Secretary Gates has chosen to exercise the authority given him by Congressman Todd Arkin (R-M0):
Today the Department of the Navy notified Congress of its intent to pursue a multiyear purchasing agreement for F/A-18E/F/G Super Hornets, in response to the so-called “Akin Amendment” that gave them the authority to do so. Congressman Todd Akin (R-MO), Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, released the following statement in response.
“The Navy and the DoD have made a wise decision. I commend Secretary Gates and Secretary Mabus for seeing the light and moving forward with a multiyear contract. A multiyear contract for F-18’s saves the Navy and taxpayers over half a billion dollars, provides stability for the workforce in St. Louis, and is an important insurance policy as the Navy faces a large strike fighter shortfall. It is encouraging to see the Navy and DoD come to their senses on this issue, after I have spent two years arguing that a multiyear contract made sense on all fronts.
Good news for Boeing, St. Louis and the taxpayers.
Maybe not so much.
More Hornets with which to swarm the enemy with. Bonus! Mind you, we may need even more if the F-35C turns into a turd.
I have a feeling that somewhere in the mass of paperwork on that “turd” is the smoking gun that’s starting to get some people worried. This could be a sign of hedging their bets.
Hell, yes!
You don’t send a Vice Admiral to take a program over when things are going well.
Good news for Boeing indeed. This should keep their St. Louis facility warm for a while longer keeping them a viable alternative to provide some competition to Lockheed Martin in the fighter market, at least in terms of not having to shutter their only remaining fighter lines. Should a new competition come along any time soon that is.
Stephen Trimble has had some interesting reporting over at the DEW Line recently about Boeing’s F/A-XX ideas. From what tiny I read it sounds like that concept is all over the map and any possibilities of a solid program are currently on quickly shifting sands, but that’s nothing out of the ordinary for something so early on in the design/acquisition cycle. That being said though the artist concept’s ideas just look expensive, and not terribly maneuverable. But if the F-35C indeed $hits the bed maybe necessity will be the mother of invention again and a good concept will finally be borne out of all this chaotic “preliminary” idea tossing to keep Navy airpower supreme over advanced Flanker and double digit SAM threats. (Also some interesting articles from Ares blog on the NGJ while on that topic . . .)
But it seems like we’re finally hedging our bets on the F-35. Even if the JSF somehow miraculously turns out great, a diverse force that allows for diverse capabilities/tactics is generally a good thing IMHO. I believe Napoleon mentioned something along the lines of you should change your tactics every ten years lest your enemy figure out how you fight.
AMDO-
Why do you think it’d be ‘miraculous’ if the JSF turns out great? Would you be more impressesed if first flight was like this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qfM5FxnWPm4 ?
For a lot of reasons
- Since the cancellation of the F-22 I’m afraid our air power force structure is unbalanced and not capable enough against future high order threats, i.e. advanced Flankers, double-digit SAM’s, possibly even PAK-FA. The F-35 is a bomb truck. The F-22 is a fighter. The ratio of so few F-22′s to so many F-35′s is pushing the heaviest single engine fighter since the F-105 into a very sub-optimal role.
- It is doubly-inferior in T/W and W/S to nearly all other air superiority aircraft out there, and the fog of war, entropy and rules of engagement all exert a push towards the WVR fight.
- The configuration is a bastardized Yak-141 because the requirements are fantasy driven and ask WAY too much of a single airframe. Thinking the same general configuration can fulfill the requirements of all three branches isn’t F-4 thinking (a Navy aircraft developed to Navy specifications by the Navy and then pushed on the Air Force) it’s an even more ridiculous redux of the JFX fiasco. The requirements have led to an aircraft which can have only a single engine which is far forward of where it should be and a very inefficient structure with a big gaping hole where the lift fan goes on the B version.
- It is FAR too complex because it’s a fantasy concept that only a wet-dreaming accountant could have come up with, and is promising to be more expensive to operate than legacy aircraft.
Do you seriously think you’re making a point with the F-14 video? Does the lack of a crash of the JSF mean it’s a success? Has every aircraft that suffered a crash been a hopeless disaster. I honestly apologize, I don’t have a clue what you’re argument is with that video.
