Yesterday we briefly touched on the issue of the “impossible turn” back towards a runway after a low altitude engine failure. AOPA has pretty much endorsed the notion that turning back to the field from which you recently departed is, in fact, impossible using the sterling example of US Airways Flight 1549 and Captain Sully:
Pilots seeing images of US Airways Flight 1549 floating in the Hudson River probably shared three thoughts: those pilots did everything right; I hope I could do it right if I ever had to; I hope I never have to.
Bruce Landsberg, executive director of the AOPA Air Safety Foundation, says general aviation pilots can learn valuable lessons from the airliner’s amazing emergency landing and increase their odds of a successful conclusion to any emergency.
First, he says, pilots need to remember that the “impossible turn” back to the runway really is impossible.
“If you have an emergency shortly after takeoff, the call of the runway behind you can be extremely strong,” Landsberg said. “But time and again we see pilots desperately trying to make it back stall and spin into the ground instead. Look for the best option within a few degrees of your flight path.”
But David Rogers, a former Naval Academy professor of aerodynamics says that the impossible turn might just be possible after all, depending upon a myriad of factors. The keys, he says, are bank angle control, airspeed management and coordinated flight:
Fundamentally the turnback maneuver is an energy management problem. When the engine quits, the aircraft has a total energy equal to the sum of its kinetic energy (due to its velocity) and its potential energy (due to altitude). This energy must be continuously expended to overcome drag and maintain flying speed. The problem is to optimally expend the available energy while executing the turnback maneuver.
Using this approach a long time colleague Professor Bernard `Bud’ Carson developed a theoretical solution for a decelerating descending turn that showed that a bank angle of 45 degrees at stall velocity is the optimal turnback maneuver. Why 45 degrees at stall velocity? Simplistically, 45 degrees, because here equal amounts of the lift are being used to support the aircraft against the pull of gravity and to turn the aircraft. At stall velocity, because the lower the velocity the smaller the turn radius and consequently the less time spent in the turn. Coincidentally, the smaller turn radius keeps you closer to the field and turns you around faster. After completion of the turn the aircraft is accelerated to best glide speed by lowering the nose.
It’s easy to see why this approach has led to so many stall/spin fatalities when attempted by invariably surprised aviators who have suffered a loss of power soon after take-off. Flying an unpowered aircraft right at stall in a 45-degree angle of bank turn will generate some pretty eye-opening sink rates – up to 1000 FPM, according to Dr. Rogers. You were never very high to begin with, and now the earth is coming up at more than twice its accustomed rate. The temptation to further stretch the glide – and enter a spin prone angle of attack – will be severe. Just a little not enough rudder to keep the inboard wing flying and you’ll be belly-side up.
I’m not currently a Certificated Flight Instructor, and even if I were, I don’t think I’d teach this to any of my students. But I may just climb a rental up to safe altitude some leisurely Sunday afternoon to see what this feels like.
But I may just climb a rental up to safe altitude some leisurely Sunday afternoon to see what this feels like.
Which is the first application of Rule 1, is it not?
In the commercial syllabus, a loss of engine on take off means a landing choice fifteen degrees to the right or left of centerline. You need at least a thousand feet to consider an on airport landing.
While it’s a well written article, a number of private pilots have trouble maintaining a controlled 45 degree bank angle when they *have* power.
If in mountainous terrain or surrounded by an industrial park the steep bank turnaround might be the only option if you can handle a plane like Bob Hoover.
And under the heading of mixed messages:
While the head of the AOPA Air Safety foundation says that the “impossible turn” really is impossible, the same ASF provides a slideshow and video that shows that it IS possible. (See: http://flash.aopa.org/asf/pilotstories/impossibleturn/) I guess the real lesson is to KNOW the capabilities of your airplane, practice operating it with precision at the corners of the envelope, and constantly evaluate your options. Most takeoff engine failures offer options that transition from landing ahead on the runway remaining, to landing off the airport somewhere forward of the wingline, to being able to make it back to the airport. The key part is knowing where these transitions occur. When possible, adjust the departure track to stack the deck in your favor.
