in Congress. They had their very own lobby, with lots of supporters who loved their short tooth-to-tail ratio and warfighting esprit. The Marines were like the proverbial “third rail”, mess with them on the Hill and you’d get burned.
So it is with some degree of glee mixed with trepidation that I read this missive from a former Army Bradley driver of your acquaintance as he goes boldly where flags fear to tread:
I’ll grant, strictly for the sake of argument, that the Marine Corps is a fine fighting organization.
But one thing they can’t seem to do is buy aircraft in a way that makes any kind of sense. At all. I can’t think of a single aircraft procurement program the Marines have run well since the UH-1N program. And that was mostly run well because the Twin Huey was first built for the Canadians. The Marines just bought what someone else designed…
Now, I’m not saying the Marines should get out of the aviation business. At the tactical and operational level, they do a fine job. And the Marine Corps has been organized and trained since before WWII to integrate ground, air, and logistics forces to produce the optimum balance of firepower and strategic mobility.
But they can’t figure out how to buy aircraft to save their asses. So what should be done? Well, all is not gloom. Despite very poor choices, there are readily available platforms that the Marines could adopt or adapt that would go a long way to recapitalizing their aircraft inventory, while spending as little as possible, freeing funds up for full procurement, training, operations, and maintenance.
XBradTC makes a good technical argument for adaptation of other service’s platforms to the Marine role, but I think he misses the essential element of the Marine Corps culture: Every Marine a rifleman, and all DOTMPLF elements aligned to supporting that tactical corporal. They don’t want their fate or the fate of their acquisition tied to any other program or service, and accept the Department of the Navy’s oversight only grudgingly – there is in fact a recurring sentiment in Congress to rename DoN as the “Department of the Navy and Marine Corps.”
The Marines, much to Navy’s dismay, even opted out of the Super Hornet program while waiting for the STOVL variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, saying that the FA-18E/F didn’t scratch any of their MAGTF itches any better than the “legacy” Hornet did. This not only upped the Super Hornet’s unit cost, it has put us in an awkward place as we try to fit the super-hot exhaust gasses of the F-35B variant on Navy amphibious class flight decks that were not built for those kinds of thermal stresses.
Another twist that comes with the F-35B is that those airframes will replace those of FA-18C squadrons currently deploying aboard Navy aircraft carriers under the “Tactical Air Integration” plan. Under the terms of the TAI, Marine Hornet squadrons graciously help to ameliorate Navy shortfalls in strike fighter procurement by integrating into and deploying with Navy carrier air wings: We just don’t have sufficient strike fighters all our own to justify the number of carrier decks we need to maintain routine deployments and surges.
Flight deck issues aside, no one has yet figured out how to work STOVL operations into conventional aircraft carrier cyclic operations (I watched with real horror the first time I saw Harriers and rotary wing aircraft operate together off an LHA), and the issue remains unsettled – or at least it did until recently – with senior uniformed officers of the Blue/Green Team, “agreeing to disagree”, leaving the whole mess up to the Secretary of the Navy (and by extension, Congress) to figure out.
Seeing things through the Marine Corps lens, they want to get those strike fighters and rotary wing off the Navy amphibs to operating bases ashore as soon as entry is forced so that they can directly support the engaged riflemen without having to beg permission from the Joint Forces Air Component Commander, far less have to negotiate supported/supporting roles with a Navy amphibious squadron commander. There are a number of greater and lesser tasks a fully trained MAGTF can execute, but supporting grunt infantry as they engage in real estate acquisition and population control is fundamentally the raison d’etre for all supporting arms branches in the combined arms team construct. Being forced to adapt USAF fixed wing aircraft or Army helicopters (and becoming dependent upon the acquisition communities of those services to protect Marine Corps equities) is deeply counter-cultural.
The Marine Corps doesn’t have anything the USAF wants, but what it does have the Army has often lusted after. Don’t think for a second that the Marines don’t know that. If the Marines have issues with aircraft acquisition, you can bet that they’ll want to solve them within their own lifelines.
I have always found the “Ft. Lauderdale Agreement” that stripped the Army of it’s own air support aircraft to be flat out wrong. The need integral air support, just as do the Marines. The USAF seems to have very little enthusiasim for anything that is capable of sub light speeds, and I am sure the Army could find many an Army Aviator willing to fly the CAS mission. The new model OV-10 would be just up thier alley, I should think, or that armed cropduster.