First, there was no point with the video other than to mock the Tomcat. Mocking the Tomcat is always fun.
- You make intersting points on all fronts and I applaud the critical thinking. Accepting the given answer without question NEVER is a good idea. Particularly when assumptions are made about the success a multi-service A/C in a maritime environment. Not everyone gets that.
A couple of thoughts:
-W/S will be different in each model. Math bears that out. Can I derive an E/M diagram from that without other assumptions? No. Won’t try.
-Phrases like ‘very sub-optimal’ and ‘very inefficient structure’ may need better qualifiers than ‘bomb truck’ and ‘big gaping hole’. Not saying you’re wrong, but those are pretty big generalizations, and as such, require broad back-up.
-As far as ‘promising to be more expensive to operate than legacy aircraft’. That may very well be the case. I’m guessing that you’re referencing this: http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2010/01/chart-f-35bc-operating-costs-v.html since you’ve referenced the DEW Line earlier. However, the cost of Hornet SLEP is not shown in that chart. I realize that’s not a variable in cost per flight hour, but I also don’t think that the chart is a fair comparison when you consider limitations and cost involved with SLEP. Valid concern, though. With the MYP done, it would be nice to see something such as ‘capability delivered per flight dollar-flight hour’ on the F-35 vs. the E/F in 2029. Good luck on getting any agreement to quanitfy that, though!
Pablito
W/S and T/W will be different in all models. I’m pretty sure in all models both will be pretty poor relative to say the EF2000, Rafale, Gripen, MiG-35, Su-27 family, J-10 and T-50.
- Sub-optimal: the F-35 was not designed for air-to-air combat as is attested by its doubly inferior performance. It’s being pressed into that role by being the only airframe available to do it when the keystone of our planned force structure, the F-22, was killed. I guess this is repetitive but wonder if re-stating it somehow makes the definition more clear. Over to the friendly viewers on that one.
- Big gaping hole: The most efficient type of beam is a straight one. A lot of aircraft have a keel or a set of longerons either of which acts as a beam. The best beams are not only straight but have as much distance between the compression and tension member as possible in the plane perpendicular to the vector of the moment applied, to go into probably rusty and inaccurately used engineering terms in a sad attempt to be more precise and accurate. (With the frames essentially acting as the shear web for the longerons.) Internal holes, be it the very large one for installation of the lift fan or internal weapons storage, tend to impede on the most structurally weight efficient design for a given maneuverability requirement as far as sustained g-load is concerned.
- Although the boat has sailed, unfortunately IMHO, on a different 5th gen fighter design comparing legacy fighter and new fighter design operating costs would be comparing apples and oranges if you include SLEP for the legacy. So, yeah, you can say the same about me making the comparison minus SLEP costs but the point I’m trying to make is that you can produce fighters that are much more cheap to operate, and the operability is important. To preview my response to Casey, if the pilot makes a big difference, maybe the biggest, and I believe he does, ceterus parabis which pilot gets more air time to hone his (or her!) skill, the one flying the cheap to operate per flight hour fighter, or the one flying the very expensive to operate per flight hour fighter? To ask it is to obviously answer it.
- And yes, it’s practically impossible to quantify capability so it’s probably a bridge too far to even try. It’s not that you can’t make assumptions and thus develop numbers, it’s that there’s too much subjectivity in those assumptions and definitions.
AMDO-
I’m pretty sure you and I need a couple of beers next time I’m in Whidbey if you’re up for it.
Um, Prowler, the Russians are working on producing twenty-year-old designs, while the Chinese are busy selling cheap knock-offs for the export market. Not too worried about “advanced Flankers” for a while. Modern SAMs are more problematical, but approaches such as Wild Weasel and stealth tend to mitigate that; and yes, I think killing the F-22 production line was foolish.
Remember, it’s frequently not the better plane, but the better pilot who wins. Recall the F4F vs. Zero kill ratio. By any sane logic, that result was very nearly impossible.
The question is less whether the planning is “fantasy,” and more whether the airframe can handle it. The Spitfire never progressed beyond a point interceptor. The P-38 & P-47 were designed as interceptors. The P-51 was designed as a low-level rhubarb fighter. Yet the Spit soldiered on quite well, and the latter ended up as three of the most effective escort fighters of the war.