Of note: Glider pilots are required to demonstrate this “impossible turn” to the departure runway from 200 ft in order to get their rating. When the engine quits, you’re now a glider pilot.
I commented on this on a different post, but you’re correct. The big difference of course, is a glider is made to fly slow and to glide, so the impossible turn becomes possible, once the towing airplane is out of the equation.
Not being a pilot, I wonder, can’t this be programmed into simulators to give pilots the virtual experience? Wouldn’t that be a reasonable facsimile that already licensed pilots could try to prove to themselves whether they have the “right stuff” to beat the odds?
Very few private pilots spend any time in a sim.
And I’m willing to bet there’s a “coffin corner” where the impossible turn is really impossible, even if you use the 45/stall speed technique.
The best bet is have a plan before you need it. The Boy Scouts were right. Be prepared.
Why not turn left to land on cross runway in the instance cited by MikeB?: http://flash.aopa.org/asf/pilotstories/impossibleturn/
When the engine quits, pull the handle. Two choices: rocket ride (probably not out of a C-172), or BRS chute (can be installed on 172/182 and a couple hunnert other types. Live to fly another day. Or as my CFI told me 33 years ago at Owens Field Cola, SC “never ever ever accept an intersection takeoff. I guarantee that the time the engine quits will be the time you departed with 4000 ft of unused runway behind you”.
says don’t do it. Gol darnit, I ain’t doing it!
I didn’t even put in the right link.
Lex, I can’t delete my mistakes anymore. Can you delete the above for me pls….
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Grampaw-Pettibone/60919852291?ref=ts
That’s supposed to say “Grampaw Pettibone says don’t do it…”
He probably means I shouldn’t try HTML…
Apologies for length in advance…
I hate when AOPA gets on their soapbox… so now I must return fire!
I agree the vast majority of GA pilots would be better off straight into the trees – I’ve actually seen that done once. However, most GA aircraft can execute a useful return to the departure runway. Judgement and proficiency are the killers here, and granted there are plenty of wind/sheer/terrain/altitude/aircraft combinations where it would be a poor option.
Consider these: a pre-solo glider pilot must demonstrate low altitude tow rope breaks – a low performance glider can return to the runway from about 200-250 feet AGL provided typical conditions and correct technique. A J-3 cub can do it from 300-500 AGL depending on wind. A C-150 a little higher, and so on. I required my pre-solo students to handle this manuever and vocalize engine out judgement (where we goin’?) during climbout through at least 1000 AGL. I know, the cruelty.
Its simply another manuever albeit critically slow, critically close to stall and critically low. Judgement intensive.
In my opinion the #1 mistake is ignorance of how quickly airspeed decays (GA aircraft) from the climb attitude during power loss. You simply cannot push over too quickly in a low performance, draggy aircraft. One second of delay is not acceptable. The turn back manuever will require a healthy margin of energy above stall. If you simply pitch down to the normal glide attitude you will be critically slow with a high sink rate. Loss of control here = game over… adding a turn prior to impact will not get you points for style.
For draggy GA aircraft – you’ll be pushing over approx to 0g and once you get your attitude for manuevering, commencing an agreesive and precise steep turn. The trees look carnivorous at 20-30 degrees nose down. 45 degrees of bank will take too long for a typical draggy GA aircraft to do a return to departure runway manuever. You simply are not max performing if you fly the longer path required 45 degrees of bank. You’re not looking for min sink rate, you’re looking for min altitude loss – steeper bank 60-75 deg for 4-5 seconds – not moderate bank for 10-15 seconds. You’ll also need time, space and energy to complete runway alignment to touchdown. You’ll quickly see that the immediate pitch over at step #1 is the key – and you need to know that the end manuever is possible given the conditions BEFOREHAND. The successful outcome of this manuever to a controlled power off landing must obviously must be beyond question if you are going to employ it in an actual power loss situation.