The Marines have thier reasons, and they know more about being Marines than anyone else does. Although I never will figure out what possessed them to buy the V-22.
What platforms did XBradTC have in mind? I suspect that he is right about there being planes that the Marines could use just as well as special built, with the proper mods made to them.
Scott: That would be the Key West Agreement of 1948.
Key West, thank you, I knew it was somewhere in FL.
As they seem to say in the trade these days (on TV anyway) ‘with all due respect’… to me the brouhaha about JSF-B heating the deck issues has been unnecessarily conflated with the V-22 Osprey serious deck heating issues. Solve the Osprey problem and for sure any potential JSF-B heat issues will be solved. I read about the STOVL engine to see that the lift fan exhaust gas is 200C cooler than aft engine exhaust. Both produce about the same amount of power during a vertical landing (non afterburner) at around 21.5K lbs of thrust. I don’t believe any JSF vertical landing will last for two minutes hovering close to the deck. Harriers regularly approach the side of the deck some fifty feet above it to then sidle across sideways to the landing spot for a quick vertical descent to touch down. Depending on pilot skill that takes only a few seconds hovering over the deck. RN Harriers return usually at minimum fuel in this fashion to allow more thrust to weight for vertical landing and they nail it within seconds every time [STOP then LAND]. Their new CVFs will likely allow SRVL (Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing) to enable more weapon load ‘bring back’ and help alleviate any potential deck heating/blast hassles. Old former SHAR pilots tell me they can walk across the deck heat footprint within seconds of a SHAR vertical landing. However I cannot attest to any JSF-B issues because it ain’t flewed vertically yet in present form. I guess this new year will tell us (the public) more on this issue. Anahappynewyear.
“I’ll grant, strictly for the sake of argument, that the Marine Corps is a fine fighting organization.”
What does he mean “strictly for the sake of argument?” If the Marines haven’t earned that attribution who has?
Tacking off in a somewhat different direction, they do seem to get that whole war-fighting thing spot on more often than not, IMHO:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/grizzly.htm
vs.
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/06/marine_engineer_vehicle_070609/
The whole VSTOL F-35 argument/need is bogus today anyway in this digital age–if it EVER was. The recce version of the Harrier made sense in analogue days where it could land in forward areas and off-load imagery to the front-line engaged gnd cmdr. In the digital down-load age that no longer applies. CAS from “fighting-front” launches ashore? Don’t make me laugh. Strictly vert. t.o from improvised “pads” maxed-out with ord gives the thing a combat radius of about 50 feet. And, by-the-by, what sort of aircraft and landing strip will be used to transport all the ord., fuel, and main. equip to the fighting front without LONG runways? And how about exposure of same support ac to close-in enemy AAA fire? And what about gnd security for support personnel? What % of the offensive force must stick around the FOB to provide gnd security? And where will all the Avaition maint., support types be housed and fed–and how will THAT operation be safely/effective/efficiently supported by additional logistics? And with WHAT assets? From where? And at WHAT carrying capacity to support intense on-going ops?
I love the Marines, but they need a VSTOL F-35
like Eskimos need freezers. All they REALLY want is to stay out of the grips of the USAF single manager system. And while that may be valid for many reasons, this is, imho, the wrong way to go about it. Far better to operate scarce, expensive, multi-million dollar easily damaged soft assets and support personnel safely away from damage from $100 20mm AAA shells and 82mm mortar shells.
what sort of aircraft and landing strip will be used to transport all the ord., fuel, and main. equip to the fighting front without LONG runways?
Well, once upon a time there was SATS, which was my field of endeavor in the Marine Corps. HQMC abolished the catapult in the mid 70′s and stretched the runway from 2200′ to 6000′; not a particularly expeditionary concept anymore.
You’re right about the Harrier’s short legs, which was why having a short runway was the way to go. A good crew could clear out a site and lay down an operating runway in 4-6 days, one capable of operating any shipboard aircraft type around; the whale included! Grow the runway to 4000′ later on and the Herc’s could stop by for coffee and donuts, using JATO of course. OV-10′s were no stranger and made quick work of SATS runways.
Whatever happened to that whole notion of ‘Forward FROM the Sea’? Are the chow and the racks aboard ship really not to be missed?
