VADM Venlet weighs in on the potentially fatal decision to execute concurrent “build and test” on the F-35 program:
“The analyzed hot spots that have arisen in the last 12 months or so in the program have surprised us at the amount of change and at the cost,” Vice Adm. David Venlet said in an interview at his office near the Pentagon. “Most of them are little ones, but when you bundle them all up and package them and look at where they are in the airplane and how hard they are to get at after you buy the jet, the cost burden of that is what sucks the wind out of your lungs. I believe it’s wise to sort of temper production for a while here until we get some of these heavy years of learning under our belt and get that managed right. And then when we’ve got most of that known and we’ve got the management of the change activity better in hand, then we will be in a better position to ramp up production.”
Venlet also took aim at a fundamental assumption of the JSF business model: concurrency. The JSF program was originally structured with a high rate of concurrency — building production model aircraft while finishing ground and flight testing — that assumed less change than is proving necessary.
“Fundamentally, that was a miscalculation,” Venlet said.
Sure looks that way.
But we had computers, and modeling/simulation, and that. And we were ever so much smarter. Everything was going to be different, this time.
It always is.
“Fundamentally, that was a miscalculation,” Venlet said.
Ya think???
Must be easy to sum it up that way when you are spending Billions of our tax dollars….whatever happened to leaner, meaner, cheaper, better???
It got eaten by a process-centric acquisition system.
Schedule for success. Where have I heard that before. Computers, modeling and simulation are only as good as the programers and engineers using those tools and the data that is input. Garbage in = Garbage out. Concurrency only works if you are willing to have a bitch of a modification line after Certification or equivalent testing is finished. Wait until you have actually finished flight test before ramping up production. What a novel concept. Guess what, the civilian world isn’t any better.
+1 to that one.
I’ll add a +1 as well. Price tags tend to go up on limited purchase orders. Its hard to ramp up to large purchase orders when you don’t know what will or won’t be in the system a year down the road.
I pity Venlet. He inherited this disaster, and is left trying to pick up the pieces.
There is something of a similarity between manufacture of both Naval equipment and Army equipment and civilian cars. During my years as pit crew for a race car, I listened carefully to the backchat that went on before, during and after the races. My race driver was brilliant about automobiles, if not about any other civilian activity, and I remember him saying something to the effect that when you buy a personal car, always select a car model which has been pretty much the same except for yearly refinements and minor changes in the model. So when I finally collected enough money to buy a Volvo [a car he highly recommended for its safety features and endurance] I picked the 1991 model which had been being refined and improved for the past ten years.
It was [and still is] a wonderful choice and gave me 20 years of wonderful service until this year, when I regretfully let her go to a dear friend who much admired her.
I guess I’m saying that tried and true excellence is what to look for in big investments, whether boats, planes or cars.
Marianne
P.S. The above also works with people, doesn’t it, Lex?
Marianne
Anyone remember the M247 Sergeant York air defense gun? Also known as Division Air Defense (DIVAD), Ford Aerospace sold it based on the ability to concurrently design, build and test. Finally killed by Cap Weinberger. Here’s an excerpt from Wikipedia:
“In February 1982 the prototype was demonstrated for a group of US and British officers at Fort Bliss, along with members of Congress and other VIPs. When the computer was activated, it immediately started aiming the guns at the review stands, causing several minor injuries as members of the group jumped for cover. Technicians worked on the problem, and the system was restarted. This time it started shooting towards the target, but fired into the ground 300 m in front of the tank. In spite of several attempts to get it working properly, the vehicle never successfully engaged the sample targets. A Ford manager claimed that the problems were due to the vehicle being washed for the demonstration and fouling the electronics.[18] In a report on the test, Easterbrook jokingly wondered if it ever rained in central Europe.[15]
As early production examples started rolling off the production line, the problems proved to be just as serious. One of the early models is reported to have locked onto a latrine fan, mistaking its return for a moving target of low-priority. Reporting on the incident in another article on the vehicle’s woes, Easterbrook reported that “During a test one DIVAD locked on to a latrine fan. Michael Duffy, a reporter for the industry publication Defense Week, who broke this aspect of the story, received a conference call in which Ford officials asked him to describe the target as a ‘building fan’ or ‘exhaust fan’ instead.”[19]
Read the whole thing at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M247_Sergeant_York
Simultaneous build and test, indeed!
chalkboard:
At “Bring the Heat…” there was a lengthy article about the M247. I think it is better than the Wikipedia article because it doesn’t refer to it as a tank. (“but fired into the ground 300 m in front of the tank.”)
Your point is well taken and the article you cite supports it well. I’m just really touchy about what is a tank and what isn’t. Being in an M109 Bn. can do that to you.
