Or at least – when it comes to the notorious battle of Wanat – nobody important:
The Army’s official history of the battle of Wanat – one of the most intensely scrutinized engagements of the Afghan war – largely absolves top commanders of the deaths of nine U.S. soldiers and instead blames the confusing and unpredictable nature of war.
The history of the July 2008 battle was almost two years in the making and triggered a roiling debate at all levels of the Army about whether mid-level and senior battlefield commanders should be held accountable for mistakes made under the extreme duress of combat.
An initial draft of the Wanat history, which was obtained by The Washington Post and other media outlets in the summer of 2009, placed the preponderance of blame for the losses on the higher-level battalion and brigade commanders who oversaw the mission, saying they failed to provide the proper resources to the unit in Wanat.
The final history, released in recent weeks, drops many of the earlier conclusions and instead focuses on failures of lower-level commanders.
There’s a phrase used at the end of commendatory citations, “in the best traditions of the service”. This latest re-write does not seem to me at all commendatory, not when 9 US soldiers – poorly equipped and positioned – lost their lives. I hope it’s not a service tradition.
Now I’ve got 274 pages of light reading to do.
Update: Uncle Jimbo sees things differently.
http://www.blackfive.net/ has a good post on this issue also.
Jeez, 274 pages? I’m trying to finish “Einstein Lived Here” by Mr. Pais this week and it is only 304 pages.
Duh, just realized the OFFICIAL Army Report is 274 pages, and only 2.5 years after the fact.
Sorry, I’ve too many flashbacks of OFFICIAL Army Reports from VN, so while I scanned it, I won’t read it.
We need to get out of AF and salt the friggin land if need be.
The various tribes can deal with situation, or not. Would be rather nice if we had an actual War Leader instead of an idiot that plays more golf in two years than Eisenhower.
Deja Vu all over again IMO.
It’s this kind of PC horse dookey that will teach leaders to test the wind direction before making a command decision in extreme circumstances. More times than not that decision will be the wrong one. I weep for the future of our Armed Forces.
I
What Steve said
Having not read everythng extant on the subject–let alone talked with any of the survivors–I’m in no shape to be critical one way or the other–not to mention the fact that zoomies ain’t experts in land warfare. Nonetheless, it seems to be that the central question(s) to be asked are (1) Who made the decision to est. the outpost where it was and why?, and, following from the first (2) Was it regarded as a justified necessity even if the risk/combat environment was such to include the potential–however regrettable–for losing the outpost with all hands–and was this threat assessment transmitted up & down the chain of command? Or, alternatively, (3) was the risk assessment deemed to be more benign? I.e., faulty after the fact?
From what I can tell, despite the interim and final rpts, none of these questions have yet been completely and/or directly addressed/answered. Am I wrong?
In the Aubrey-Maturin series of books by Patrick O’Brian, wherein he created a fictional Captain Aubrey and his Ship’s Surgeon, Stephen Maturin, to carry out what were very real accomplishments and adventures of actual British Naval Officers as taken from Admiralty reports and ships logs, he pointed out that all Admiralty orders ended with the charge: “…nor you nor any of you may fail as you will answer the contrary at your Peril.” High expectations certainly led to huge accomplishments by the British Navy at sometimes huge costs. But the officers always knew that their actions would be harshly reviewed, particularly if they failed.
Firstly, and again, I re-post: read “Defense of Duffer’s Drift”.
Secondly – give our troopers the best damned rifle in the world – one that can reach out beyond what is coming in.
Heavenly Father, may those 9 Troopers Rest in Peace.
Boy you’re SO right about the need for long-range rifles/rounds with stopping/penetrating power. It’s not as if people couldn’t see the need coming–didn’t need a PhD in cartography/geography for that one..
PS: As I’ve harped here before on this subj., the Falklands War provided a prime recent prior object lesson–as if anyone should have needed one–in the need for Inf. to be equipped w. rifles w. long-range penetrating power over exposed terrain and long distances.
The M-1 Garand seemed to work rather well for a long time under the most trying of conditions.
Leadership seems stuck on the 5.56 though there were complaints from day one about the M-16 and the 5.56. Its not as though there is an only one gun solution. I’m afraid we will be living the VN War until long after I’m gone.
I’ve never read of a time where a G.I. didn’t bitch about weight (amongst food, weather, command and everything else): I’d rather see us improve armor, boots or other gear rather than provide weapons inappropriate or ineffective for the battle.
This smacks of the tried & true ” The Dead Guy did it…” excuse which shows a true lack of “Honor” in the Army Command Structure….They botched this and nine brave men paid for it with their lives…
I wish for once, we would see the intestinal fortitude of a true leader in these situations – a senior commnader among the 1-4 star idjits in charge stepping up and stating, ” We have reviewed what happened, and I failed to protect our soldiers. It is my fault and I take full responsibility.”