RE. the F-35: Don’t forget that it’s single engine. Unless they’ve got a garbage gut for an engine, it won’t take much to FOD/damage them out of service. Which is prolly a bad thing whilst in flight. Or so I’ve been told.
IIRC Mongo, you and I have been here before on this. I well remember the catapult they had for Skyhawks at Chu Lai. But my point is that even THAT was considered “rear area” as opposed to a true VSTOL FOB site. I only flew in and out of there a couple of times in 68 carrying a light Col in an O-2 for TACAIR USAF-USMC “coordination” ( i.e., arm-wrestling
) talks.
Yeah, we have. Same $h!t different day. The SATS concept was designed to be somewhat forward area, giving TacAir a shorter run to the battle lines. Chu Lai proved the tactical viability of the system, but wasn’t a particularly good strategic proof of concept. Somewhere near Hue or Quang Tri would have been a better situation.
Arm wresting, eh? and the beer was cold?
Yeah, well Lt. Gen Crossen and his XXI Corps aced y’all out of the runway at Hue-Phu Bai after Tet, Your 3 Star Chapman at IIIMAF should have beat him to it when he had I-Corps all to himself pre-Tet except for the Americal Div down @ Chu Lai. You snooze you loose…
I’ll say that for an awful lot of the world, it is easy to find existing 4000′ runways and real hard to find the longer ones. Having a jet that can go where a C-130 can gives you a lot of deployment options.
Very true, Taxi, but one STILL doesn’t need a hyper expensive maint nightmare VSTOL ac to access most. At super max-gross on the hottest day in history at the highest altitude runway in the world 5,800′ would/will get it for the old F-4. Most more modern ac need even less…
Want to know how I’d do it in Virgil-World? I’d give the A-10 to the Marines for FOB use ashore, and make the AF buy the Frogfoot. Its got the legs and speed the AF always bitches that the A-!0 lacks and has a titanium tub like the Warthog along with a serviceable 30mm gun. Put our electronics in it. And make both the Navy and USMC buy the Navalized version to operate off carriers for CAS.
Problem solved at half the price and twice the effectiveness.
Plus go back to the ORIGINAL numbers of the planned F-22 production-run buy and junk the 35 for UAVs for long-range strike penetration of hard, heavily defended tgts.
Why not just navalize the Frogfoot, the way Sukhoi did the Flanker, and make it multi-service?
IMO, we either need to modify the LHD’s to a ramped bow, or replace the flat decked amphibs with an amphib CVF. It helps to diminish the VSTOL fuel/range issue, and looks kinda cool once you get used to it.
Intradeck cooling, such as is used in the JBD’s, might be feasible for deck thermal issues.
VX, notwithstanding your arguments about FOBs (I’ll fob it off) for small navies (RN, Italian, Spanish etc.) the JSF-B is a gift for staying in a small carrier world that perhaps the USMC may inhabit one day when CVNs become too expensive to build?
USMC have been helping trial a ski jump with RN using new matting system. USAF in 1991 trialled ski jumps, small PDF here gives some detail: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA237265 Go here for ‘EAF enables JSF landing anywhere’ June 09 info: http://www.navair.navy.mil/press_releases/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.view&Press_release_id=4144&site_id=15
I’m not sure if this is US equipment but the added ski jump (red) gives one an idea of ‘how to add a ski jump’: http://i98.photobucket.com/albums/l261/SpazSinbad/USMCdeckrampED.jpg
For the love of God, that’s the freakin’ smoking sponson!!!
Byron – forgive me! I dinna know.
Sub 1Mb PDF explains ski jump concept: http://www.f-16.net/f-16_forum_download-id-12611.html
Flight deck issues aside, no one has yet figured out how to work STOVL operations into conventional aircraft carrier cyclic operations (I watched with real horror the first time I saw Harriers and rotary wing aircraft operate together off an LHA), and the issue remains unsettled – or at least it did until recently – with senior uniformed officers of the Blue/Green Team, “agreeing to disagree”, leaving the whole mess up to the Secretary of the Navy (and by extension, Congress) to figure out.