The F-4 was originally designed as a fleet-defense craft, without guns (just to keep the historians honest), yet it ended up becoming one of the most popular jet fighter designs of all time, despite the fact that it was big, heavy, smoky, and ugly.
Heck, the F-14 was big, heavy, complex, pushing the state of the art (sound familiar yet?), and encountered a lot of teething troubles in its day, including a bribery scandal. Despite that -and pablito’s video- does anyone claim the Tomcat was a bust?
For that matter, the B-29 was rushed into production with one of the worst engines in the world; the cylinder heads would melt at environmental temperatures in Egypt before they even started the engine! The prototype on that line crashed, killing one of Boeing’s best test pilots. Yet no one says the B-29 was a dog.
Not to mention the M-1 Abrams and M-2 Bradley were touted as money-wasting lousy designs as well, back in the day.
So maybe the F-35 might turn out to be an effective design in the long run, since aviation history is full of examples which seemed to be bad ideas, but later worked out quite well. Like the B-17 -another test design which literally crashed & burned- considered too expensive and advanced for it’s time. The B-18 received primary funding, at first, and cost half as much as Fortress. The latter was not considered to be combat-useful until the E-model came out, five years after the Y1B-17A was produced.
Um, Casey, is the T-50 twenty years old? How old is the F-22? How long before China starts mass producing advanced Flankers? Sometime during the F-35′s expected service life perhaps?
Your history is dead on though. (Although the Corsair was roughly equivalent to the Zero in power to weight and built like a tank vice the flimsy Zero which was done in by one hit, so it wasn’t a complete mismatch on paper.) I’d add on that the JFX eventually became the F-111 which was a very successful interdiction bomber. It was never really intended for that role either. Would it have been a success though if it had been used in its originally intended role as primary A2A fighter and attack aircraft of both the USAF and USN. Not likely. It ended up being a success because people with some sense essentially “sidelined” it into the one role set it happened to excel at almost purely by accident and let other aircraft competently fulfill all the roles it was supposed to do. The point being, we had other aircraft back then. Now? Not so much. So the F-35 would have to buck history now by being both good at its intended job and miraculously much better than planned at its unintended job to achieve what no aircraft in history has ever done, provided all role superiority in a single general configuration. And oh yeah, do so while being V/STOL. It does this by taking the Yak-141′s configuration, something the USSR toyed with briefly and said forget it, all the while adding on stealth and far more stringent range/payload requirements. I’m not holding my breath. Look, I want a strong America, I hope the friggin’ thing works. But at this rate if it does whoever the chief designer of it is should be carved into Mt. Rushmore alongside Teddy. If it doesn’t, we’ve just put all our eggs in one basket and dropped the dang thing.
Admittedly as a trained Aerospace Engineer it’s not terribly comforting to concur that so many aircraft end up being good as something entirely other than what they were supposed to be good at. But that’s Murphy’s law in play on an extremely complex design and development problem, NOT a force structuring strategy!!!
I’m no F-35 fan as is probably obvious to anyone here, but I’ll go on record again and say: It will be good at something. It’s not looking like A2A though, or deep penetration strikes. I could be wrong of course.
And on the topic of SEAD/DEAD, well, against the double digit SAMs (which ARE proliferating, and a lot faster than the advanced Flankers) my personal only opinion is: be afraid. Be very afraid. NGJ, where are you when we need you?
I will claim that the West will have superior electronics/avionics for at least the next 10-20 years, but that’s a gut feel from general history.
Dunno why you mentioned the Corsair, unless I mucked up my Navy designations. Wasn’t F4F the Wildcat, and F4U the Corsair? I’ll grant the latter was not only impressive, but sexy.
Wouldn’t it have been grand for several hundred Corsairs to go barnstorming into Europe?
True, the F-111 was supposed to be an F/A craft, and ended up as a low-level penetrator. I’m just saying that it’s possible the F-35 may work better than expected. I would estimate -worst case- we might regress to the F4F vs. Zero level, which didn’t work out too badly. On the other hand, you make a good point that we shouldn’t rely on Murphy to get us out of a tight spot. Relying on luck is never a good idea.