Decelerating 45 descending turns in a draggy GA aircraft are not going to be a usable solution… later accelerating to glide speed unlikely due to limited altitude. I think the Naval professors have in mind a higher energy state at step #1 and a very different type of aircraft. With GA aircraft you are critically slow wings level at the moment of power failure.
In a low performance GA aircraft on a hot day with a short, obstructed runway there may never be conditions where the return to runway is doable. Judgement required.
Practice at altitude and later near the ground with someone qualified. The Varga should beat 500 AGL aligned to return with reasonable margins. You can line up over a road at aerobatic altitude for starters… lots of unintentional stall/spin potential.
Capt Sully was running his engine-out options actively (glider guy) and obviously dispatched his situation with the perfection required. Judgement was #1. He eliminated the return to runway early and proceeded without hesitation to a controlled outcome. Knowing the return was not possible is different than blind reliance on dogma stating return is never possible (thus my problem with AOPA’s stance). Ask Sully, I’m betting he’s not a blind dogma kind of guy.
Here’s my thought, if I don’t have a good idea how much a given aircraft takes in still air to do the return to runway with reasonable margins, I don’t know the aircraft yet. Call me an old fart. If I’m not thinking about my options, my wings may as well be made of lead.
This subject is controversial and dangerous both in igorance and execution. All risks are your own!
AOPA understands membership pretty well, though I question much else they do and utterly reject some of their dogma. Certainly this is a challenging manuever and understandibly easy to mess up with immediate dire consequences. However, there have been many times in my judgement when the return to runway manuever was be the best, most survivable option.
Happy flying safely… (check out Duane Cole’s book by that name)
Jeff
My son flies a Falcon, and last time he flew the Sim they exactly followed the Hudson flight emergency. Had no trouble making it back. Maybe it does have a lot to do with the airplane.
Had a partial after takeoff once, (plug fouling) 300- 400′ from memory?. All I had time to do was IAs and set up for the landing. With all the other guff you should be doing ie mayday call and shut down if time permits, can’t see how the average low time GA guy (or gal) should be taught to do anything else but 15° of the nose.
(Lycoming putted back to life and I made a precautionary with heaps of side slip to get down asap).
I have tried this on a really cold windy day at 1100′ agl with an 11000 hr Ag pilot. Can be done but you better be current and quick, initial rate of descent is alarming but as above , need to keep the airspeed up. We also cheated in that it was a planned manouevre thus no surprise vs the normal WTFWT 1-2 second delay which is critical. Downwind landings are always fun and prove to me that NZ top dressing pilots are mad.
In addition to getting the nose down right away, some other thoughts from a former airplanes/helicopters/gliders CFI: If you’re going to turn back, start the turn into the cross wind, if there is any. That will shorten the time back to the runway which minimizes the altitude required. If the airplane has a variable pitch prop, pull the prop control all the way back: the difference in glide ratio is significant. If the engine quit suddenly, you’ve got some time to do some troubleshooting on the way down, and the fuel tanks are selectable, try another tank or the both selection.
Kinematically, it’s marginal but possible in some conditions. The problem is that the pilot has to recognize the failure instantly, and immediately execute the turn flawlessly. Do-able under controlled conditions, but not in the real world.
No, Sully had the right idea.
With 22,000 hours, I tend toward cautious. The last three small airplanes I have owned (all in the last five years),were an Ercoupe – 85 hp, fat wing and it took 380 feet to complete the maneuver. A Symphony, a high wing -152 lookalike – but with 160 hp, and it took 520 feet. My present Piper Dakota (’79) with 235 hp needs 900 feet. So, yes, the shape of the wing, the weight and the wing loading all are factors to be considered. When I buy a new (to me) airplane, within the first hour of flying I complete this test so I know how much altitude is needed.
In all those hours, I’ve lost a total of 2 engines. One a wing engine on a DC-10 mid Pacific and the other was in an Ercoupe in 1965 at cruise.
Fred
I watched a guy lose it at around 500 off the end of the airport at Gillespie?.
Rolled up on the port side to go back home and put himself into a parking lot.
If he had gone ahead, maybe.