(from FDR association site):
“From June 1976 to April 1977, VMA-231 deployed with 14 AV-8As aboard the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42). This deployment demonstrated that the Harrier could be completely integrated into normal CV air operations. Almost every conceivable takeoff and recovery option was flown: upwind, downwind, crosswind, and before, during, and after re-spots. The Harrier demonstrated not only that VSTOL operations could be conducted within the rigid framework of cyclic operations, but that because of VSTOL’s inherent flexibility, a carrier can launch and recover at any time and steam wherever desired while achieving a combat capability that does not exist when using only conventional aircraft. A STOVL jet is unrestrained by launch/recovery times and mission permitting, could fill in gaps created by the CV cycle.
On 13 January 1977, two other Harriers made bow-on approaches and landing aboard the carrier, marking the first time a fixed wing aircraft had made a bow-on, downwind landing aboard a carrier at sea.”
In 1987 while serving under Fox Fallon on the AIRLANT staff I did a deep dive in the Operational Archives on this very deployment as we were looking at doing something similar. Eventually other matters intervened and the window of opportunity closed, but there was quite a bit of lessons learned – good and other; from this deployment. One interesting note – old as the Phantom is/was, many of the demands it placed on cyclic operations we found replicated when the Hornet entered the fleet.
Expect to see a fuller exposition of this deployment in the near future as the files I built for the subject surfaced while we were moving.
- SJS
‘Harrier Operations from a Ski Jump’ by Major Art Nalls USMC (now a Harrier Warbird owner) Naval Aviation News May-June 1990: http://www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1990s/1990/mj90.pdf
Flight International online PDF archive has an article ‘V/Stol on the big carriers’ 30 April 1977 edition with similar SJS FDR/USMC Harrier story.
Friends of mine were in CAG-19 when they made that cruise. What you should be most interested in, SJS, was that was the last E-1B operational deployment.
And yes, Lex, you are correct — the VSTOL integration was “interesting”.
The dumbest thing a man can do is jump into a conversation about something he doesn’t know squat about and spout off. That’s why in an attempt to maintain my facade of purported intelligence I really enjoy sitting back and letting you guys who know what the hell you are talking about get after it and grind the grist. I always learn something listening to you fellas. Priveleged to be in such fine company I am. stephen
when CVNs become too expensive to build?
They’re already God awful costly, but the return on investment is what makes them worth the while. If you want to talk about per unit cost, that’s where I’d have to throw JSF on the table. Regardless of how many copies get built for Foreign Military Sales, we’ll never purchase enough of an inventory to recover R&D costs.
Of course, IMO, that’s what helped crush the F-14 program throughout its history. First, Congress reneging on contracted manufacturing numbers, which cut the numbers by more than a third. Next, Navy lost the planned engine upgrade, which was a doozie of a blunder. Then the planned avionics and wiring upgrades were lost, which resulted in an obscene MMH rate throughout the -A’s history. Then with the -D program, “It’s too expensive to make A/G a native capability in the aircraft” was the mantra that kept it out of the Strike Fighter game, and which, ultimately, forced Cheney to say ‘Adios’ to the program. We all hated him for it, but it made good fiscal and operational sense. A damned shame too, given what the platform could have become. Pure hell on wings.
The whole notion of doing so much more with so much less has really been like someone grabbing the tail of the tiger, without having any sort of plan for how to deal with its teeth. Reduced inventories, late-in-the-game systems modifications and add-ons, unforeseen sub-contractor issues, and such, have always been the lovely set of pearly whites in the Tiger’s mouth.
DoD wide, we never really seem to learn…and then there’s Congress.
“…and then there’s Congress.”
Always a pleasant thought with this present crowd. Yee Gods! Never met a wpns system the Dems didn’t want to shrink or defund–unless it’s made or based in their district, that is…
la plus ca change….
Mongo:
There was also an inherent bias against A-G capability in the VF community leadership and ranks at the time (late 70′s through the 80′s) that despite a nascent capability, there was no way in h*ll they would ever be caught with bombs on a fighter (ala F-4) again.
Period.
End of Discussion.
I know, I had tried to raise the subject on numerous occasions at different levels and in different capacities/fora, officially and not. Turned out beating myself with a bat was more fun and productive in the end run…
- SJS
{sigh} Yeah, I’d heard that too. Damned shame.
Thanks for your efforts…
Um, Mongo; maybe the whole “swing-wing” business had something to do with the decision making? Maybe? Considering that everyone dropped swing-wing like a hot potato after the Tomcat?
No, really; the US produced the F-111, the B-1, then the F-14; after which no swing-wing design was introduced.
