It’s clear that not all of the Afghan people trust the Karzai government, whom many see as thoroughly corrupt and self-interested.
What’s also becoming clear is that the Karzai government doesn’t entirely trust the Afghan people:
A first meeting last week between (General Petraeus) and the Afghan president turned tense after Karzai renewed his objections to the plan, according to U.S. officials. The idea of recruiting villagers into local defense programs is a key part of the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, and Karzai’s stance poses an early challenge to Petraeus as he tries to fashion a collaborative relationship with the Afghan leader.
Senior U.S. officials say that the United States would like to expand the program to about two dozen sites across Afghanistan, double the current number, and are hoping to overcome Karzai’s concerns. But the issue is delicate to many who fear that such experiments could lead Afghanistan further into warlordism and out-of-control militias…
“We always have long meetings and many arguments,” said a senior Afghan official who was present at Karzai’s meeting with Petraeus. “We always try to teach our foreign partners how to deal with a situation like this. We Afghans know better than you.”
In his first week on the job, Petraeus has met with Karzai three times and discussed many topics. But on at least one issue, the village defense forces, the general has run into resistance from Karzai. The policy would give the United States and the Interior Ministry authority to pursue a variety of programs, including expanding the pilot projects that give uniforms and salaries to villagers trained by U.S. Special Operations forces.
The Afghan official said Karzai is wary of creating “a force that will be viewed as a private militia.”
The problem is that there is already a private militia making war on the Afghan people, or at least, intimidating them into acquiescence: The Taliban. The Afghan National Army is not large enough to blanket the country with security, and has training, equipment and reliability issues. The National Police force would be a joke, were it not for the fact it actually contributes to a pervasive culture of corruption that would make a US congressman blush for shame.
If the local clans and tribes cannot defend themselves from the depredations of the Talibs, they will roll over for them. In the near term, that’s a much higher threat to the Mayor of Kabul than arming the rustics.
The Mayor of Kabul is showing as much foresight as the Soviet version. I don’t think we have the ability to buy the time Karzai needs to do things his way. Building a National Guard would take time, more time than we have, frankly.
But, even our National Guard has local loyalties that could transcend those to the country. I think an Afghan version would be even worse in that regard.
“a force that will be viewed as a private militia.”
Not just the Taliban.
There would also be the tribes. Been there a cuppla millennia already, and out fighting for survival against the best the world has to offer. So, I’m thinking that adding a decent wardrobe, some might call them gang colors, some standardization in weaponry, and a few tactical notions on how to give better than you get, shoun’t otter be such a big deal to Karzai.
Unless, of course, Crazy One has something else in mind that he’s not telling anybody on our side about. Like considering the AF Army his own private militia.
Nah…Nobody’s that egocentric.
I’ll have to differ with you there Lex. I’m betting you can’t make a US Congresscritter blush, no matter the level of shame or corruption.
“National Police” everywhere in the 3rd world are almost always the most corrupt and/or ineffectual outfit going. In S. Vietnam the ARVN Military Police, the “QC’ Quan Canh, or “white mice” (due to their white uniform blouse/shirt, white gloves and widespread use of sunglasses.) nicely fit the bill.
If Karzai was smart he’d realize that the tribes run things outside of Kabul, they always have, they will for the forseeable future, and work with them to preserve their authority instead of challenging it.
Nearly two centuries ago, Sir WalterScott pointed out that the Afghans were very much like the Scottish Highlanders…brave, tough, proud, and poor. And more concerned with being free to run things their own way than with the advantages of a central government. Their first loyalty is to the tribe…and perhaps the only way Afghanistan can be run is as a federation of tribes.
In any event, I think it’s time to rethink our strategy and objectives. Our goal should be the eradication of Al Quaeda, not establishing a Western-style liberal democracy. And that may require the methods used by the British Government in the Highlands…help friendly clans thrash hostile clans.
Greetings:
Just another day in the lands of “I against my brother; my brother and I against our cousin; and, my cousin, my brother and I against the stranger.” Alliances tend to flow like the shifting sand depending who or what is to be had or avoided.
I wanted to thank Neptunus Lex, all his accolytes, and especially the U.S. Military out in the trenches or on
the waves for a daily reality check…Wish more folks would read it…Did my time–didn’t get shot at–but wonder if I’d do it again after seeing what has happened to our nation.