Is trying to make it back, flying on the bleeding edge of skill and aircraft performance, worth the risk of failure? A stall/spin is probably not survivable. A landing somewhere in the front semicircle probably is; the airplane is expendable in matters of life or death.
The pitch angle change from full power climb to no power glide, after an engine failure, is as much as 60º in some aircraft. Just releasing the back pressure doesn’t get you glide speed, it takes a significant push.
I’m still biased to “land straight ahead,” but for what it’s worth I set myself up over a roadway in the Cardinal yesterday at 3000 and 80KIAS. Full power, wheels up/flaps up climb to 3500′ MSL and pulled power to simulate the engine loss. Left the prop full flat to offset residual power. Nosed her over to capture best glide (initially) and the a coordinated 45 degree AOB turn back to whence I came at a little above stall speed. It was pretty nose low.
I ended up back over the “runway” with 200′ left to go.
Is it possible in a controlled experiment? Maybe, my little test proves nothing. Would it be possible if you weren’t continually spring loaded to these actions? I doubt it.
Went on to Ramona for some touch and goes. The airfield was mine, no traffic in the pattern. And the notion of trying it “for real” never crossed my mind.
Regardless of your choice, you must not loose control of the aircraft no matter the unfair ugliness which may loom ahead. As noted, even straight ahead will require an aggressive, precise push to maintain flying speed followed by steely disciple to hit the softest possible obstructions at minimum controllable speed.
Straight ahead may be most survivable – except when its not. 1/2mv^2 is grim accounting even at minimal impact speeds. Abrupt stops challenge survivability. So do liquids and low temps coupled with mere loss of consciousness. Was there not a single departure where the view ahead was unfavorable in these terms? How often do you miss the tree trunks if you’re landing on top of the forest? Yes, mostly you miss the trunks, but still – How are we weighing those probabilities against a moment of judgement for a valid manuever?
Most pilots (CFI’s included) without specific training, choose not to push over following power loss during takeoff or early climb in a light aircraft. That’s no judgement or awareness at all (even for the straight ahead manuever), that’s loss of control followed by impact. Physics says you don’t have seconds to spare here, so you must be prepared and not accepting of moments of surprise or disbelief.
Return to runway (like all of aviation) is no choice at all sans the training and chops to fly the manuever, but judgement will always be the most difficult part. If you choose this manuever, the outcome must not be in doubt, prior training and judgement required. My problem with the AOPA stance is that judgement is not promoted and the value of such training marginalized.
Shall we not teach spin recovery from various configurations including an actual spin? Shall we not teach stall recovery from various configurations including actually exceeding the critical AOA? Or do we take comfort in the mantra that a need for such skill shall not arise… and that greener pastures are always ahead when the power quits?
Subjects like these are controversial.
If you’re out there trying to imagine how to do it, or confident in preachings by AOPA, my sadness is that I can’t imagine it likely that many GA pilots will find or recognize a mentor who might impart this sort of training in a safe and effective manner. It’s becoming unfavorable for CFI’s to teach this high value stuff or even write about. I hope I’m wrong.
I prefer a more active approach to safety wherein the risks are managed, not ignored. I’d like to learn the limits and train to use all the performance I safely can call on. I’d like to have more options than less, even if that means more headwork to choose the best and the need to guard against overconfidence and resist temptation of an impossible turn as needed.
Good judgement = controlled outcome, but also good judgement aspires to controlled outcomes.
AOPA seems to promote a simplified face of aviation, easy enough for everyone. This has the unfortunate effect of making it even harder to teach judgement.
Final note:
I began flying gliders as the CFI aboard engine failure #1, and thereafter sought to learn from a more formal course of training, which continues to serve me well through unplanned glider event #4. I taught power students the return to runway manuever prior to this, but learned alot in gliders. Mostly to have a landing site in mind always, always, and when in doubt glide faster – which works well for manuevering anyway. Oh yeah, that means you look at your runway all the time (especially on t/o and climb) and think about ways you can or cannot get there.