On the other side, from what I’ve heard, the USAF considers Russia’s swing-wing designs the best thing since sliced bread, since the Air Force claims the ability to predict imminent combat maneuvers of said Russian designs since those designs were limited to very few (specific) angles of sweep.
So we have Russian designs which have never been proved in combat, compared to three US designs, two of which have been assigned to the graveyard.
Tell me again how great swing-wing designs are?
I’m not knocking the Tomcat per se, but let’s not gild lily here. The F-14 was just too expensive in terms of maintenance. WW2 saw something similar when the P-38 was replaced by the P-51. The Lightning was a monstrously kick-ass aircraft, especially the L-model and later. Alas, it was far more expensive to produce and maintain than the Mustang.
As for the Marines, from over here I see a bit of procurement-envy. The USMC usually manages to do better with less as compared to their better-endowed (heh) siblings…
Oh well,
Can’t help but dogpile on the F-35. Some good all that expensive, hard to maintain, performance reducing stealth will do the Marines in the Close Air Support role where you can fire at the dang thing visually with AAA. The concept of an all stealth air force should have died the death of the Pentomic Army concept but sadly the franken-beast somehow fumble-f&*ked its way through the system, getting more grotesque at every stage. I’ll blame USAF spinsters going before congress (from my industry days the AF was indeed far better at playing the game) not because I know they’re at fault but because I’m Navy now and it just feels like fun . . . Something like the OV-10 for USMC could probably do the job more effectively and at lower cost allowing more numbers to be fielded, and if you could get it to fly off an LHA/LHD (ski ramp possibly? EMALS? arresting gear likely) that would be even better. A small, light jet might be preferable from a performance standpoint but I can’t see anything out there that would really fit the role too well. None of the new series of slick trainers (KAI T-50, EADS MAKO/Yak-130, etc.) looks all that survivable if hit with small caliber AAA and you probably couldn’t get them to fly off a modified amphib.
To go into tin-foil hat mode I’ve always wondered about a “variable” front aspect stealth only concept to affordably introduce a “first-few-days-of-the-war” survivability aspect into a more affordable 4, or say 4.5, generation fleet of strike fighters. Conceptually similar to a variable geometry wing design approach. It would be a mostly non-stealthy performance based configuration that could move a few surfaces in flight to trade off a lot of performance for some front aspect stealth. This would be useful in the first few days of the war when stealth is needed (and after which, presuming you won those few days, it’s mostly a drain on individual system performance and force structure affordability/sustainability.) Imagine if you will something configured like a hornet (or better yet the original Rockwell ATF design) with a chimed nose and with doors in the LERX in front of the engines. In stealth mode these doors would swing down to block the engine fan from ground based SAM radars and open up an air path into the engine from the top of the fuselage. (With this system you could have a much simpler straight inlet instead of an S-inlet with baffles, so installed engine performance should be much better than on most current fighters.) I’m also thinking butterfly tails that in stealth mode tuck up past the vertical to both point inwards towards the centerline, like the original HAVE BLUE. The plane would likely have two engines separated more widely than the hornet (more like a Mig-29) to fit a small “bomb bay” between the engines for internal carriage of maybe six SDB’s or a HARM or a couple AIM-120D’s in stealth mode. Just a small load. If you no longer need stealth you could put a fuel tank in this small bomb bay and start hanging tons of ordnance on the wings. Supercruise and an integral jammer would be necessary too.
Early in the war these fighters would supplement some precious few (all we can practically afford) all stealth F-22′s, UCAS, B-2′s etc. in SEAD/DEAD, taking off and landing in performance mode then transitioning to stealth mode just outside IADS radar range for some frontal dash runs against SAM sites. (Being frontal aspect stealth only they couldn’t take out an IADS themselves given good air defense tactics, but combined with a few all aspect stealth “golden bullets” like the F-22 which would engage any radars that attempt to attack these penetrators from the side they could end up doing a lot of the lifting, employment tactics being the key with them adding a critical mass of numbers.) Once the IADS is crippled they could just start flying sorties in high performance non stealth mode with good payload-range capability due to the extra fuel in the internal bomb bay and better installed engine performance to start pounding large numbers of enemy ground forces and installations.
Just a fantasy that allows me to doodle here and there.
