The US military has a “can do” culture. When assigned a mission, the question is not whether it is a good idea, or whether it is even achievable, but how to get the mission done, preferably with minimum casualties to own forces. That’s the way you fight and win, from the squad level up to corps. Failure is not an option, not for the men in the field, not for those who command them.
In between the grunts with muddy boots and the generals in their hooches, there are countless layers of intermediaries. A platoon leader may tell his company commander that his troops are being wasted, the company commander in turn will tell his battalion commander that he needs more resources, the battalion commander will report to his brigade commander that the troops are struggling manfully with the resources at hand, and the brigade commander will report to the division staff that the fight is being manfully taken to the enemy. Division tells corps that things are looking up, and that there is a light at the end of the tunnel. Which, in the case of Afghanistan, is somewhere between the summer of 2013 and the end of 2014. This is by no means a uniquely military facet of organizational culture.
Not everyone decides to play the game, including one Lieutenant Colonel Danny L. Davis, a veteran of four combat deployments and two to Afghanistan:
I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.
What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.
Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.
Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.
Lt. Col. Davis took the unusual step of publishing his critique of the Afghan campaign outside normal Army communications channels:
He wrote two reports, one unclassified and the other classified, summarizing his observations on the candor gap with respect to Afghanistan. He briefed four members of Congress and a dozen staff members, spoke with a reporter for The New York Times, sent his reports to the Defense Department’s inspector general — and only then informed his chain of command that he had done so…
“No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan,” he says in the article. “But we do expect — and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve — to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on…”
Last March, for example, Mr. Petraeus, then an Army general, testified before the Senate that the Taliban’s momentum had been “arrested in much of the country” and that progress was “significant,” though fragile, and “on the right azimuth” to allow Afghan forces to take the lead in combat by the end of 2014.
Colonel Davis fiercely disputes such assertions and says few of the troops believe them. At the same time, he is acutely aware of the chasm in stature that separates him from those he is criticizing, and he has no illusions about the impact his public stance may have on his career.
“I’m going to get nuked,” he said in an interview last month.
He may well too, although for now official Army responses have been muted. Time will tell, both for Lt. Col Davis, and for our efforts in Afghanistan.
I’ve met this guy, I just can’t think of where, but it was in a “not for attribution” environment. He has political top cover, and he’s just a reservist, much harder to punish. He’s also not a kid, he’s a fiftyish man independently professional–not reliant on the Army for his next paycheck.
Sorry, honey, don’t know what you mean with the smokescreen about “speaks truth to power,” but Petraeus has been BSing and getting away with it for a long time. Pwned.
Cautiously poking his beak around the corner
God speed the right! Good on Lt. Col. Davis!
Shades of Vietnam all over again…programmed failure, with how many tens of thousands of lives on the chopping block again?
Ducking back out
Mongo! Where you been man? Good to see you!
Mongo! WTH have you been! I see you’ve updated the blog for the first time since August, but we’ve been getting a bit worried, shall I say (more like I’m gonna hunt you down and choke you until you give us an adequate explanation for your AWOL status).
“I’m going to get nuked.”
When one does such things one has already made up one’s mind to put one’s papers in–maybe not at the beginning, but as the process (the Afghan tour in this case)runs its course, the inevitable conclusion slowly takes form–all that remains is the formality and timing of stopping by personnel..
Didn’t see Zane’s comment. Nevermind..
Yeah. He knows what’s coming, but he probably wasn’t going any higher than O-5 anywayz. If he was promotable, he ain’t now, so he may as well put in those papers and stay home.
McMaster was very close to this kind of analysis.
OBOT & his minions try to control the message as if voters know the ” real deal “, things would get ugly real quick for the sheister from Chicago.
Just like unemployment falling to 8.3% – REAL unemployment ( all those unemployed, underemployed & those who stopped getting benefits ) is really about 15%….That info isn’t shared by the media as it would be curtains for Mr. ” I deserve another term ”
IF OBAMA was working at any company in the US, his performance would have put him on the unemployment line two years ago….Time to go you feckless idiot.
Our Troops deserve better, our country deserves better.
OMG – Obama Must GO !!!!
I understand the concept of civilian control of the military, and I understand that the flag officers report to the President and are responsible for supporting the administrations policies.
I even understand how to shade your facts in order to support that policy decision.
But I cannot understand why there is such a deafening silence about the conduct of the mess in Afghanistan. At what point do people look into the mirror and say, I need to be honest in my testimony…In fact, if you’re giving sworn testimony, wouldn’t you think that would be a time for honesty?
It seems to require someone like LTC Davis, who as a reservist with Capital Hill connections is almost immune to retaliation, to come along and say anything.
glad you posted this. Reminds me of Westmoreland and vietnam–bodycounts proved success (until Tet). Remember the general who scoffed at the Bush administration’s minimal cost of occupying Iraq at a congressional hearing? While he was absolutely right he quickly was pushed out of the Army. Whistleblowers in the private worls fare similarly. I think with all the pending budget cuts, the army hierarchy is starting to distance itself from the surge orthodoxy and try to avoid blame. The author’s lack of punishment means something.
Eric Shinseki
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Shinseki
Some things never change. The disconnect between reality and the troops at the tip of the spear and the PR effort on the home front has always been around to one degree or another. Slightly tangential is a humorous take on this is the famous “What the Capt Really Meant” tape from Vietnam spoofing PR types sugar-coating fighter-pilot talk. Listen@ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQ1AYVcAS7k
Do you still get royalties for this? This is like the 79th time you’ve recommended it. Still funny, though.
He must get royalties for every view.
VX, Flippen priceless…it was indeed a fu*ked up war…no matter which way her runway ran. Best
Welcome to the top of the RIF list. And kiss them eagles good-bye.
James – I understand the “Shinseki was fired for telling the truth” meme – especially popular on the left, but not factual. Shinseki’s retirement after a single term as Army COS was named in May, 2002, after officers on the Army legislative affairs staff attempted to lobby Congress for the Crusader self propelled howitzer system – which was cancelled that spring by DOD leadership. His testimony about troop levels required was in February, 2003. Your cause and effect are temporally impossible.
trying to imagine if W was still in office how this would be reported…..