THAT would be what is required and expected – LEADERS willing to admit their failure, especially when it involves the loss of life experienced at WANAT….WHY, WHY, WHY can’t we get the people in charge to perform this simple but required act of Leadership, especially when it involves the very duty they were sworn to perform???
Sad, just sad.
It’s sad and it is more sad that a lot fail to understand. In war, soldiers and sailors die and it is not a crime. It is war.
Watch again, “We were Soldiers once; and young”. Where exactly did it say that anybody at any level of command was PERFECT AND GODLIKE?
Whenever the Army f’s up (examples abound) the question is always: will anyone alive and/or above the rank of Captain be blamed?
@Curtis: we don’t expect commanders to be PERFECT AND GODLIKE, just competent and to give a damn about their troops.
Wasn’t there. Don’t know anyone who was there. Nor have I read anything on this event up to this point so I can’t comment on any of the issues. I do know that there can be significant tactical factors that have to be weighed doing the METT-T analyis. I have been out of the tactical loop for quite a while now but all leaders from platoon on up have a level of discretion, (or should have).I recall several tactical scenerios where terrain is so hosed up that there could be several courses of action to implement, each with its own strengths and weaknesses but all require assuming a level of risk with each. The enemy is alway the variable. Most guys plan for the most likey enemy COA and assume risk should the enemy decide on executing his most dangerous(to your mission and unit)COA. Sometimes you are lucky, sometime’s not so much. I know the CAC gets paid to do these analyses, however, throwing someone under the bus, no matter what rank and position, for decisions that any of us could have made under the same circumstances is crap. What makes it all the more egregious is the fact that all the facts had not been gathered and evaluated.
Well Shaman,
I don’t know what to say. Are you thinking Husband and Kimmel? Firing every general senior to Eisenhower and Marshall? Firing MacArthur? Various AF generals who were fired in Vietnam?
Did you perchance see what the Army did to generals who failed to perform in WWII?
Oh! Say!, wasn’t there this LtCol who was fired in Iraq?!!!! He’s on the HASC.
there remains these little bitty things known as the fog of war and friction.
We would be much better off if WWII standards and practices were followed today. Beginning in Vietnam and continuing to this day, most services but especially the Army throw the JO’s and below under the bus and protect seniors. What was the rank of the most senior person who went to jail after Abu Graib? Was it even an officer? Fog of war and friction are things to be taken into account by senior officers, not excuses for inattention to events as they unfold and failure to supervise less experienced officers.
My grandmother was a nurse in the Canadian Army in France 1916-18.
She brought home a poignant collection of watercolors of bombed-out churches that had been damaged or destroyed in the fighting.
Seems we have no compunction about destroying churches but by all means mosques must be protected. What does that mean???
Just some perspective…
The highest ranking officer to lose their job over Abu Gharib was the Brigadier General in charge of the prison. And speaking as a former enlisted soldier, I think that was most likely an unjust firing. Mostly because in my opinion (which should NEVER be confused with facts) the misconduct rose no higher than a sadistic Staff Sergeant named Chip Frederick. Who, if you are not aware, was a reservist who worked as a prison guard in Virginia and is alleged (never proven in court) to have a history of abusing prisoners under his watch in the US. His claims of “the MI told us to ‘soften them up’” were nothing more than a BS smoke screen to cover for his misconduct. Do I think anyone in his Chain of Command knew it was going on? Honestly, no. The entire unit was overworked and understaffed, which is perfect conditions for a sadistic bastard like this to get his jollies.
SHOULD they have known? Yes, I think they had a responsibility to (it is the job of NCO’s to know what their soldiers are up to), but again, given the low levels of manpower and how spread thin the unit was at the prison, lack of oversight was inevitable. Should the Brigadier General have known? No, that’s unfair. I never once in my five years so much as SAW a star in my chain of command, much less had one know what I was doing. To expect such is unreasonable. Hell, in most units, my Battalion commander (a “mere” O-5) didn’t even know my name. BUT IT’S NOT HIS JOB TO EITHER!
Jimbo at BLACKFIVE is deeply into this, and as one of the mud-dwelling members of our world, I believe that his take on the situation is probably the best we will see.
Many of the decisions were made by those with their boots on the ground, and butts in the line of fire, and as Jimbo quoted one of the survivors, picked the least bad of all bad options.
When mission focus is on winning hearts and minds of civilians with minimal casualties, instead of killing bad guys, you get stuck putting small bands of troops near population centers instead of higher ground more easily defended against bad guys.