Aussies dogpiled/hit first last year – some comments/thoughts from then: ‘Of Wargames, JSFs and Baby Seals’
- SJS
Yeah, it’s only doubly-inferior to any version of the -27. Lower T/W and higher W/S. At least the F-4′s could outperform the MiG-21 in the vertical if it came down to the wire. Sure Virgil could expound on that a million times better then me. And then you have the V/STOL version that lugs around a freakin’ lift fan for most of its mission instead of fuel. Yikes . . .
I think F-35 catastrophe watch is on. When will the DoD stop throwing good money after bad on this dog of an airplane (not even the TFX guys were dumb enough to try to make a V/STOL version of their disastrously unable to meet requirements franken-monster), limp by on Super Hornets and F-15SK’s and then try to put all our eggs in the unmanned basket for another round with Nemesis before we pull our heads out of our you know whats. Hopefully there’s a light at the end of the tunnel of a renaissance in strike fighter design with at least a new a reasonable “lo” capability design for the AF to complement the “hi” F-22, and maybe at least two designs for the Navy, a true F-14 / F/A-18 replacement and a true A-6 replacement to bring us back into the long range strike game (although UCAS will likely fill this latter role).
Anyway . . . Happy New Years to All!!
“The Marine Corps doesn’t have anything the USAF wants, but what it does have the Army has often lusted after.”
What might that be Lex? I’ve spent some time in Army Aviation circles, both active and reserve component. The only thing the Army ever wanted, and lusted after, was the very thing forbidden by the Key West agreement.
Starting with Korea, the Army has complained about the lack luster CAS given by the Air Force. The Air Force doesn’t really want the role, but it won’t give it up either. This has nothing to do with the facile statement “no ground forces have ever been hit by enemy air for XX years.” That is true, but utterly irrelevant.
The Army needs its own CAS fixed wing aviation assets just as the Marines do, and for the same reasons. Let the AF have the long range bombing and the air superiority missions, the things that an independent AF was really meant for.
As for missing the “every man a rifleman” culture of the Marine Corps, I have very serious doubts that Brad does not understand it. While it possible, almost every Army officer I’ve known has had an understanding of the Marine culture and how different it is from the Army’s culture. It’s a function of Naval Infantry, and anyone that has looked at operational history in the Pacfic War of WW2, knows of the problems that the much different tactical cultures of the Army and Marines created in several island operations. They led to an Army Division CG being transferred to the ETO and the relegation of Marine General Holland M. “Howling Mad” Smith to CG of the Fleet Marine Force, an admin command. These things are seated in the historical memory of Army Officers.
The Marines have long been dependent on the acquisition programs of other services, mostly the Navy and Army. There have been some exceptions. The AV-8 and the Osprey are two glaring exceptions. Minor things, such as the acquisition of Remington Bolt Action rifles for scout/sniper use, instead of the accurized M-14, is a minor example.
VX, this is not meant to get you up on a soap box. I think if the Af were to give the A-10 to Uncle Sam’s Misguided Children, there might be an explosion and revolt. The Army spoke up when the AF was going to phase out the A-10, and the Army said they would take them. The AF decided they needed to keep them after all. Why, I have no idea. The things are a career dead end for anyone that gets stuck in them.
LOL. We’re afraid that if we give you Army guys an inch you’ll take a mile, QM! I know this is ancient hist & obsolete tech, but when you guys put in-cockpit IR read-out and SLAR pods on the Mohawks you totally aced out the USAF in terms of tactical recce in low-threat areas for all intents and purposes. Greedy bastards!
Hell, the AF didn’t have a single recce capability in I-Corps. All the AF FACS had to get their hand-held 35mm camera recce/intel pics developed at Army’s 1st MIBARS in DaNang. Would fly down from Hue and Quang Tri City or up from Quang Nai City, etc., to get it developed–then fly back. (And that was only because we asked nicely and they took pity on us) Helluva way to run a railroad…
VX,
Got to agree with QM on this: “The only thing the Army ever wanted, and lusted after, was the very thing forbidden by the Key West agreement. Starting with Korea, the Army has complained about the lack luster CAS given by the Air Force.”
From my limited experience with the issue, it was a real pain in the butt pleading with the AF to get CAS or to have it on standby. We envied the USMC having their own and having one boss to make certain it worked. Back in my day, our division at least had its own aviation battalion and cavalry squadron with a bunch of UH-1s and AH-1s that we could count on; and we did, often. Simpler when the division commander gave the order, and everyone made it happen without having to coordinate with the AF guys at the O-Club (cheap shot, sorry, couldn’t resist — this being the last day of 2009 and all).