The bottom line seems to be that all of our combat arms (except maybe the Marines) have lost a sense of direction since the end of the Cold War. The F-22/F-35 hi/lo combo was one of the last sprouts from that conflict. Now the Army/Air Force is blathering between bleeding-edge manned craft & smart UAVs. The Navy has blown several hundred billon dollars on precisely two LCS test craft, neither of which inspires much confidence. We’ve also heard rumors the past couple of years about studies to re-introduce turbo-prop aircraft to the mix, such as the Super Tucano (although I would love to see the Piper Enforcer take that ring). The Army is looking for ways to provide CAS to the troops as inexpensively and effectively as possible. Since they have gathered the greatest hands-on experience the past nine years, their opinion holds greater sway. It seems to involve a lot of drones.
Air Force has been reduced to CAS so they can justify F-16s and F-15s on hand, even if Army UAV drivers can do the job faster and cheaper from Nevada. Using B-1s and B-2s as very expensive JDAM platforms is the only other option they have right now. Yet they still can’t field a fracking tanker on time and on budget. As far as the Air Force is concerned, they’ve been in many ways at peacetime status for the past 5-7 years.
The Navy hasn’t seen a single serious challenge (except for, oops, mines) since the end of the Cold War.
So it’s not surprising that the Navy is chasing its own tail, considering the lack of serious opposition to this point. The lack of a legitimate opponent tends to corrupt both planning & acquisition. It’s pretty much a truism that planning & funding are based on perceived threats, not actual threats.
Me, I’d love to see more Corvettes, Frigates, and AIP subs in the mix, but I don’t work in DC.
Bottom line: money gets spent on bleeding-edge junk, and what pleases local voters (Yes, I’m referring to John Murtha). This usually has not much to do with genuine threats. So the AF got the F-22 (arguaby good) and the B-2 (costs the same a cruiser and drops the same bombs a UAV does). The Navy got LCS, and neither branch seems to have a clue what likely (legitimate) threats for the next 20 years will be.
Oh, well, at least the Navy got some more Super Hornets. Pity they didn’t manage that with the A-6. So, how did that hopey-changey thing work with the A-12, anyway? {/snerk}
It took Congress to make the Navy aware of the practical vs. marketing hype.
Great quip. Care to expand a bit as to where the Navy failed because of marketing hype? I’ve seen the posts on your blog tying together the F-35, USN and “officer career progression for the ring-wearers from the boat club for little boys and girls”, (http://ericpalmer.wordpress.com/2010/05/11/going-forward-with-the-f-35/), so I don’t expect anything without a bit of slant. However, I’d be genuinely interested as to your opinion on where the USN is failing here.
Pablito, the Navy is failing in the manner that is usual for the Military – placing all its eggs in one basket. Some of the problem is Congress, but in this case much of it falls on the Flags and SecDef’s desk.
The exercise of an option to procure more Super Hornets is a very good idea, but it is happening only because there is great discomfort on the line about the JSF and it’s progress.
Alas, ELP is correct about the marketing hype. That’s why the discomfort about the future of JSF and how far it has fallen behind vs the schedule it was to have met.
I’m only an ex-enisted Airdale, but I do appreciate technical risks.
Might LockMart have been able to start shipping product with the low risk Alfas (the Air Force variants that would never need cat shot capability and only the odd arreested landing).
Then they might have begun shipping the Charlies, with a ‘Hook for the good guys.
Why has all the effort and good-will been
shotspent with the highest risk STOVL variant? To my eyes, it’s taken years to get that thing to take off and land and it seems to barely work. It’s barely a blow torch for removing the non-skid off the big decks and for cracking concrete.That project HAS to be in trouble.
I’ll bet a six pack some of those jets end-up with “VMFA” painted along the dorsal! Takers?
I think betting against you would be a fool’s bet. Not being a fool (at least in opinion
), I won’t.
Yes, very good news for St. Louis. The school district I graduated High School from borders Lambert airport (which is where the McDonnell-Douglas factories [now Boeing] are). A large plurality of the parents of the kids I went to school with worked at MacDac. This hits right home.
OBTW, it is Todd Akin not Todd Arkin. He isn’t my Congressman but I’d rather have him than the one I do have (Russ Carnahan).