The really bad decisions were to engage in an ill-defined campaign with uncertain goals, inadequate resources, and a defined date of departure, and zero support from the Commander in Chief. The soldiers in country, and pretty much their chain of command through the theater commander are doing their best and many are true heroes.
There’s a new book about Pat Tillman, “Where Men Win Glory” (available in paperback at Target no less) which pretty much deals with a similar conclusion.
Of course halfway through it the author goes off the rails with Bush derangement, but other than that an interesting read…
One of the few books by Krakauer that I’ve no intention of reading.
Is it just me, or when an O-1 or O-2 is in charge, without resources and support, people fixate upon the tactical decisions, like the position of an OP, as an error causing the catastrophe? I guess things like air support, artillery, reinforcements, resupply, they really don’t have a bearing upon the battle quite like the position of an OP.
On the other hand, when there is an O-4 or O-5 in charge, suddenly resources become available, and even when defeated (say, Dunkirk, Market Garden, Little Bighorn) nobody yet has written about something as pithy as an observation post.
To my mind if there’s an O-1 in charge and he screws up, the fault lies with the person who placed him in charge and did not mentor him enough, educate him enough, train him enough, and above all support him enough so he could do his job properly. The O-2 is who should be offering resignation papers to the O-3 above him — and the O-3 should accept them. Increment numbers as required. When you give authority to a subordinate you either do so with full confidence in their ability or you don’t do it at all.
– Max
That O-1/2 probably has little experience on which to draw on – as has always been the case. (Unless they have come up through the ranks which is rare, now days; maybe a lesson learned in and of its self.) You hope to God that they have enough sense to listen to their senior NCO’s and have the opportunity to learn from their mistakes. History is rife with these occasions and is part of war. We do a better job now than the past through extensive training. Since the JO gave his own life is support of his troops/mistake, use it as a teachable lesson learned and move on. As for the senior officers, they seem to be too out of touch with reality.
Here’s a thought, why play the blame game at all? Is the purpose to help make sure the same mistakes aren’t made in the future (the point of an AAR) or to punish officers because things went wrong? I feel that too often the exercise seems focused around ending some careers in order to protect others, which is EXACTLY the wrong focus. Careers be damned, it’s the lives of the soldiers that matter.
I think that when you seek to assign blame for failure, you are making the assumption that all control rests in the hands of those “responsible” for the failure. And while that seems to be very fashionable in today’s litigious society, it’s patent nonsense. Part of why the Battle of Wanat was a “failure” was because of enemy action. Is the enemy now a passive factor? Are the enemy’s actions (because they refuse to act like popup targets in the real world) of no consequence? Sometimes one side loses, not because they made egregious errors, but because the other side made better decisions. Sure, with HINDSIGHT, we can say “if only Hood had pushed harder at Little Round Top, the CSA would have won the battle”. Does that mean that Hood made egregious errors he should have been fired for? Or does it mean that Joshua Chamberlain’s spirited defense made the difference?
I’m with Jimbo at Blackfive. I don’t see the fight for Wanat as a failure. I did read the interim report and have skimmed this one (I’ll read it completely as time allows.) The paratroopers, Marines and ANA soldiers that were there fought their butts off. They were put in a bad situation because of their mission (they needed to be near the village) and the enemy hit them at one of their most vulnerable times. Darn the enemy for not waiting until we were better prepared. They were outnumbered, in a very inferior tactical position, many of them had ineffective weapons and when it was all over they forced the enemy to break contact and held the field. Where I come from that is a victory. Were there many obstacles to overcome – yes. Was there a heavy price paid – yes. History is repleat with examples of victories that had a hefty cost (just ask the men of TAFFY3 about heavy prices).
There were plenty of mistakes made and I hope the Army (and Marine Corps) are able to learn from this and make the necessary changes to equipment, doctrine, training and maintenance that will allow our infantry to be more effective.
May the Lord bless those who gave all and give strength and comfort to those that remain.
In Oct, I had the wonderful opportunity to be asked to head the Annapolis for the USNI Conference. My provided lodgings enabled me to come across a yellowed 3×5″ card in front of the TV set. Notes used by a man who understood combat.
Some clear headed thinking from the mind of Col John Ripley, USMC, and they may provide some context here.
I’m with Uncle Jimbo on this one, they were given a tactical mission to hold the ground, they went thru hell to hold the terrain and were the ones left standing after a massive assault.
They Won.
I’m very sorry that they won at such a high cost but to try to apportion blame over this is demeaning to their memories.
Blame, if any, needs to be place at a political level for rules of engagement that constrain the use of our overwhelmingly superior firepower…but destroying the village to save it would not fit the mission profile.