Not sure what you mean by, “Hell, the AF didn’t have a single recce capability in I-Corps.” In Thailand in early 1970 as a very junior Army captain (O-3), I had the opportunity to visit my AF cousin who was also a very junior captain who was the backseat guy in an RF-4 outfit flying out of one of the Thai fighter bases in the northeastern part of the country. As very junior captains who are cousins are likely to do, he took me in to their very secret bunker and showed me what they did. Very nice photos of all kinds of stuff before and after taken by some fancy cameras that got stuffed into the RF-4′s nose. All that was done by the AF; I was the only (American) Army guy I saw on base. Many of the photos were of places I’d been/seen in I Corps a year or so earlier. Honestly don’t know who in the AF who would use the photos wouldn’t have seen them (security clearances not withstanding). Now as for the Army, that’s another story. No sharing there is my guess. I know I’d never seen anything like them before (and rarely since).
If I’m missing your point, it’s because I’m a little dense when it comes to a lot of the technical points (feel free to straighten me out). And time has taken a toll on the gray cells, too.
Regards,
Mike
Uncle Mike/
Yeah, gettin’ that time. Happy New Year to you and everyone else here too!
What I meant was that all in-country USAF recce assets were centralized for maint purposes in one giant beefed up recce-tech wing (RTW) at Ton Sun Nut in Saigon. Oh, they took a lot of pretty pictures up in I-Corps alright–just that it took days to get the actual photo results back up-country to us in I-Corps–by which time most were worthless in terms of tactical timeliness. The Marines 1st MAW at DaNang sitting across the two runways from us, by contrast, as a composite air-wing, had their own dedicated recce RF-4s that they owned and could pop up when the wx was good and take pics and get them back, developed, and to end user same day… HUGE difference. We at DaNang were just one of many fighter wings ( plus all in-country MACV supporting FACS) competing for recce priorities across all of S. Vietnam–same for Army and ARVN ground units in I-Corps and the rest of S. Vietnam…ONE single RTW at TSN handled the entire country and THEY decided on priorities! Good luck with that!
PS: I should clarify that the 366th TFW at DaNang was the ONLY AF fighter wing to fly both in-country AND out-country msns. The reccee for out-country up North was a whole different deal and was pretty good as time was not so much of the absolute essence as compared to gnd ops in the South.
There’s a link I put in the comments at my place that explores this issue. The AF tac recce had a two/three day turnaround to get photos in the hands of groundpounders. The Marine photorecce guys could get photos in the hands of a grunt in about 2 hours.
VX,
Thanks for the clarification. Being an Army guy and having been in I Corps in the late 60s, most of this stuff was/is over my head (in more ways than one). Don’t understand why the photos taken by AF fighters operating out of Thailand couldn’t/didn’t make it to AF units in I Corps (not very far as the crow flies). However, that was in the days before Al Gore invented the Interweb (as our host sometimes calls it) and moving photos physically was probably more of a challenge than I appreciated — even for guys with all those nice jets blasting around the skies. Heaven knows we in the Army had more than our fair share of challenges moving things around.
Have always admired the Marines for their tight integration of units/arms/resources/command.
Best wishes for the new year to you and all who enjoy our host’s interesting corner of the world.
Regards,
Mike
I’m channelling an old bold A4G/SHAR pilot here (via e-mail): “There is no heating issue with VL’s on metal decks because the evolution is so short. You could put a stream of 25 jets down on the same spot and the heat will dissipate fast enough to have no effect whatsoever. People will be able to walk all over the deck as soon as the jet wash from the taxying aircraft has gone.
The V22 solution is as simple as pie. Why go for complexity when the solution is self evident escapes me? Think of what they do with the venerable Huey exhaust! They put a nozzle on the jet pipe which adjusts flow by 90 degrees and direct flow into the rotor wash. Imagine the same deviator on a V22 and the problem is solved. It may even make the beast faster, pumping hot air up into the disturbed prop wash?
All that talk about limited range on the F35B! Limited compared to what? It’s better than the F18C by a factor of more than 2. Heaps better than an AV8B. The only aeroplanes it will be worse than in the context of age are the F35A and C models, and the whole concept of the B is to be available when As and Cs are not! How can that be a limitation!