On my Commercial Glider check ride, on aero-tow, my examiner asked me to call out when I thought I could return to the runway. He pulled the tow rope off before all my syllables of “we can make it” were spoken, at about 200′ above runway, 1000′ beyond it, and about 120′ above the trees below. Good tow pilots will sidestep a runway a bit to make a rope break return more manageable, this one had done so. Manuevering ensued so as to bring us over a favorable gap in the trees/hangars mostly lined up with the intended runway. I had good energy and the arrogance to ask him where he’d like us to be parked while on short final between the trees. He said by the windsock (about 300′ from the beginning of runway), which is where I put us thanks to spoilers, wheel brake and mostly nose skid.
After we stepped out of the glider (me trying very hard not to look too pleased with self), he said with a gaunt face, “If you say that was fun, you fail.” I did notice a big grin as he turned to walk away. He had after all pulled a very early rope break on me and we both knew it.
I’d say 1 second sooner would have been very uncomfortable over the last obstacles. 2 seconds sooner would not have been a return to runway in my judgement – because though possible, it was a manuever in doubt in my mind, 95% sure is not good enough. Also please note that prior to my ‘return’ call out, we would not have attempted the runway, we would have landed in the trees. Another note is that low performance gliders are towed at speeds higher than their best glide speed, giving a little extra energy not apparent by saying I was 120′ above trees.
Anyway, more laughter ensued after he wrote my ticket because earlier in the day we were attempting auto-tow launches (yes, tow the glider airborne with a car) so I could achieve an unrestricted license (ground launch plus aero launch demonstrated). The car wasn’t completely warmed up, the grass was wet, etc… so the first few attempts were all aborts by me, though each one a little faster and further down the runway. Tense checkride situation – I was trying to read his body language as to whether I should cancel my checkride in exercise of good conservative judgement. We continued. About the 4th try, things felt slightly better and we got airborne enough to execute one circuit above the hangars to a landing aim point about mid field (i.e. base leg flown well inside the numbers, over obstructions, on about a 2500′ strip).
The examiner fessed up that he wasn’t sure if I was overconfident/getting lucky during those quick ground launch aborts (examiner in front pit can’t see expressions of applicant in back)so he wanted to make me sweat later in the ride – thus the early rope break.
So half my check ride was below 200 feet manuevering with zero horse power. Damn that was fun!
Wow! Well said. Byrdman! Couldn’t agree more. In fact I’d go further. While there’s no requirement, every pilot, to become really competent, should have tailwheel, glider, altitude chamber, and aerobatics experience–plus a TRACON and Control tower visit, under their belt.
My only disagreement is to your reference to a 200′ simulated rope break as , “…a very early rope break….” As a commercial glider pilot (and CFIG) I’ve never been the recipient of one higher than that, and as a tow pilot I’ve never seen one given higher (except the real thing, on a couple occasions).
My mantra is 0-50 feet land straight ahead on the runway or overrun. 50-100, within 45 degrees of straight ahead. 100-200 within 90 degrees of straight ahead. Above 200, go back. And lest anyone misunderstand, we talking SAILPLANES here.
As a tug pilot, and as a matter of company policy at Skysailing (Warner Springs CA), we start a U turn as soon as possible in the hopes that that 90 degrees of straight ahead includes the runway if we’ve made it to crosswind. Of course, local terrain and conditions might dictate otherwise.
I’ve only been a glider pilot of a powered aircraft twice, both at altitude. But it’s nice to know that it’s really no big thing–something glider pilots do every day–if the prop stops. Assuming, of course, that you’re within gliding distance of a runway. (As an aside, at 5000 feet in Ohio you are.) If all you see underneath you is water or forest maybe your preflight planning should have considered the possibility?
Funny how all this becomes more meaningful as I age and my testosterone levels decline. I’m reminded of an instructor who pulled the mixture in the downwind to demonstrate that it could be done. At the time I though it was brilliant example of what today would be called scenario based training. Now? Not so much.
Nice flight Lex
Sorry my last posted after yours, now it sounds all preachy
Spring load = yes
Taxiways, infield are good, runways get busy with busy folks not looking outside.