Paul
We need to stop initiating new designs after we decide the current kit is going to be replaced. DOD should be constantly spreading money around to purchase new designs. Then, when we decide the F-15 needs to be replaced we can pick the design that best suits our needs and shop it around to see who is actually going to build it. Make the procurement a binding contract. We pay X dollars for Y planes. Run behind schedule and your cash flow suffers. Cost overruns come out of your pocket, bid accordingly. Congress cancels the order you still get the contract termination fee.
As for right now, I think that between the F-15, F-16, and the F-18E/F/G we are pretty well sorted for fighter planes. We do need new airframes, but the fundamental designs are still first class. As for the AV-8, the Marines operated for 200 years without VSTOL, and I can’t think of a scenario where they would have to be operating outside the umbrella of carrier or land based aircraft.
We have two separate but intertwined problems here. One is systemic in terms of “concurrency” in build & test, which affects all programs; the other is the fact that two concepts–stealth and VSTOL–were way oversold. VSTOL is a pretty much useless concept today–even for recce in the digital download age–except for Marine embedded amphip Task Force AD, which the USMC is wisely buying British Harriers for.
At risk of repeating what has been said here many times before by many others, “stealth” is fine for first-engagement air-superiority and night-time strike, but for daylight “mud-moving” ops and cas when the other side can see you coming anyway, and besides, is often one of multiple repetitive sorties, one needs ord. carrying capacity–which stealth doesn’t afford–in fact forbids. The Navy’s desire for an advanced strike bird, married w. the AF’s need to spread the costs around for the 35 (ill advised concept in the original tho I believe it to be) mated with the Marines dogged insistence to remain independent from the clutches of the USAF “somehow” have all conspired to produce one of the most costly blivets known to man. Hadn’t anyone ever heard of the F-111? At least we got a superb all-wx long-range, low-level strike-fighter out of it. The 35? Not do much of anything, looks like. PAMDO fisked THAT bird here a long while back..
The Marines saw what happened to the Army with the loss of AAF and wanted nothing of it. I can’t say as I blame them.
At the same time, the Marines are a different class of force in that their purpose is different. The Marines are designed from the ground up as a shock force that goes in fast and hard. As a result they need people in the cockpits that are tuned to that philosophy, which the USAF is not. USAF doesn’t make the Army happy and I can’t see much chance of them doing any better with USMC either.
p.s. Agree with you completely on the mud mover stealth stuff. The B-2 is effective for the missions it was designed for, and I note it flies those missions when it is night over the target. Not so great if it’s day time.
Cook-Craigie, anyone? It’s all been tried, and failed, before.
I wonder if the F-35 is going to crater? 10-13 years ago I was arguing till I was blue in the face that the then JSF was a waste of time and resources and USAF should have pursued an F-22/advanced F-16 fleet. It would have been more affordable than this mess. I figured the F-22 would be gutted because of the wondrous F-35 following, and then the F-35 would crater on failure to meet requirements, horrendous expense, and the basic foolhardiness of designing one airframe to meet 57 different missions.
It’s so hard being so right all the time. Not as if I was the only one, of course – again, this has all been tried and failed before.
It’s always seemed to me that the F-22 was strangely unpopular in Congress and even DoD. Not sure why……it’s almost like it’s too good. The apotheosis of 20th century American airpower. “Unfair.”
Whatevs.
More like too good to be true. Acquisition seems to be more and more like a set of pipe dreams put to paper then shopped around.
I was chatting with a colleague (Army colonel) just a bit ago about the DIVAD fiasco. At the time he was at West Point and I was getting to retire. The Army acquisition strategy was “give Ford the money and get out of the way.” No testing beyond what the contractor saw as necessary, which was sterile testing indeed. When we trapped the Army into conducting IOT&E after three LRIP lots, the dirty battlefield quickly demonstrated what a disaster a gun on an old tank chassis (M48A5) on a dusty battlefield could not break out hovering attack helos from the ground clutter and the laser rangefinder couldn’t see more than a couple hundred yards. “Get out of the way” indeed.
JSF never had the “no-test” strategy. Highly integrated DT/OT yes, but that’s not a bad thing. What’s causing Venlet’s tummyaches is unexpected flaws in the design when they’re already in high LRIP. Keeping the horde of engineers on the payroll for years extra costs a bundle, but they’ve got to get the design right. The services and allied partners have little other realistic choice.
TC
My fear is that costs will continue to soar to the point the program will have to be terminated for lack of funds to complete it. There may be no realistic choice, but things can turn to the point there is no hardware to dispense.
Well, yeah. We’re all fearful of potential draconian cuts. But JSF will be one of the last to fall under the knife. They’re like the V-22 program was in 2003-2004 or so. Recovering from near-mortal wounds, but with great potential to produce a marvel of aircraft that costs a lot to buy and fly.
TC