If they are saying the F35B must replace Marine Squadrons on big deck carriers, then they will be fine! The only difference will be that they don’t need to use the catapult. You can still fly navy style circuits in STOVL aeroplanes if that’s what they want.. but why would you? [Even JSF-B SRVL if need be.]
STOVL aircraft can operate from anywhere. Air Force and USN aeroplanes can only operate from their specific places. I know USN carriers have 4 cats for redundancy, but no-one ever considers what will happen when the big bullets fly in and bend and twist the old boat, but don’t sink it. Bent cat tracks won’t work, nor will misaligned arrestor systems. Having 45 F18Es and 45 F35Cs is a complete waste if mum can’t launch them… then even 1 F35B would be better than 1,000 F35Cs…”
Seconding QM here, can’t think of one system the USMC has that the Army wants excepting only (A) fixed wing aviation, and (B) odds and ends, stuff a man can lift with his own hands. And sex-segregated basic…
Lex, thanks for taking note.
For the record, I’m not really all that against the F-35B. It just seems odd to have to design backwards from a STOVL platform to a CV platform to a CTOL platform. You have to wonder what compromises were made.
My real concern was on the rotary-wing side of the house. Especially the UH-1/AH-1 program. Essentially, they built an entirely new design aircraft over the course of almost a decade and a half, when they could have just bought off-the-shelf aircraft.
And I’m at a loss for what systems the Marines might have that the Army lusted after.
It’s not a weapons system that the Army lusts after, but the capability set IMHO. The Marines have a forced entry capability that – setting aside the maritime delivery method – seems to me falls squarely in the Ranger wheel house. The USAF doesn’t compete with the Marine Corps for roles and missions, the Army does.
After the 15th MEU took an airfield south of Kandahar in November of 2001 – the longest amphibious raid in history and the first strategic toehold in the Af – and set up Camp Rhino, there were a number of young Army officers who asked why this hadn’t been an Army mission.
I’m not sure they ever got a good answer from their Chairman.
The Army has a significant “kick in the door” capability, and it isn’t just resident in the Rangers (though for a while in the 80s and 90s, the Rangers focused pretty tightly on airfield seizure). We call it “the 82nd Airborne”.
Yes, it’s true that the 82nd would have a hard time seizing a toehold against a mech force. But so would the Marines.
I don’t think there’s as much tension between roles and missions as you do, but a large part of what there is, is because the Marines aren’t being used in an expeditionary role when we have them in Iraq and Afghanistan for 7 and 8 years.
For the sake of the country, I think the Army needs to return to having the same capability it had in 1945. The old TAC commands were what gave the Army it’s capability, and they did not have to negotiate with the AF to get CAS on standby. They simply ordered it, the way they need to be able to now.
Armed Helos are a good thing, but they are Rapier, and sometimes you need a Claymore instead. There are times when nothing will replace a 5000 pound bomb. You won’t get that with an Apache or a Cobra twin pack.
Give the Army its own tactical Air Force and leave the AF with long range bombing and air superiority, the jobs they want and can do well. The Key West agreement was not in the best interest of the country.
In any event, the real issue with the “F”-35 is that it is NOT a fighter. It’s an attack aircraft with limited A/A capability, kind of like an A-4.
Now, personally, I think it was a bad idea. Especially for the Navy. It should have been killed off a year ago, replaced with additional F-22s, late-model F-16s, F/A-18s, and acceleration of F/A-XX.
If the F-35B works, the definition of what a bare base is, will certainly change. You will need to get 7 tons of gas into the base for every F-35B sortie.
The USMC still thinks it can do F-35B IOC by 2012. Given the glacial progress of flight testing that will be an interesting trick. 25 percent of FY2010 is done. An FY what was supposed to see 1200 some F-35 flight tests (plus the make-up work from 2009–a few dozen done of what was supposed to be over 300). The only thing we know now about the F-35 program is that it is in trouble.
The trouble with the USMC procurement is that it went gold-plated. EFV, MV-22, and the F-35B. With what will be esentially flat DOD procurement budgets in the coming years, it would be best if the USMC alter their taste for overly expensive, poorly thought out gear.
Surprised no one has yet brought up the logistics nightmare of the first USMC V-22 deployment to Iraq. Austere environment operations? Don’t count on it.