Get somebody good with you before attempt at runway, or don’t do it – I’m just trying to get some perspective out there, don’t nobody take this a dual given!
P.S. gliders are fun
I have to agree with Jeff that AOPA’s stance is a bit extreme and not all situations are created equal. But, generally I suspect they *are* helping the average pilot with their message.
I co-own a Mooney M20F, and the co-owner and I decided it was worth practicing the “impossible” several years ago at a quiet little airstrip surrounded by flat, empty fields. Practicing at safe altitude is one thing, but, truth be told, practicing the real thing is a wholly different beast and provided a valuable experience.
We openly discussed the risks and due to proximity of the ground, the co-pilot’s job was to watch airspeed and attitude like a hawk. We did not attempt a true max-performance turn back and instead chose to practice the maneuver at a speed near best-glide in order to provide reasonable margin against a stall during the 45° bank turn. At 500′ altitude, with that load and light winds, there was 50-100′ of altitude margin — more than enough time to get the gear down waiting for the airspeed to bleed off.
Could that be improved upon? Most certainly. But at some point, the risk becomes too great, even in a true emergency situation.
Would I chose to turn-back at 500′ with my family aboard on a windy day at full load? Heck no! But, now I have a reference point to make a judgment about should I need to.
The the real value was getting the sight picture in a controlled environment — no, that windshield full of ground is not normal or comfortable to watch.
Call us foolish if you will, but, having an experienced pilot familiar with the airplane making certain that safety margins were never encroached upon gave us both sufficient comfort to learn our aircraft’s capabilities.
Opinions…most everyone has one. Here is a link to an interesting article, and an interesting rebuttal within the comments. FWIW
AIRBUS A320 CRASH
Once when working on my private with a very young instructor we were practicing short field takeoffs. Climbing at best angele, maybe 200 feet above the runway he chopped the throttle as a simulated engine failure. I nosed over right away but not fast or steep enough as we were sinking like a rock. We flared and hit hard. Maybe dropped in from I’d say 10 feet or so. I thought we had ruined the airplane and figured we must have hit the prop. The sight picture of seeing the ground coming up that fast when out of airspeed and ideas at the same time was very instructive to say the least.
We taxied back, got out of the airplane while the instructor was giving me hell for not recovering soon enough, etc. He was right of course but the entire time I was thinking what sort pf damn instructor would do such a thing without being spring loaded on the controls to make sure we recovered without pranging the airplane.
Bottom line is I got the reality of how fast things happen when nose high with little airspeed margin and got the sight picture of terra firma filling the windshield way too fast. So in that sense it was a “good” lesson.
That the instructor proved himself to be an idiot and we almost crashed convinced me never to fly with him again.
I’m still not sure the airplane didn’t suffer as a result and was glad I didn’t own it. It was a Warrior IIRC or maybe a 172 – I found somebody else to finish up the ticket with.
As far as turning back I’d say the chance of pulling it off is very slim as, even practicing at altitude will never give you the sensation of seeing the ground rushing up and, no matter how disciplined your instinct will be to cheat back on the stick with predictable results. Maybe after getting your zero altitude aerobatic waiver you’d be ready. Flying a spam can four seater – best look to plant it straight ahead and aim the fuselage between the trees….
All training included power out landings IIRC (it’s been a while). Was it +200′ / -0′ from the target? A lot less risky from pattern altitude and in level flight.
OldT6: Didn’t you have an encounter with trees?
Well yes I did. That was another story and involved losing an engine on short final when I’d botched the approach in that I wasn’t going to make the runway. Options were a football field full of soccer playing kids or, a 15 degree turn to a nice stand of tall North Carolina pines. I took the pines and walked away after “landing” in there tops and riding them to the ground.
Not one of my best moments…but luck and keeping my wits ( I remember saying OUT LOUD to myself “don’t stall, don’t stall…) led to about the best outcome possible after I screwed the pooch leading up to the event. The event happened so fast there wasn’t a lot of time to think echoing all those admonishments to practice emergency procedures until you can do them without thinking as, when the time comes, you probably won’t have time for much of that.
My 2-cents: The attitude of “don’t tempt fate by getting near such situations, even in practice, has long been deeply ingrained in the US pilot community–the armed services as well as civilian. Back in the sixties the USAF put stick shakers in the old F-101VooDoo due to its wicked post-stall handling characteristics with the admonition to NEVER,EVER, ignore the first sign of the slightest vibration and dump the nose IMMEDIATELY to avoid stall/spins AT ALL COSTS–forget any practice of recovery techniques. The Canucks, by contrast, checked out each and every newbie–let alone experienced pilots new to the ac–by putting them thru the whole stick-shaking nine yards of stall, spin and recovery before they were considered checked out and signed off in the aircraft. Theirs
(the Israelies–and to some extent the RAF/RAAF) was/is simply a totally different training philosophy. And more realistic, IMHO. Red Flag exercises are another difference. We don’t allow ACT below 4000′AGL (or used to) while the vast majority of air-to-air kills historically take place precisely in that envelope. The Isrealies and Brits, by contrast, in their own tng emphasize that envelope. And that “safety first” don’t-tempt-fate–attitude pervades the civilian side as well–for the same reason one finds seven different kinds of safety stickers on step-ladders one buys at Home Depot.
Funny, we had this conversation today at the gliderport with a Open class sailplane world record holder, a Designated Pilot Examiner, and a pilot who flew his Staggerwing Beech from Nicaragua to Canada and back in the 60s (also a glider pilot).
We wonder when, as with healthcare today, the lawyers began determining what was appropriate.
It was interesting to me that the call for spin training led to Piper building the Tomahawk which, unlike the Cherokee, could be spun. The Cherokee tended to simply mush ahead when stalled and it had to seriously mistreated to spin it.
Also interesting was the fact the Tomahawk earned the name “Traumahawk” because of it’s spin stall behavior. I don’t think the Private syllabus was ever changed, and the Tomahawk became a hazard to the unsuspecting. The FAA put it through another test series, and I think they gave it a clean bill of health.
CFIs have to demonstrate spin recovery. Private level students don’t have to. They were at one time introduced to it, but I don’t think that’s required these days.
[...] week, Neptunus Lex published an item for aviators The ‘Possible’ Turn which discusses the options available to a pilot when an engine fails on take-off. The commonly [...]
Last I checked, CFI’s only have to actually demonstrate a spin plus recovery if they previously failed the check ride on a stall/spin related subject area. Otherwise you demonstrate ‘awareness’ from incipient manuevers (good start, but what about the main course?). Guess they lost too many examiners. The only way you can even provide spin training without finding ‘chutes is for training required by license sought (i.e. CFI students). That is how weak we are brewing the coffee nowadays.
PA-38…sometimes you can’t find a lawyer when needed:
According to Piper’s own test pilots, however, the FAA-mandated fix offered little or no improvement.
According to the NTSB, one former test pilot who worked at the Lock Haven facility from 1978 to ’84 told the board that the Tomahawks he flew were “totally unpredictable; one never knew in which direction they would roll off, or to what degree, as the result of a stall.”
The NTSB also reported that a second former test pilot, who worked for Piper at Lock Haven for six years beginning in 1979, told safety investigators earlier this year that Tomahawks “were very unpredictable in a stall. Each airplane did not perform stalls the same from one flight to the other,” the test pilot is quoted as saying.
A third former Piper test pilot, also interviewed by the NTSB earlier this year, reportedly told investigators that production Tomahawks “were nothing like the article certified (by the FAA) as far as stall characteristics are concerned.”
According to the NTSB, this test pilot said the additional stall strips that Piper added to tame the airplane’s stall characteristics “did not eliminate the stall/spin defects that he observed in the airplane.”
Flight Instructor [CFI] as a part of my two year check demo’d and then asked me to do the “dead man turn” from 500′ in a 172 [three down and welded]. Opened my eyes; as it was easy to get back with the altitude we had as long as you dont get excited and do something really wrong !! He did insist on coordination and 30 Deg bank. Color me among the believers.